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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JAMES NAUGHTON
Appellant No. 607 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered March 10, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No: CP-02-CR-0007535-2007
BEFORE: OLSON, STABILE, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: JANUARY 20, 2016
Appellant, James Naughton, appeals pro se from the trial court’s March
10, 2015 order dismissing his third petition pursuant to the Post Conviction
Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We affirm.
On March 15, 2008, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to two
counts each of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, statutory sexual
assault, aggravated indecent assault, unlawful contact with a minor,
corruption of minors, and indecent assault.1 That same day, the trial court
imposed a sentence of five to ten years of incarceration. Appellant did not
file post-sentence motions or a direct appeal.
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3123, 3122.1, 3125, 6318, 6301, and 3126 respectively.
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Appellant filed a timely first PCRA petition on September 11, 2008 but
later withdrew the petition. On January 5, 2012, Appellant filed a second
PCRA petition. The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s second petition on
April 19, 2012, and this Court dismissed the subsequent appeal for failure to
file a brief. On October 7, 2014, Appellant filed the instant petition, styled
as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The PCRA court treated Appellant’s
filing as a third, untimely PCRA petition and, after proper notice, dismissed it
without a hearing on March 10, 2015. This timely appeal followed.
Before we address the merits of Appellant’s arguments, we must
consider the PCRA’s jurisdictional timeliness provisions. Appellant
acknowledges that his petition is facially untimely because he did not file it
within one year of the date on which his judgment of sentence became final.
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). Appellant agues his petition qualifies for the
timeliness exception set forth in § 9545(b)(1)(iii) because the United States
Supreme Court announced a new constitutional right in Alleyne v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). The Alleyne Court held: “Any fact that,
by law, increases the minimum penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must
be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at
2155. On that basis, Appellant argues the five-year mandatory minimum of
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his sentence2 is illegal. He further argues that the United States Supreme
Court’s Alleyne opinion entitles him to avail himself of § 9545(b)(1)(iii).
We discern two fatal flaws in Appellant’s argument. First, Appellant’s
judgment of sentence became final well before June 17, 2013, the date the
United States Supreme Court decided Alleyne. In Commonwealth v.
Newman, 99 A.3d 86, 90 (Pa. Super. 2014), we explained that Alleyne will
apply to cases pending on direct appeal as of June 17, 2013. This Court’s
opinion in Commonwealth v. Riggle, 119 A.2d 1058 (Pa. Super. 2015),
provided a detailed explanation of why Alleyne does not apply retroactively
to cases pending on collateral review. Id. at 1066-68. Appellant cannot
rely on Alleyne to overcome the PCRA’s jurisdictional time bar.
Second, Appellant filed the instant petition more than one year after
Alleyne. The PCRA statute required Appellant to file his petition “within 60
days of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545(b)(2). Appellant’s petition, filed sixteen months after United States
Supreme Court announced its decision in Alleyne, does not qualify. The
PCRA court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain
Appellant’s petition.
Appellant also argues habeas corpus relief is available to him. We
disagree. The PCRA provides: “The action established in this subchapter
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2
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718(a)(1).
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shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all
other common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist
when this subchapter takes effect, including habeas corpus and coram
nobis.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (emphasis added). Thus, where a petitioner’s
claim is cognizable under the PCRA, the petitioner must proceed thereunder.
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 465-66 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Likewise, a court must treat such a petition as a PCRA petition regardless of
its title. Id.
This Court has held that Alleyne claims implicate the legality of a
sentence and therefore are cognizable under the PCRA. Newman, supra.3
Likewise, in Riggle the petitioner’s Alleyne challenge to his mandatory five-
year minimum sentence for IDSI was cognizable under the PCRA. Pursuant
to § 9542, therefore, the PCRA court correctly treated Appellant’s habeas
corpus petition as one filed pursuant to the PCRA.
Appellant argues, based on Chief Justice Castille’s concurring opinion
in Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 11-18 (Pa. 2013) (Castille,
C.J., concurring), that habeas corpus relief is available to him. In
Cunningham, Chief Justice Castille addressed difficulties that may arise if
the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct.
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3
This issue is currently pending before our Supreme Court.
Commonwealth v. Washington, ___ A.3d ___, 2015 WL 7763806 (Pa.
December 2, 2015).
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2455 (2012) is never held to apply retroactively. In Miller, the United
States Supreme Court held that mandatory sentences of life imprisonment
without parole for juvenile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment’s
proscription of cruel and unusual punishment. Addressing Miller, which as
of now does not apply retroactively, Chief Justice Castille wrote: “[A] new
federal rule, if sufficiently disruptive of state law—such as by requiring the
state to treat identically situated defendants differently—may pose an issue
of Pennsylvania constitutional law independent of the federal rule.”
Cunningham, 81 A.3d at 14 (Castille, C.J., concurring). The problem, in
other words, is that juvenile offenders convicted of first-degree murder
whose sentences were final prior to Miller will remain in prison for life
without the possibility of parole while others convicted of the same offense
will receive lesser punishments. Chief Justice Castille offered “tentative
thoughts” on how to remedy this inequity. Id. at 14. One such thought was
that “there is at least some basis for an argument that the claim is
cognizable via a petition under Pennsylvania’s habeas corpus statute[.]” Id.
at 18. Chief Justice Castille wrote only for himself in offering these
thoughts. At present, this Court remains bound by the case law set forth
above. We therefore affirm the order dismissing Appellant’s petition.
Order affirmed.
Judge Strassburger joins the memorandum.
Judge Olson concurs in the result.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/20/2016
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