CLD-092 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 15-3723
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IN RE: KIM RAGLAND,
Petitioner
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On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
(Related to D.N.J. Civ. No. 1-14-cv-00458)
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Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
December 22, 2015
Before: FISHER, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 13, 2016)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
Kim Ragland, a New Jersey state prisoner, presents a petition for writ of
mandamus requesting that we compel the District Court to rule on a motion for summary
judgment that the Defendants have filed in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. We will deny the
petition.
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
In January 2014, Ragland filed a complaint in the District Court against New
Jersey Department of Corrections officials Gary M. Lanigan, Evelyn Davis, Debra
Quinones, and Lydell Sherer, alleging that they improperly withdrew funds from his
inmate account in violation of his equal protection and due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. In June 2014, the District Court dismissed all claims as to
Defendant Sherer. The District Court also dismissed Ragland’s equal protection claim
against the remaining Defendants, but permitted his due process claim against those
Defendants to proceed.
On September 11, 2015, after discovery closed, the Defendants moved for
summary judgment. On October 5, 2015, Ragland filed a response opposing the motion
for summary judgment. The Defendants filed a reply brief the following month. Ragland
asks us to direct the District Court to rule on the Defendants’ summary judgment motion,
asserting that it has been pending for “more than two years.”
A writ of mandamus is a drastic remedy available only in extraordinary cases. See
In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005). To obtain
mandamus relief, a petitioner must show that “(1) no other adequate means exist to attain
the relief he desires, (2) the party’s right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable,
and (3) the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 588
U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Ragland has not made that showing here.
2
Although we may issue a writ of mandamus when a district court’s “undue delay
is tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction,” Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d
Cir. 1996), that situation is not present here. Contrary to Ragland’s assertion, the pending
summary judgment motion has been ripe for disposition only since November 2015. Cf.
id. (determining that eight months of inaction on petitioner’s motions was insufficient to
compel mandamus relief). We are fully confident that the District Court will rule on the
Defendants’ summary judgment motion without undue delay. In light of the above, we
will deny Ragland’s mandamus petition.
3