FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 27 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ERNESTO MORALES-LOPEZ, No. 13-71935
Petitioner, Agency No. A094-812-289
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted January 20, 2016**
Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Ernesto Morales-Lopez, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal
from an immigration judge’s decision (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
(“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo
questions of law, including claims of due process violations, and review for
substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400
F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny the petition for review.
We reject Morales-Lopez’s claim that the IJ violated his due process rights
by not allowing his witness to testify. See Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th
Cir. 2000) (requiring error and prejudice to prevail on a due process claim).
Morales-Lopez argues we should import the regulatory definition of an
“arriving alien,” 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(q), into the statutory provision setting forth the
one-year time limit for filing an asylum application, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B).
However, the term “arriving alien” does not appear anywhere in the language of
section 1158(a)(2)(B) and is therefore irrelevant in interpreting that provision.
Because Morales-Lopez’s asylum application was untimely, it is statutorily
barred unless he can demonstrate the existence of changed circumstances that
materially affected his eligibility for asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), (D).
The record does not compel the conclusion that Morales-Lopez established such
circumstances to excuse his untimely filing. See id.; see also Al Ramahi v. Holder,
725 F.3d 1133, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2013) (delay in filing was not reasonable under
all the circumstances). Thus, we deny the petition for review as to asylum.
2 13-71935
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Morales-Lopez
failed to establish it is more likely than not he will be persecuted in Guatemala on
account of a protected ground. See Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 740-41
(9th Cir. 2009) (applicant must prove a protected ground was or will be a cause of
the persecutors’ acts); Castro-Martinez v. Holder, 674 F.3d 1073, 1082 (9th Cir.
2011) (“[g]eneralized economic disadvantage does not rise to the level of
persecution” on account of a protected ground). We reject Morales-Lopez’s
contentions that the BIA erred in finding he did not meaningfully raise, and
therefore waived, his claims based on his father and brother’s former political
affiliations. Thus, Morales-Lopez’s withholding of removal claim fails. See
Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004).
Finally, substantial evidence also supports the denial of Morales-Lopez’s
CAT claim because he failed to establish it is more likely than not he would be
tortured if returned to Guatemala. See Silaya v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1066, 1073
(9th Cir. 2008). We reject his contentions that the BIA’s analysis was improper or
insufficient. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (BIA
adequately considered evidence and sufficiently announced its decision).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
3 13-71935