FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JAN 20 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CINDY ORELLANA, No. 13-56369
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:12-cv-01944-MMM-
CW
v.
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, local MEMORANDUM*
public entity; DEPUTY V. FELIX,
individually and in her official capacity,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 22, 2015
Pasadena, California
Before: RAWLINSON and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges and PONSOR,** Senior
District Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Michael A. Ponsor, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
Cindy Orellana appeals a final judgment, issued after a jury trial, dismissing
her claims for, inter alia, false arrest in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
The district court did not misstate the law in its jury instructions, including
the instruction challenged by Orellana which allowed the jury to find that Deputy
Felix had probable cause to arrest based on any of five offenses (two controlled
substance offenses and three traffic violations). Gantt v. City of Los Angeles, 717
F.3d 702, 706 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[J]ury instructions must fairly and adequately
cover the issues presented, must correctly state the law, and must not be
misleading.”) (quotation and citation omitted). “An officer may arrest an
individual without violating the Fourth Amendment if there is probable cause to
believe that the offender has committed even a very minor criminal offense in the
officer’s presence.” Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 322 (2001).
Although California law may prohibit arrest for certain traffic “infractions,” such
violations may nevertheless support probable cause for arrest under the Fourth
Amendment: “[W]hile States are free to regulate [warrantless] arrests however they
desire, state restrictions do not alter the Fourth Amendment’s protections.”
Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008); see also Martinez-Medina v. Holder,
2
673 F.3d 1029, 1037 (9th Cir. 2011); Edgerly v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco,
599 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir. 2010).
Orellana’s arguments that the factual characteristics of her arrest require a
different formulation of the jury instructions regarding probable cause are similarly
unavailing. First, Orellana contends that the traffic stop was already complete at
the time of her arrest, but she failed to present an unlawful detention claim to the
jury and she does not challenge on appeal the district court’s decision prohibiting
her from doing so, and thus the cases she cites in support of this point are
inapposite.1 Second, Orellana alleges misconduct by Deputy Felix relating to the
controlled substances offenses, but even if true this would not necessarily render
the arrest impermissible under the Fourth Amendment because “probable cause
supports an arrest so long as the arresting officers had probable cause to arrest the
suspect for any criminal offense, regardless of their stated reason for the arrest.”
1
The record does not support Orellana’s argument that the on-scene
resolution of the traffic offense was clearly over before the arrest occurred. Deputy
Felix and Orellana offered conflicting testimony regarding the arrest, but even
Orellana’s version—that Deputy Felix handed her the traffic citation to sign and
then confronted her with evidence relating to the controlled substances
offenses—indicates that the situation was highly fluid and does not establish a
clear break between the traffic stop and the arrest. Under these circumstances we
cannot say that the lower court’s instruction that the arrest would be lawful if the
officer had probable cause to arrest based on one or more of the traffic violations
was incorrect.
3
Edgerly, 599 F.3d at 954 (emphasis added); see also Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S.
146, 153-55 (2004).
AFFIRMED.
4