In the Matter of Paul Williams, Township of Lakewood

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0341-15T2

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

January 25, 2016
IN THE MATTER OF PAUL WILLIAMS,
TOWNSHIP OF LAKEWOOD APPELLATE DIVISION
________________________________

Submitted January 13, 2016 – Decided January 25, 2016

Before Judges Ostrer, Haas and Manahan.

On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service
Commission, Docket No. 2014-1750.

Mets Schiro & McGovern, LLP, attorneys for
appellant Paul Williams (Kevin P. McGovern,
of counsel and on the briefs; David M.
Bander, on the briefs).

Secare & Hensel, attorneys for respondent
Township of Lakewood (Steven Secare, on the
brief).

John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General,
attorney for respondent New Jersey Civil
Service Commission (Pamela N. Ullman, Deputy
Attorney General, on the statement in lieu of
brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

HAAS, J.A.D.

In this case of first impression in New Jersey, appellant

Paul Williams appeals, by leave granted, from the March 5, 2015

administrative decision of the Civil Service Commission (the
Commission) finding him guilty of insubordination for refusing to

comply with his employer's demand that he undergo a psychological

fitness-for-duty examination. Because we conclude that the

employer's order was not reasonably justified under the Americans

with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213, we

reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I.

We derive the following facts from the testimony and

documents presented at the hearing conducted in the Office of

Administrative Law (OAL). On November 3, 2004, appellant began

working as a truck driver for the Department of Public Works (the

DPW) of the Township of Lakewood (the Township).

On or about March 28, 2013, the Township manager received an

anonymous letter purportedly from a "[v]ery concerned employee at

Lakewood Public Works." The unsigned letter stated:

I am writing this letter because I am very
concerned about the mental well[-]being of
[appellant]. We as co-workers dread being
assigned with him and everyone knows he has
some sort of mental issues and I truly feel
it puts us all at risk with his tirades and
outbursts on a daily basis like the one he
had today with his union stewards [M.C.,
B.T., and P.R.] as well. The men and women
here at Lakewood public works deserve to come
to work and not be afraid of this man, we
deserve a hostile free working environment
and you as our employer are legally obligated
to provide us such. For years we have
complained about this man to former Director
[J.F.], to our current administration in

2 A-0341-15T2
 place now and it seems like a joke, it[']s
not. In 1992 there were over 750 workplace
killings and this is no laughing matter[;]
it's very real and very serious. [Appellant]
is a time bomb waiting to explode and he
needs help, and it's your responsibility to
ensure he gets it or provide some way for us
to feel safe at work. I truly hope there is
something you can do to ensure our safety,
please don't put the township[']s fear of
liability ahead of the employee's safety.

Thank you for your time[.]

For over eight months, the Township took no action

concerning the letter. On December 2, 2013, however, "the

Township advised appellant that he would be sent for a

psychological fitness-for-duty examination, and that if he did

not attend such an examination he would face disciplinary

action." Eight days later, the DPW director sent a letter to

appellant notifying him that an examination had been scheduled

for December 16, 2013, with "a follow-up meeting" set for

December 20, 2013. The letter warned appellant that the Township

would discipline him if he did not attend both appointments.

Appellant alleged that the examinations were not "job-

related and consistent with business necessity" under 42 U.S.C.A.

§ 12112(d)(4)(A) and, therefore, the Township could not demand

that he undergo them. Therefore, appellant did not attend either

evaluation.

3 A-0341-15T2
 On December 18, 2013, the Township served appellant with a

Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action seeking to remove him

from employment on charges of incompetency; inefficiency or

failure to perform duties; inability to perform duties; conduct

unbecoming a public employee; and "other sufficient cause" for

discipline. The specification for the charges stated that

appellant "failed to report for [the psychological fitness-for-

duty] examination contrary to a direct instruction from [his]

supervisors."

That same day, appellant requested a departmental hearing,

which was held on January 6, 2014. The Township rejected

appellant's contention that its demands were not permissible

under the ADA and issued a Final Notice of Disciplinary Action

terminating appellant's employment. Appellant appealed to the

Commission, which transmitted the matter to the OAL for a

contested case hearing.

At the OAL hearing, the Township presented the testimony of

one witness, the DPW director, who testified that he had worked

for the Township for thirty-two years and was familiar with

appellant's work. The director stated that we "had problems with

[appellant] over the past years" because he was "at times . . .

confrontational, and at other times [he walked] away from someone

who wished to speak with him." The director testified that he

4 A-0341-15T2
was not afraid of appellant. Other than "writing up" appellant

"for not helping a fellow worker" on an unspecified date, the

director did not identify any prior, formal disciplinary action

taken against appellant. When asked to describe appellant "as a

worker[,]" the director stated that he was "no different than any

other employee[.]"

The director testified that the Township manager showed him

the anonymous letter "[r]ight after he received it." The

director did not investigate the allegations contained in the

letter, and he was not sure what action, if any, the manager took

concerning it. The director stated that appellant's "job

performance was not a basis for [the Township] sending him to a

psychological evaluation." The Township also stipulated that it

had "never sent anyone for a psychological [examination]

predicated upon the fact that they failed to help" other

employees.

Appellant's union representative briefly testified on his

behalf. The representative stated that the Township manager

showed him the anonymous letter "shortly after it was received

. . . ." The manager said that he thought "he need[ed] to act

on" the letter. The representative questioned whether the

manager had "'a legal basis to act on it,'" and that was "the

5 A-0341-15T2
last" the representative "heard of" the letter until the Township

filed charges against appellant over eight months later.

In a thorough Initial Decision, the Administrative Law Judge

(ALJ) reversed the Township's decision to remove appellant. The

ALJ found that there was "no documentary or testimonial evidence

of an investigation by the Township of the anonymous letter to

determine the veracity of the allegations contained therein."

Based upon the director's uncontradicted testimony, the ALJ also

found that the Township's demand that appellant "attend a

psychological fitness-for-duty examination was not related to his

work performance or to any specific allegation of

psychologically[-]disruptive behavior."1 The ALJ also noted that

appellant's "work performance was satisfactory."

Under these circumstances, and relying upon 42 U.S.C.A.

§ 12112(d)(4)(A), the ALJ concluded that the Township's demand

that appellant undergo a psychological examination was not

"reasonably related" to his job duties and was not "consistent

with business necessity." The ALJ stated:

Here, there was no evidence of a risk of
injury to a fellow employee or the public,
and no evidence or allegation of physical

1
As we will discuss below, even if the anonymous letter did
present a "specific allegation of psychologically[-]disruptive
behavior[,]" the allegation was not based upon reliable
information provided by a credible third party as required by 42
U.S.C.A. § 12112(d)(4)(A).

6 A-0341-15T2
 contact with another employee. The evidence
offered by the [Township] is an anonymous
letter that the Township took eight months to
act on. There is no showing of an
investigation into the anonymous letter.
[The DPW director] credibly testified that
appellant may be confrontational at times;
however, this observation regarding appellant
was not the asserted basis for the Township's
request for a psychological fitness-for-duty
examination of [appellant].

[Appellant] did fail to attend the
psychological fitness-for-duty examination,
but without a reasonable basis for the
request that he undergo the examination, the
Township cannot punish him for failure to
attend. Such an examination was not job-
related and consistent with business
necessity.

Because the Township "failed to meet its burden to prove by

a preponderance of the evidence that [appellant] committed the

charged violations[,]" the ALJ ordered that he be immediately

reinstated to his truck driver position with back pay from the

date of his termination to the date of his reinstatement. The

ALJ also granted appellant "reasonable counsel fees."

The Township filed exceptions and, on March 5, 2015, the

Commission reversed the ALJ's determination. In its decision,

the Commission failed to address appellant's contention that the

Township's demand that he undergo a psychological examination was

impermissible under the ADA. Indeed, the Commission did not even

cite the ADA in its decision.

7 A-0341-15T2
 The Commission found that appellant was insubordinate

because he "fail[ed] to perform his duty by disregarding his

superiors' orders to appear for the fitness-for-duty

examinations." Although the Township had not charged appellant

with insubordination, the Commission reasoned that the

specifications for the charges set forth in the Preliminary and

Final Notices of Disciplinary Action "clearly subsumed

allegations of insubordination."

The Commission determined that appellant should not be

removed from employment, and instead imposed a six-month

suspension. The Commission explained that "appellant's blatant

disregard of oral and written orders from his superiors is

significantly egregious to warrant a substantial penalty."

The Commission also ordered appellant to undergo a

psychological examination before he was reinstated to ensure that

he was "fully capable of performing the duties of his position."

If the psychologist determined that "appellant [was] fit for

duty, without qualification," the Commission directed the

Township to immediately reinstate appellant. However, if the

psychologist determined that appellant was "unfit for duty," the

Commission ordered the Township to charge appellant "with

inability to perform duties" and remove him from employment,

subject to appellant's right to appeal such a determination to

8 A-0341-15T2
the Commission. The Commission also denied appellant's request

for counsel fees. This appeal followed.2

II.

Established precedents guide our task on appeal. Our scope

of review of an administrative agency's final determination is

limited. In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007). "'[A] strong

presumption of reasonableness attaches'" to the Commission's

decision. In re Carroll, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App. Div.)

(quoting In re Vey, 272 N.J. Super. 199, 205 (App. Div. 1993),

aff'd, 135 N.J. 306 (1999)), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 85 (2001).

The burden is upon the appellant to demonstrate grounds for

reversal. McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544,

563 (App. Div. 2002); see also Bowden v. Bayside State Prison,

268 N.J. Super. 301, 304 (App. Div. 1993) (holding that "[t]he

burden of showing the agency's action was arbitrary,

unreasonable[,] or capricious rests upon the appellant"), certif.

denied, 135 N.J. 469 (1994).

To that end, we will "not disturb an administrative agency's

determinations or findings unless there is a clear showing that

(1) the agency did not follow the law; (2) the decision was

2
Appellant initially filed a notice of appeal, which we dismissed
on our own motion because it was interlocutory. We thereafter
granted appellant's motion for leave to appeal the Commission's
March 5, 2015 decision.

9 A-0341-15T2
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; or (3) the decision was

not supported by substantial evidence." In re Application of

Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees for a Certificate of Need, 194

N.J. 413, 422 (2008) (citing Herrmann, supra, 192 N.J. at 28);

see also Circus Liquors, Inc. v. Governing Body of Middletown

Twp., 199 N.J. 1, 9-10 (2009). We are not, however, in any way

"bound by the agency's interpretation of a statute or its

determination of a strictly legal issue." Mayflower Sec. Co. v.

Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973).

Moreover, if our review of the record satisfies us that the

agency's finding is clearly mistaken or erroneous, the decision

is not entitled to judicial deference and must be set aside.

L.M. v. State of N.J., Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs.,

140 N.J. 480, 490 (1995). We may not simply "rubber stamp" an

agency's decision. In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 657 (1999).

On appeal, appellant contends that, under the ADA, "the

Township lacked the lawful authority" to order him to undergo a

psychological fitness-for-duty examination. We agree.

The ADA "provide[s] a clear and comprehensive national

mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals

with disabilities[.]" 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(1). In enacting

the ADA, Congress found that "discrimination against individuals

with disabilities persists in such critical areas as employment,"

10 A-0341-15T2
42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(3), and therefore sought to "assure

equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living,

and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals[.]" 42

U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(7).

Regarding employment discrimination, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a)

sets forth the "general rule" that "[n]o covered entity shall

discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of

disability in regard to [the] . . . discharge of employees[.]"

42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(d)(1) states that this "prohibition against

discrimination as referred to in [42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a)] shall

include medical examinations and inquiries." 42 U.S.C.A. §

12112(d)(4)(A) prohibits employers, like the Township, from

"requir[ing] a medical examination" or "mak[ing] inquiries of an

employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a

disability . . . unless such examination or inquiry is shown to

be job-related and consistent with business necessity."

"There is very little discussion of [42 U.S.C.A.] §

12112(d)(4)(A) in the ADA's legislative history." Kroll v White

Lake Ambulance Auth., 691 F.3d 809, 815 n.8 (6th Cir. 2012).

However, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's

regulations make clear that an employer cannot require an

employee to undergo medical tests that do not serve a legitimate

business purpose. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.13(b) (stating the

11 A-0341-15T2
general rule that, except as permitted by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14,

"it is unlawful for a covered entity to require a medical

examination of an employee"); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c) (stating

that a medical examination may only be conducted if it is "job-

related and consistent with business necessity"). Courts give

"'substantial deference'" to the EEOC's regulations interpreting

the ADA, including 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(d). Tice v. Ctr. Area

Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 515 n.8 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting

Chevron. Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 143 n.4 (3d

Cir. 1998) (en banc)).

In addition, the EEOC has issued interpretive guidelines to

provide employers with detailed guidance on when they may

lawfully require an employee to undergo a medical examination.

Enforcement Guidance: Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical

Examinations of Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act

(ADA), THE U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N [hereinafter Enforcement

Guidance or Guidance], http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-

inquiries.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2016). We have long

recognized that deference "should be afforded to the

interpretation of the agency charged with applying and enforcing

a statutory scheme." Hargrove v. Sleepy's, LLC, 220 N.J. 289,

301 (2015). Thus, while not binding, "[t]he EEOC's

interpretative guidelines . . . 'constitute a body of experience

12 A-0341-15T2
and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly

resort for guidance.'" Duda v. Bd. of Educ., 133 F.3d 1054,

1060, n.12 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson,

477 U.S. 57, 65, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2404, 91 L. Ed. 2d 49, 58

(1986)).

In its Guidance, the EEOC explained that, prior to the

enactment of the ADA, "many employers asked . . . employees to

provide information concerning their physical and/or mental

condition. This information often was used to exclude and

otherwise discriminate against individuals with disabilities --

particularly nonvisible disabilities, such as mental illness --

despite their ability to perform the job." Enforcement Guidance,

supra. Thus, "[t]he ADA's provisions concerning . . . mental

examinations reflect Congress's intent to protect the rights of

. . . employees to be assessed on merit alone, while protecting

the rights of employers to ensure that individuals in the

workplace can efficiently perform the essential functions of

their jobs." Ibid.

Psychological fitness-for-duty examinations are "medical

examinations" under the ADA. Enforcement Guidance, supra.

Thus, the examinations that the Township ordered appellant to

undergo would only have been lawful if they were "job-related and

consistent with business necessity." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(d)(4)(A).

13 A-0341-15T2
The Guidance defines these terms and "addresses situations in

which an employer would meet the general standard for . . .

requiring a medical examination." We therefore quote from the

Guidance at length.

The EEOC has defined the "job-related and consistent with

business necessity" set forth in 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(d)(4)(A) as

follows:

Generally, a disability-related inquiry or
medical examination of an employee may be
"job-related and consistent with business
necessity" when an employer "has a reasonable
belief, based on objective evidence, that:
(1) an employee's ability to perform
essential job functions will be impaired by a
medical condition; or (2) an employee will
pose a direct threat due to a medical
condition."

[Enforcement Guidance, supra (footnotes
omitted).]

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r), the term "[d]irect threat

means a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or

safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or

reduced by reasonable accommodation."3 The EEOC has further

explained:

Sometimes this standard may be met when an
employer knows about a particular employee's
medical condition, has observed performance

3
Although not specified in the regulation, we discern no reason
why the term "direct threat" would not also include a significant
risk that the individual would harm property.

14 A-0341-15T2
 problems, and reasonably can attribute the
problems to the medical condition. An
employer also may be given reliable
information by a credible third party that an
employee has a medical condition, or the
employer may observe symptoms indicating that
an employee may have a medical condition that
will impair his/her ability to perform
essential job functions or will pose a direct
threat. In these situations, it may be job-
related and consistent with business
necessity for an employer to make disability-
related inquiries or require a medical
examination.

[Enforcement Guidance, supra (footnotes
omitted) (emphasis added).]

In other words, the employer must reasonably believe, either

through direct observation or through reliable information

received from credible sources, that the employee's perceived

medical condition is affecting his or her work performance or

that the employee poses a direct threat. Then, and only then,

may the employer lawfully require the employee to undergo a

psychological fitness-for-duty examination. See Yin v.

California, 95 F.3d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 1996) (observing that an

employer cannot require an employee to undergo a medical

examination unless the employee's "problems have had a

substantial and injurious impact on [the] employee's job

performance"), certif. denied, 519 U.S. 1114, 117 S. Ct. 955, 136

L. Ed. 2d 842 (1997).

15 A-0341-15T2
 The Enforcement Guidance cautions employers that they may

not

require a medical examination of an employee
based, in whole or in part, on information
learned from another person[, unless] the
information learned is reliable and would
give rise to a reasonable belief that the
employee's ability to perform essential job
functions will be impaired by a medical
condition or that s/he will pose a direct
threat due to a medical condition[.]

[(emphasis omitted).]

In determining whether the information provided by a credible

third-party is sufficiently reliable to support an order

requiring the employee to submit to a psychological examination,

the Guidance states that the employer should consider the

following factors:

(1) the relationship of the person providing
the information to the employee about whom it
is being provided; (2) the seriousness of the
medical condition at issue; (3) the possible
motivation of the person providing the
information; (4) how the person learned the
information (e.g., directly from the employee
whose medical condition is in question or
from someone else); and (5) other evidence
that the employer has that bears on the
reliability of the information provided.

[Enforcement Guidance, supra.]

To illustrate these requirements, the EEOC provided the

following example, which is particularly pertinent to the case at

hand:

16 A-0341-15T2
 Example[]: Kim works for a small computer
consulting firm. When her mother died
suddenly, she asked her employer for three
weeks off, in addition to the five days that
the company customarily provides in the event
of the death of a parent or spouse, to deal
with family matters. During her extended
absence, a rumor circulated among some
employees that Kim had been given additional
time off to be treated for depression.
Shortly after Kim's return to work, Dave, who
works on the same team with Kim, approached
his manager to say that he had heard that
some workers were concerned about their
safety. According to Dave, people in the
office claimed that Kim was talking to
herself and threatening to harm them. Dave
said that he had not observed the strange
behavior himself but was not surprised to
hear about it given Kim's alleged recent
treatment for depression. Dave's manager
sees Kim every day and never has observed
this kind of behavior. In addition, none of
the co-workers to whom the manager spoke
confirmed Dave's statements.

[(emphasis omitted).]

Based upon the facts of this hypothetical example, the EEOC

advised that

the employer does not have a reasonable
belief, based on objective evidence, that
Kim's ability to perform essential functions
will be impaired or that s/he will pose a
direct threat because of a medical condition.
The employer, therefore, would not be
justified in asking Kim disability-related
questions or requiring her to submit to a
medical examination because the information
provided by Dave is not reliable.

[Enforcement Guidance, supra.]

17 A-0341-15T2
 After carefully reviewing 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(d)(4)(A) and

the EEOC's regulations and its Guidance, and distilling them to

their essence, we conclude that an employer may only require an

employee to undergo a psychological fitness-for-duty examination

when the employer has a reasonable belief, either through direct

observation or through reliable information from credible

sources, that the employee's perceived mental state will either

affect his or her ability to perform essential job functions or

that the employee poses a direct threat. As the EEOC has

observed, the employer's "reasonable belief . . . must be based

on objective evidence obtained, or reasonably available to

the employer, prior to . . . requiring a medical examination.

Such a belief requires an assessment of the employee and his/her

position and cannot be based on general assumptions."

Enforcement Guidance, supra.

III.

Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we hold

that the Township violated 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(d)(4)(A) when it

ordered appellant to participate in a psychological fitness-for-

duty examination based upon the information contained in the

anonymous letter. Simply stated, the Township did not meet its

burden of demonstrating that its directive was "job-related and

consistent with business necessity."

18 A-0341-15T2
 Here, the DPW director testified that appellant's work

performance was satisfactory and "was not a basis" for the

Township's demand that he undergo the evaluation. While

appellant was "confrontational" at times, the director stated

that appellant was "no different than" other employees. Under

these circumstances, we are satisfied that the Township failed to

demonstrate that appellant's ability to perform his job functions

was impaired by any suspected medical or mental condition.

The Township also failed to prove that appellant posed a

direct threat to either himself, others or property. Again, the

Township did not present any evidence that appellant had

threatened other employees. The DPW director only mentioned one

specific incident in appellant's nine years of employment where

appellant was disciplined for not helping a co-worker. However,

the Township stipulated that other employees were similarly

disciplined over the years, but none of them were ordered to

undergo psychological evaluations. The Township did not present

any documentary evidence concerning any other disciplinary

actions involving appellant.

In addition, the Township obviously did not consider

appellant to be a direct threat to other employees or property

because, after it received the anonymous letter, it failed to

take any action concerning it for over eight months. During that

19 A-0341-15T2
entire time, appellant performed the duties of his position

without incident.

Turning to the anonymous letter, it is clear that, even

though the letter made allegations of disruptive behavior, it did

not represent the type of reliable information from a credible

source upon which the Township could reasonably rely in ordering

a psychological examination. The identity of the "[v]ery

concerned employee at Lakewood Public Works" who sent the letter

was unknown. Therefore, the information in the letter was

exactly the type of innuendo and rumor that the EEOC has advised

employers is insufficient to support a mandatory evaluation.

Contrary to the Township's contention, it was not powerless

to take appropriate action after it received the anonymous

letter. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(d)(4)(B) plainly provides that an

employer "may make inquiries into the ability of an employee to

perform job-related functions." Thus, the Township could have

solicited information from the DPW director and any other

supervisors concerning appellant's job performance. The Township

also could have contacted the three "union stewards" specifically

named in the anonymous letter for information about the alleged

"outburst" appellant had on March 28, 2013. Instead, the

Township failed to investigate the allegations in the anonymous

letter for over eight months and then sought to rely upon that

20 A-0341-15T2
letter as the sole basis for its order requiring appellant to

submit to the psychological evaluation. Thus, this order clearly

violated 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(d)(4)(A). Accordingly, the

Commission's finding of insubordination,4 given the undisputed

circumstances presented, was erroneous as a matter of law.

Therefore, we conclude that the Commission's decision is

arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable and, accordingly, we

reverse and vacate the penalty imposed. We remand to the

Commission for a calculation of back pay due to appellant upon

his reinstatement to his former position and for consideration of

his request for counsel fees. In remanding, we express no view

on the merits of appellant's application for counsel fees or the

amount that may be due him in back pay.

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

4
Neither the Civil Service Act, N.J.S.A. 11A:1-1 to -12-6, nor
the applicable regulation, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(2), define
"insubordination." However, we have observed that it is
ordinarily defined as a failure to obey a lawful order. See
Rivell v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 115 N.J. Super. 64, 71 (App. Div.
1971), certif. denied, 59 N.J. 269 (1971).

21 A-0341-15T2