In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of S.J. v. Eskenazi Health (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jan 20 2016, 6:22 am

regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Darren Bedwell Anna Kirkman
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In The Matter of the Civil January 20, 2016
Commitment of S.J., Court of Appeals Cause No.
Appellant, 49A02-1505-MH-390
Appeal from the Marion Superior
v. Court
The Honorable Steven Eichholtz,
Eskenazi Health, Judge
Appellee. Trial Court Cause No.
49D08-0905-MH-21678

Barnes, Judge.

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 Case Summary
[1] S.J. appeals her involuntary civil commitment. We affirm.

Issue
[2] S.J. raises one issue, which we restate as whether there is sufficient evidence to

support the trial court’s determination that she is gravely disabled.

Facts
[3] In 2009 and 2010, S.J. was hospitalized because of mental health issues. In

January 2015, S.J.’s family sought an emergency detention after S.J.

disappeared for three months and returned acting as if nothing had happened.

S.J. was wearing the same clothes she was wearing when she left. S.J. received

inpatient care but was resistant to treatment. She was then placed in temporary

respite care to create a discharge plan. Because of concerns about S.J.’s ability

to care for herself, a petition requesting an extension of S.J.’s commitment was

filed. Following a hearing, the trial court concluded that S.J. was gravely

disabled and extended S.J.’s commitment. S.J. now appeals.

Analysis
[4] S.J. argues there is insufficient evidence that she is gravely disabled.1 “The

liberty interest at stake in a civil commitment proceeding goes beyond a loss of

1
Although S.J. mentions a patient’s right to judicial review of a proposed treatment plan, we consider this to
be part of her overall challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and not a separate issue.

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 one’s physical freedom, and given the serious stigma and adverse social

consequences that accompany such physical confinement, a proceeding for an

involuntary civil commitment is subject to due process requirements.” Civil

Commitment of T.K. v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 27 N.E.3d 271, 273 (Ind. 2015).

To satisfy the requirements of due process, the facts justifying an involuntary

commitment must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that not only

communicates the relative importance our legal system attaches to such a

decision, but also has the function of reducing the chance of inappropriate

commitments. Id.

[5] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 12-26-2-5(e), a petitioner is required to prove

by clear and convincing evidence that “(1) the individual is mentally ill and

either dangerous or gravely disabled; and (2) detention or commitment of that

individual is appropriate.” “Gravely disabled” is defined as:

a condition in which an individual, as a result of mental illness, is
in danger of coming to harm because the individual:

(1) is unable to provide for that individual’s food, clothing,
shelter, or other essential human needs; or

(2) has a substantial impairment or an obvious deterioration of
that individual’s judgment, reasoning, or behavior that results in
the individual’s inability to function independently.

Ind. Code § 12-7-2-96. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we will

affirm if, considering only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences

supporting it, without weighing evidence or assessing witness credibility, a
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 reasonable trier of fact could find the necessary elements were proven by clear

and convincing evidence. T.K., 27 N.E.3D at 273.

[6] S.J. claims that, although she does not behave as her family and doctors would

like her to, there is scant evidence that she is unable to provide for her own

needs or function independently. To the contrary, the evidence shows that S.J.

suffers from schizophrenia and is “extremely paranoid.” Tr. p. 10. When she

arrived at the hospital, S.J. was “slightly malnourished, disheveled, with poor

hygiene, very confused and disorganized.” Id. at 9. While hospitalized, S.J.

refused to let medical students interview her, rarely let her doctor into her

room, and only ate packaged food. Her doctor testified that there is no depth or

substance to S.J.’s conversations, with S.J. repeatedly stating she is “perfectly

fine” and “doesn’t need medication.” Id. at 11. S.J. “believes that she has

nothing wrong with her and does not need any assistance finding housing,

getting an income, receiving treatment. She wants to do everything on her own

and we just believe that at this time she’s too sick to do that.” Id.

[7] As examples of S.J.’s behavior, the doctor stated that S.J. spent hours on the

phone trying to buy a plane ticket to Mexico and trying to obtain a bank loan

by posing as a hospital employee. S.J. refused offers to help pay for medication

and waited five or six weeks to agree to receive Medicaid assistance. The

doctor explained that S.J. will not change her clothes and suggested that S.J.

had gone a year without changing her clothes. S.J. also refused to allow a

medical exam despite her doctor’s concerns about S.J.’s leg, which had a sore

and appeared swollen. According to her doctor, when asked how she will

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 provide for herself, S.J. says she will “sell stuff” but offers no “solid information

to help . . . her own discharge plan.” Id. at 14. S.J. is also reluctant to take

medication to treat her mental illness and has been off of her medication for five

years. Her doctor testified that S.J. will not voluntarily take medication. S.J.’s

doctor testified that S.J. is “[a]bsolutely” gravely disabled. Id. at 13. She also

testified that S.J.’s reasoning and judgment are so impaired that she is

“[a]bsolutely” at risk of harm. Id. at 15.

[8] This is consistent with S.J.’s testimony that she disagrees with the

schizophrenia diagnosis and does not feel like she needs medication. S.J.

testified that she could get money by selling her things, connecting with her

church, and asking her cousin. S.J. did not specify where she had been living

prior to her hospitalization in January but suggested she was spending time in

libraries and train stations. Regarding her three-month absence from

Indianapolis, S.J. described traveling to Flint, Michigan, via bus and train,

packing only a few items, and not washing her clothes during that time.

[9] This evidence, including her own testimony, shows that S.J. is unwilling to

accept that she suffers from schizophrenia and to treat her disease. She is also

unwilling to take help when it is offered to her. Further, S.J. does not have

financial resources to support herself and could not offer a clear plan for

obtaining housing and continuing treatment upon her release from the hospital.

This is clear and convincing evidence that, as a result of her mental illness,

there is a danger of harm coming to S.J. because she is unable to provide food,

clothing, shelter, and other essential needs and because of an obvious

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 deterioration of her judgment and reasoning. There is sufficient evidence to

support the civil commitment.

Conclusion
[10] There is clear and convincing evidence that S.J. is gravely disabled. We affirm.

[11] Affirmed.

[12] Robb, J., and Altice, J., concur.

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