This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-0744
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Shawn Theodore Hoshal,
Appellant.
Filed January 19, 2016
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge*
Itasca County District Court
File No. 31-CR-14-1354
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
John J. Muhar, Itasca County Attorney, Todd Webb, Assistant County Attorney, Grand
Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Smith, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.
*
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
KLAPHAKE, Judge
Appellant asserts that he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea to first-degree driving
while impaired (DWI), arguing that his plea was not intelligently made because he was not
notified of the mandatory conditional-release term until after sentencing. Because
appellant was given sufficient notice of the mandatory conditional-release term, we affirm.
DECISION
A defendant must be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea at any time if it is
“necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. “A manifest
injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn.
2010). We review the denial of a plea-withdrawal motion under the manifest injustice
standard de novo because “[a]ssessing the validity of a plea presents a question of law.”
Id. To be valid, a guilty plea “must be accurate, voluntary and intelligent.” State v. Trott,
338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983). Hoshal challenges only the intelligence requirement,
which “ensures that a defendant understands . . . the consequences of his plea.
‘Consequences’ refers to a plea’s direct consequences, namely the maximum sentence.”
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96 (citations omitted).
Before accepting a guilty plea for a felony DWI offense, the district court must
“ensure defense counsel has told the defendant and the defendant understands . . . [that] a
mandatory period of conditional release will be imposed to follow any executed prison
sentence.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01, subd. 1(6)(k). “[A] conditional-release term for the
statutorily enumerated offenses is mandatory and nonwaivable.” State v. Henthorne, 637
2
N.W.2d 852, 855 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. Mar. 27, 2002). Any sentence
that omits a mandatory conditional-release period is therefore unauthorized. State v.
Humes, 581 N.W.2d 317, 319 (Minn. 1998). But an unauthorized sentence may be
modified when a defendant “has notice that a correction is required and has not developed
a crystallized expectation as to the finality of the sentence.” Martinek v. State, 678 N.W.2d
714, 718 (Minn. App. 2004).
Hoshal pleaded guilty to first-degree driving while impaired, based on three or more
qualified prior driving incidents; driving after cancellation; driving without insurance; and
expired registration. During the plea colloquy, Hoshal stated that he understood the
sentence was a presumptive commit to prison for 54 months, with a range between 46 and
64 months. The presentence investigation ordered by the district court did not note the
mandatory conditional-release period in the recommendation or in the “Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Review.” But the sentencing worksheet stated that the presumptive
sentence was 54 months, with a range of 46-64 months, and noted that a conditional-release
period of five years applied if the sentence was executed. The district court imposed an
executed 54-month sentence for the first-degree DWI with concurrent sentences for the
other counts.
One week later, at the district court’s initiative, the district court held a second
sentencing hearing to correct Hoshal’s sentence by adding the mandatory five-year
conditional-release period. Immediately before the hearing, Hoshal formally moved to
withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that he was unaware of the conditional-release
period. The district court subsequently denied the motion, concluding that Hoshal’s plea
3
was accurate, voluntary, and intelligent because he received adequate notice that he would
be subject to a conditional-release period.
Hoshal asserts that his plea is invalid because the conditional-release term was
added to his sentence after he pleaded guilty in exchange for a definite sentence. See, e.g.,
State v. Wukawitz, 662 N.W.2d 517, 520 (Minn. 2003) (holding that a district court may
allow a defendant to withdraw a plea “in those limited circumstances where imposition of
a conditional-release term after sentencing would violate the plea agreement”). But Hoshal
pleaded guilty without any kind of sentencing agreement. Nothing in the record supports
Hoshal’s assertion that he pleaded “with the expectation that he would receive no more
than the presumptive guidelines range.” Cf. State v. Garcia, 582 N.W.2d 879, 882 (Minn.
1998) (holding that where the specific sentence promised by the prosecution did not include
the mandatory conditional-release term, the promise was unauthorized by law and the
defendant must be allowed to withdraw the plea).
Hoshal next argues that he received inadequate notice of the mandatory conditional-
release term. Despite the requirement that the court “ensure” a defendant understands there
is a mandatory conditional-release term,
[t]he supreme court has consistently held that, when a
defendant is informed of a possible conditional-release term
before sentencing, even if that term is not in the plea agreement
or sentence, the defendant has sufficient notice of the
consequences of the plea and the plea will be considered . . .
intelligent.
4
Kubrom v. State, 863 N.W.2d 88, 93 (Minn. App. 2015). Here, the specific length of the
conditional-release period was noted on Hoshal’s sentencing worksheet,1 and Hoshal did
not agree to a specific period of incarceration in exchange for a guilty plea. Moreover, the
district court gave Hoshal notice that correction is required and corrected the sentence one
week after the original sentence was imposed. Thus, Hoshal did not have a crystallized
expectation of finality in the sentence. See State v. Calmes, 632 N.W.2d 641, 649 (Minn.
2001) (holding that defendant’s sentence was properly modified to include a conditional-
release term even after defendant was placed upon supervised release because he “knew or
should have known” there was a mandatory conditional-release period based on applicable
statutes and caselaw). We conclude that because the conditional-release term was
mandatory and nonwaivable, and because the sentencing worksheet gave Hoshal proper
notice of the mandatory conditional-release period, Hoshal’s plea was intelligent.
Therefore, Hoshal’s plea is valid and the district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Hoshal’s motion to withdraw his plea.
Affirmed.
1
Additionally, the sentencing memorandum Hoshal’s counsel submitted to the district
court prior to the first sentencing hearing noted that if Hoshal’s “sentence is executed it is
subject to a 5-year term of conditional release.”
5