United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
June 2, 2003
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 02-41261
Summary Calendar
ROXANNE HAUSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF MCKINNEY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
(01-CV-8)
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Roxanne Hausey appeals from the district court's decision
granting summary judgment to the City of McKinney. Hausey
contends that she had a property interest in her continued
employment as an Office Assistant and that she was terminated from
that position without due process in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In addition, Hausey contends that the city’s refusal to
conduct a name-clearing hearing violated her Fourteenth Amendment
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
liberty interests. We find that Hausey did not have a property
interest in her employment with the City, and therefore her
termination did not violate her due process rights. We also find
that Hausey failed to provide any evidence that the City made the
reasons for her termination public, and thus she was not entitled
to a name-clearing hearing. We therefore affirm.
I.
We review a district court's decision to grant a motion for
summary judgment de novo.1 Summary judgment shall be granted if
the record, taken as a whole, “show[s] that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.”2
State law controls our analysis of whether Hausey had a
property interest in her employment sufficient to entitle her to
due process protection.3 The City’s contention that Hausey began
her employment with the City as an at-will employee is not
disputed. Nevertheless, she asserts that “the City’s policies and
practices establish [that she] had a property interest in her
position” with the City. Hausey does not cite to any specific
policy, written or otherwise, in her brief or her response to the
City’s summary judgment motion. While her complaint quotes
1
Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1109 (5th
Cir.1991).
2
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
3
See McDonald v. City of Corinth, 102 F.3d 152, 155 (5th Cir. 1996).
2
language from the Employee Handbook listing the kinds of offenses
for which an employee may be discharged, she fails to explain how
this creates the requisite interest in her continued employment.
It is well-settled that Texas is an at-will employment state
and that, absent an express agreement to the contrary, employment
may be terminated at any time by either party with or without
cause.4 A handbook or policy manual may modify the at-will
relationship if it specifically and expressly curtails the
employer's right to terminate the employee.5 Hausey fails to cite
to any evidence in the record which establishes that the City’s
right to fire her at-will was in any way curtailed. Absent a
property interest, no right to due process exists.6 Therefore,
summary judgement was appropriate.
II.
To prevail on her claim that the City infringed upon a
cognizable liberty interest by denying her the opportunity to clear
her name, Hausey must show: (1) that she was discharged; (2) that
stigmatizing charges were made against her in connection with the
discharge; (3) that the charges were false; (4) that she was not
provided notice or an opportunity to be heard prior to her
discharge; (5) that the charges were made public; (6) that she
4
Id. at 156.
5
Id.
6
See Moore v. Miss. Valley State Univ., 871 F2.d 545, 548 (5th Cir. 1989).
3
requested a hearing to clear her name; and (7) that the employer
refused her request for a hearing.7
At a minimum, Hausey has failed to raise any factual issue
with regard to element (5). The only time the charges were made
public was when the City furnished details of Hausey’s discharge to
the Texas Workforce Commission to support its position that Hausey
had been fired for misconduct and was therefore disqualified from
receiving benefits. However, this disclosure occurred after Hausey
had already disclosed in detail to the Workforce Commission that
she had been discharged for misconduct. We have expressly held
that “there is no liability when the agency has carefully kept the
charges confidential and the plaintiff caused them to be made
public.”8 We therefore agree with the district court that summary
judgment is appropriate because there is no genuine issue of
material fact with respect to the public disclosure element of
Hausey’s claim.
III.
The district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the
City of McKinney is AFFIRMED.
7
See Hughes v. City of Garland, 204 F.3d 223, 226 (5th Cir. 2000).
8
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
4