IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-1078
Filed January 27, 2016
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
NOELLE COURTNEY YOUNGBEAR,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Tama County, Nancy A.
Baumgartner (guilty plea) and Fae E. Hoover-Grinde (sentencing), Judges.
Defendant appeals her convictions for second-degree burglary and two
counts of willful injury causing bodily injury. AFFIRMED.
Melissa A. Nine of Nine Law Office, Marshalltown, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sheryl A. Soich, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Doyle, P.J., Tabor, J., and Mahan, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2015).
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MAHAN, Senior Judge.
Defendant Noelle Youngbear appeals her convictions for second-degree
burglary and two counts of willful injury causing bodily injury. There is a sufficient
factual basis in the record for Youngbear’s guilty pleas to all three charges. The
evidence shows Youngbear’s guilty pleas were made voluntarily and intelligently.
The sentence imposed in this case did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentence.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings.
According to the minutes of evidence, on November 3, 2013, at about
4:00 a.m., Merona Jefferson (Merona) and Yolanda Hernandez got into a
physical altercation at a birthday party at the home of Barbara Lincoln in Tama
County. Merona contacted her friends, Youngbear, Maggi Walker-Morgan, and
Brandy Johnson. Gage Tyon stated the women asked him for the location of
Hernandez. Tyon stated they “seemed really mad like they wanted revenge or
something.” Youngbear’s boyfriend, Andrew Jefferson, stated he believed the
intention of Youngbear, Walker-Morgan, and Johnson “was to confront them,”
referring to Hernandez and her friends.
The women went to Lincoln’s home, where Hernandez was staying.
Lincoln’s daughter, DeShane Buffalo, stated she heard a knock on the door at
about 6:00 a.m. When she and Hernandez went to answer the door, they saw
Youngbear, Walker-Morgan, and Johnson already inside the home. A fight
ensued involving Youngbear, Walker-Morgan, Johnson, Hernandez, Lincoln, and
Buffalo. Buffalo stated Youngbear struck her in the head with a wrench. Buffalo
also stated she saw Youngbear hitting Lincoln in the head with a wrench.
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Another witness, Hailee Almanza, stated she saw Youngbear strike Lincoln with
an object. Buffalo stated she then struck Youngbear in the head with a glass
lampshade.1 Buffalo received a laceration about four inches long on her
forehead. Lincoln received a deep laceration about three inches long in the
middle of her forehead. Youngbear had a fractured vertebrae in her neck and
needed to be life-flighted to Iowa City.
Youngbear, Walker-Morgan, and Johnson were charged with first-degree
burglary, two counts of willful injury resulting in serious injury, carrying a
concealed weapon, and assault while participating in a felony. Youngbear
entered into a plea agreement in which she agreed to plead guilty to burglary in
the second degree, in violation of Iowa Code section 713.5(1) (2013), and enter
Alford pleas2 to two counts of willful injury causing bodily injury, in violation of
section 708.4(2). The State agreed to dismiss the other charges. Under the plea
agreement both parties could make sentencing recommendations.
After the plea hearing on May 9, 2014, the district court accepted
Youngbear’s guilty plea to second-degree burglary and Alford pleas to two
counts of willful injury causing bodily injury. At the sentencing hearing the State
recommended Youngbear serve time in prison but requested concurrent
sentences. Defense counsel requested a deferred judgment and probation.
Youngbear was sentenced to ten years in prison on the second-degree-burglary
1
According to a police report, Buffalo’s statement that she hit Youngbear with a
lampshade “did not correspond to the evidence that the lamp reveals,” because there
was blood on the middle section of the lamp.
2
In an Alford plea, a defendant may “voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly
consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit
his participation in the acts constituting the crime.” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25,
37 (1970).
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charge and five years on each of the willful injury charges, all to be served
concurrently. She now appeals her convictions and sentence.
II. Ineffective Assistance.
A. Youngbear contends she received ineffective assistance because
defense counsel permitted her to plead guilty when there was not a factual basis
for her pleas to second-degree burglary or the two counts of willful injury causing
bodily injury.3
We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. Ennenga
v. State, 812 N.W.2d 696, 701 (Iowa 2012). To establish a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) the attorney failed to perform
an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted to the extent it denied the defendant
a fair trial. State v. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d 638, 641 (Iowa 2009). A defendant has
the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence counsel was ineffective.
See State v. McKettrick, 480 N.W.2d 52, 55 (Iowa 1992).
“It is a responsibility of defense counsel to ensure that a client does not
plead guilty to a charge for which there is no objective factual basis.” State v.
Finney, 834 N.W.2d 46, 54 (Iowa 2013). The court should not accept a guilty
plea unless there is a factual basis for the plea, including Alford pleas. State v.
Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785, 788 (Iowa 1999). “Our cases do not require that
the district court have before it evidence that the crime was committed beyond a
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Youngbear raises the claim that the court could not rely on the minutes of evidence in
this case because the proposed testimony in the minutes was not in accordance with the
deposition testimony of the witnesses. The depositions were never made a part of the
record. We do not consider her claims based on evidence outside the record. See
Hughes v. Waters, 204 N.W.2d 599, 600 (Iowa 1973) (“We must decide the case on the
evidence in the trial court.”).
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reasonable doubt, but only that there be a factual basis to support the charge.”
Finney, 834 N.W.2d at 62.
“On a claim that a plea bargain is invalid because of a lack of accuracy on
the factual-basis issue, the entire record before the district court may be
examined.” Id. We consider whether there is an objective factual basis in the
entire record available to the court when it accepted the plea. State v. Sutton,
853 N.W.2d 284, 286 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014). We may consider (1) the
prosecutor’s statements, (2) the defendant’s statements, (3) the minutes of
evidence, and (4) the presentence report, if it was available at the time of the
plea. Rhoades v. State, 848 N.W.2d 22, 29 (Iowa 2014).
1. We find there is a sufficient factual basis in the record to support
Youngbear’s guilty plea for second-degree burglary. During the plea colloquy
this exchange occurred:
THE COURT: And did you enter onto—into an occupied
structure—was it a house or was it an apartment? YOUNGBEAR:
House.
THE COURT: House. And when you did so, did you do so
without any right, license or privilege to be in the house? In other
words, you didn’t have any authority to go in? YOUNGBEAR: No.
THE COURT: And when you entered the property, did you
do so with the intent to commit an assault or did the other people
with you have the intent to commit an assault? YOUNGBEAR: Is
this a yes or no question?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes.
THE COURT: Yes. YOUNGBEAR: Yes.
....
THE COURT: There were people home?
YOUNGBEAR: Yes.
Youngbear’s answers established the elements necessary for burglary.
See Iowa Code § 713.1 (defining burglary as “[a]ny person, having the intent to
commit a felony, assault or theft therein, who, having no right, license, or
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privilege to do so, enters an occupied structure”). There is additional factual
support for the plea in the minutes of evidence. There were several people
inside Lincoln’s home on the morning of November 3, 2013, making it an
occupied structure. Hernandez and Buffalo stated that Youngbear, Walker-
Morgan, and Johnson were already inside the home when they went to answer
the door, and thus, they entered without the authority to do so. Tyon stated the
three women “wanted revenge,” and Jefferson stated they had the intention to
“confront” the other women, which could support a finding they had the intent to
commit an assault. The evidence additionally established the elements of
second-degree burglary. See Iowa Code § 713.5(1).
2. Youngbear entered an Alford plea to the charges of willful injury
causing bodily injury. “In an Alford plea, because the accused is denying his
guilt, a factual basis must be established independent of his statements.” Farley
v. Glanton, 280 N.W.2d 411, 416 (Iowa 1979); see State v. Hansen, 344 N.W.2d
725, 728 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983). The factual basis may be determined from the
minutes of evidence. State v. Ramirez, 400 N.W.2d 586, 588 (Iowa 1987) (citing
State v. Townsend, 238 N.W.2d 351, 355 (Iowa 1976)).
Willful injury is defined as “[a]ny person who does an act which is not
justified and which is intended to cause serious injury to another.” Iowa Code
§ 708.4. In a police report attached to the minutes of evidence, Buffalo stated: “I
saw my mom and Noelle on the floor and my mom was on top. Noelle had a
wrench and was hitting my mom in the head.” Also, Almanza stated, “she saw
Youngbear strike Barbara with an object.” When officers first approached Lincoln
she appeared to be intoxicated, but told the officers “she was assaulted by Noelle
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who had struck her in the head with a wrench.” We conclude there is a factual
basis in the record to support Youngbear’s guilty plea to willful injury causing
bodily injury of Lincoln.
The minutes also show Buffalo stated that as she went downstairs she
observed Walker-Morgan punching Hernandez, when out of nowhere “she was
struck in the head with a wrench by Noelle.” Lincoln told an officer, “Youngbear
had struck her daughter [Buffalo] first in the head and then she got between
them.” An officer reported that based on how deep Buffalo’s wound was, it was
clear that an object had been used to strike her. We conclude there is a
sufficient factual basis in the record to support Youngbear’s guilty plea to willful
injury causing bodily injury to Buffalo.
B. Youngbear claims she received ineffective assistance because her
defense counsel “pushed her into pleading guilty with assurances she would
receive a deferred sentence and ultimately the charges would be expunged from
her record.” She states her pleas were not made voluntarily and intelligently.
The record does not support Youngbear’s contentions. At the beginning
of the plea colloquy, the prosecutor stated he would be recommending
concurrent sentences and stated, “Defendant is free to ask for deferred
judgments on any and all of the offenses as part of the agreement.” The court
carefully explained the maximum and minimum penalties for the charges.
Youngbear was informed the maximum penalty on the burglary charge was a
term of imprisonment not to exceed ten years, while the maximum penalty on the
charges of willful injury causing bodily injury was a term of imprisonment not to
exceed five years. The court told Youngbear that while she could request a
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deferred judgment, “There’s no guarantee that that’s going to happen.” The court
told her that if she received consecutive sentences she could be sentenced to
twenty years in prison.
After the maximum and minimum penalties were explained, Youngbear
continued to enter her pleas. The court then stated, “I find that the Defendant’s
pleas are voluntarily and intelligently made, with a knowledge of the
consequences, and that there is a factual basis for each.” Based on the record
made during the plea colloquy, we determine Youngbear could not have
reasonably believed she was assured of receiving a deferred sentence.
We conclude Youngbear has not shown she received ineffective
assistance of counsel.
III. Sentencing.
Youngbear asserts her sentence constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. She states that balancing the
gravity of the crime to the severity of the sentence, the sentence is
disproportional. Youngbear claims the sentence in patently unfair because out of
an altercation where numerous people were involved, she received the most
severe sentence, although she was also the one who was most seriously injured.
Our review of this constitutional issue is de novo. State v. Oliver, 812
N.W.2d 636, 639 (Iowa 2012). “If the sentence does not create an inference of
gross disproportionality, then ‘no further analysis is necessary.’” Id. at 650
(citation omitted). “Our principal task at this stage is to ‘balanc[e] the gravity of
the crime against the severity of the sentence.’” Id. (citing State v. Bruegger, 773
N.W.2d 862, 873 (Iowa 2009)). “[I]t is rare that a sentence will be so grossly
9
disproportionate to the crime as to satisfy the threshold inquiry and warrant
further review.” Id. Also, we give substantial deference to the legislature in
establishing penalties for various crimes. Id.
Youngbear has not shown her sentence is grossly disproportionate to the
severity of her crimes. Youngbear entered an occupied home without
permission, then caused injuries to two of the residents of the home by striking
them with a wrench. The fact that she was also injured is not a mitigating
circumstance. We conclude she has not shown her sentence constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment.
We affirm Youngbear’s convictions and sentence.
AFFIRMED.
State of Iowa v. Noelle Courtney Youngbear
Combined Opinion