FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 22 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAYMUNDO RODRIGUEZ and No. 13-56920
ADRIEL GUITRON,
D.C. No. 5:07-cv-00303-ABC-OP
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM*
CITY OF COLTON and ERIC FRASER,
individually and as an agent of the City of
Colton,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Audrey B. Collins, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted January 4, 2016
Pasadena, California
Before: M. SMITH, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
1. Appellants Raymundo Rodriguez and Adriel Guitron argue that the law
of the case doctrine precluded the district court from determining that their
employment discrimination action was frivolous. See Thomas v. Bible, 983 F.2d
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Page 2 of 3
152, 154 (9th Cir. 1993). We decline to reach that argument, as Appellants never
raised it in the district court. One of the principal purposes of the law of the case
doctrine is to conserve judicial resources that would otherwise be consumed by
relitigating issues that have already been decided. See Christianson v. Colt Indus.
Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 815–16 (1988). Because Appellants never
asserted law of the case as a defense in the district court, all of the judicial
resources the doctrine is designed to conserve have already been expended. We
therefore decline to consider Appellants’ law of the case argument for the first time
on appeal.
2. The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that
Appellants’ claims were frivolous. See Williams v. Chino Valley Indep. Fire Dist.,
347 P.3d 976, 977–80 (Cal. 2015). The City provided a legitimate, non-
discriminatory explanation for its decision to terminate Appellants, who produced
no evidence suggesting that the City’s reasons were pretextual. See Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142–43 (2000). On appeal,
Appellants attempt to defend the legitimacy of their claims primarily on the ground
that Eric Fraser was the person who initiated the process that led to their
termination, and that they presented evidence from which a jury could conclude
that Fraser was biased against Latinos. But even under the “cat’s paw” theory of
Page 3 of 3
liability, Appellants had to show that Fraser’s alleged racial bias was “a proximate
cause of the ultimate employment action.” Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411,
422 (2011). Appellants produced no evidence even remotely satisfying that
requirement. The record demonstrates that Ruben Arroyo and Daryl Parrish made
the decision to fire Appellants, and that they did so only after an independent
investigation revealed that Appellants had engaged in serious misconduct during
work hours. Appellants produced no evidence that Arroyo or Parrish were
motivated by racial bias.
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that
Appellants have the financial means to pay attorney’s fees. See Miller v. Los
Angeles Cty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 617, 619, 621 (9th Cir. 1987). The district
court applied the correct legal standard when it calculated the award, and it did not
clearly err in determining that Appellants failed to show that an order requiring
them to pay $400 per month toward that award would subject them to financial
ruin. See id. at 621.
AFFIRMED.