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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-12803
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 6:15-cr-00014-ACC-TBS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
REYES PEREZ-ASTUDILLO,
a.k.a. Mario R. Astudillo,
a.k.a. Reyes Perez,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(January 14, 2016)
Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Reyes Perez-Astudillo appeals his 24-month sentence, imposed at the low-
end of the advisory guideline range, after pleading guilty to one count of illegal
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reentry of a previously deported alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and
(b)(1). On appeal, Perez-Astudillo argues that: (1) the district court plainly erred in
applying the 12-level enhancement for a felony “crime of violence” pursuant to
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii); and (2) the district court imposed a procedurally and
substantively unreasonable sentence. After careful review, we affirm.
When an appellant challenges the court’s application of a sentence
enhancement for the first time on appeal, we review for plain error. United States
v. Bonilla, 579 F.3d 1233, 1238 (11th Cir. 2009). To show plain error, the
defendant must show (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affected his
substantial rights. United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007).
If the defendant satisfies the three conditions, we may exercise our discretion to
recognize the error if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. For an error to be plain, it must be obvious
or clear under the current law at the time of appellate review. Johnson v. United
States, 520 U.S. 461, 467-68 (1997). “An error is not plain unless it is contrary to
explicit statutory provisions or to on-point precedent [from us] or the Supreme
Court.” United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1357 (11th Cir. 2009).
We review the sentence a district court imposes for “reasonableness,” which
“merely asks whether the trial court abused its discretion.” United States v. Pugh,
515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,
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351 (2007)). However, we review procedural reasonableness claims for plain error
where the defendant did not object on procedural grounds at sentencing. United
States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014).
First, we are unpersuaded by Perez-Astudillo’s claim that the district court
plainly erred in applying a 12-level enhancement to his sentence. If, prior to
deportation, Perez-Astudillo was convicted of a felony “crime of violence” without
receiving criminal history points, the guidelines provide for a 12-level
enhancement in offense level. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The Application
Notes to § 2L1.2(b)(1) define a “crime of violence” as any of several enumerated
offenses (including aggravated assault) or “any offense under federal, state, or
local law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, comment.
(n.1(B)(iii)). Prior convictions that qualify as crimes of violence for purposes of §
2L1.2 “include the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting, to
commit such offenses.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 comment. (n.5). When determining
whether a prior conviction qualifies as a crime of violence, we generally use a
categorical approach, considering the offense as defined by the law, rather than
considering the facts of the specific violation. United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d
1347, 1350 (11th Cir. 2008). We are bound by a state’s supreme court precedent
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when interpreting state law, including its determination of the elements of the
statute at issue. Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 138 (2010).
Under New York penal law, assault in the second degree is committed when:
(1) “[w]ith intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes such
injury to such person or to a third person; or (2) [w]ith intent to cause physical
injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person
by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument …” N.Y. Penal Law
§ 120.05. Criminal attempt is committed when, “with intent to commit a crime, he
engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime.” N.Y.
Penal Law § 110.00. The New York definition of criminal attempt “was not
intended to eliminate the … requirement that an attempt come very near to the
accomplishment of the intended crime before liability could be imposed.” People
v. Mahboubian, 543 N.E.2d 34, 42 (N.Y. 1989) (quotation omitted). The Model
Penal Code’s definition of attempt provides that:
[a] person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind
of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime, he …
purposely does … anything that, under the circumstances as he believes
them to be, is an act … constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct
planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.”
Model Penal Code § 5.01(1)(c).
In this case, the district court did not plainly err in applying the 12-level
enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). Among other things,
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Perez-Astudillo has not cited any binding authority or explicit statutory provisions
in his brief holding that an attempt under New York law does not fall within the
generic definition of attempt under § 2L1.2. Schultz, 565 F.3d at 1357. Instead,
both definitions require that Perez-Astudillo perform conduct that was quite
significant in order to be convicted of an attempt offense. Mahboubian, 543
N.E.2d at 42; N.Y. Penal Law § 110.00; Model Penal Code § 5.01(1)(c). Thus,
because New York Penal law § 120.05(2) includes an element regarding the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,
Perez-Astudillo’s prior attempt conviction under this law qualifies as a § 2L1.2
“crime of violence.” § 2L1.2, comment. (n.1(B)(iii)), (n.5).
We also find no merit to Perez-Astudillos’s claim that his sentence was
unreasonable. In reviewing sentences for reasonableness, we typically perform
two steps. Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1190. First, we “‘ensure that the district court
committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or
improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory,
failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence -- including an
explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.’” Id. (quoting Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). “[T]he sentencing [court] should set forth
enough to satisfy the appellate court that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments
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and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.”
United States v. Agbai, 497 F.3d 1226, 1230 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted).
When a district court considers the § 3553(a) factors, it need not state on the record
that it has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors, or discuss the role
that each played in the sentencing decision. United States v. Dorman, 488 F.3d
936, 938 (11th Cir. 2007). Indeed, we have held that “an acknowledgment by the
district court that it has considered the defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a)
factors will suffice.” Id.
If we conclude that the district court did not procedurally err, we consider
the “‘substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-
discretion standard,’” based on the “‘totality of the circumstances.’” Pugh, 515
F.3d at 1190 (quoting Gall, 552 U .S. at 51). “[W]e will not second guess the
weight (or lack thereof) that the [court] accorded to a given [§ 3553(a)] factor ... as
long as the sentence ultimately imposed is reasonable in light of all the
circumstances presented.” United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 872 (11th Cir.
2010) (quotation, alteration and emphasis omitted). We will not reweigh the
relevant § 3553(a) factors, and will not remand for resentencing unless the district
court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by
imposing a sentence outside the range of reasonable sentences. United States v.
Langston, 590 F.3d 1226, 1237 (11th Cir. 2009).
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The party challenging the sentence bears the burden to show it is
unreasonable. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).
While we do not automatically presume a sentence falling within the guideline
range to be reasonable, we ordinarily expect that sentence to be reasonable. United
States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). A sentence imposed well
below the statutory maximum penalty is another indicator of reasonableness.
United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008).
Here, Perez-Astudillo’s procedural reasonableness claim is subject only to
plain error review, because he did not object to his sentence on procedural
reasonableness grounds below. Perez-Astudillo has not demonstrated that his total
sentence is procedurally unreasonable. As the record shows, the district court
considered the parties’ arguments and had a reasoned basis for exercising its own
legal decisionmaking authority. The court also adequately explained why it gave
Perez-Astudillo a guideline sentence. Further, the court’s reliance on Perez-
Astudillo’s statement about returning to the United States was not inappropriate,
since the statement impacted the court’s consideration of §§ 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7) and
§ 3553(a)(2). In particular, his statement related to the nature and circumstances of
his offense and his history and characteristics. See § 3553(a)(1). His statement
also impacted the need for the sentence imposed to promote respect for the law, to
provide just punishment, and to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.
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See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). Perez-Astudillo wanted to enter the United States
again, care for his family, and essentially reoffend. Further, even though he had
been previously deported, he still intended to return to the United States, which
highlighted his lack of respect for the law and inadequate deterrence. Thus, the
district did not improperly rely on this statement in imposing the sentence.
Nor has Perez-Astudillo shown that his sentence was substantively
unreasonable in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. The district court
said on the record that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors when deciding its
sentence. Although the court placed specific emphasis on Perez-Astudillo’s
intention to return to the United States and potentially reoffend, the record
indicated that it did not do so to the detriment of the other § 3553(a) factors. The
district court was aware of his personal history and the age of his prior conviction
prior to imposing his sentence, and the weight to be given to a particular factor is
within the discretion of the court. Moreover, as we’ve noted, there is no
requirement that the district court state on the record that it had explicitly
considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors.
In addition, the court’s sentence of 24 months represented the lowest end of
the applicable guideline range of 24 to 30 months, and we ordinarily expect such a
sentence to be reasonable. The sentence was also well below the 10-year statutory
maximum penalty, an indicator of reasonableness.
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AFFIRMED.
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