IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN THE MATTER OF THE PARENTAL No. 63372
RIGHTS AS TO: G.L.K., A MINOR.
SHAWN E.K., FILED
Appellant,
JAN 2 7 2016
vs.
CLARK COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
FAMILY SERVICES,
Respondent.
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
This is an appeal from a district court order terminating
appellant's parental rights as to his minor child. Eighth Judicial District
Court, Family Court Division, Clark County; Robert Teuton, Judge.
The child was drug-exposed at birth and the parents self-
reported extensive histories of using illegal substances. Respondent
obtained legal custody, but the child was allowed to remain in the home
under the paternal grandmother's care. The paternal grandmother did
not comply with the safety plan, and in December 2011, the child was
removed from the home and placed with an adoptive foster family. In
October 2012, respondent filed a petition to terminate parental rights.
After trial, the district court entered an order terminating appellant's
parental rights, and this appeal followed.
To terminate parental rights, the district court must find clear
and convincing evidence that (1) at least one ground of parental fault
exists, and (2) termination is in the child's best interest. NRS 128.105
(1999); Termination of Parental Rights as to N.J., 116 Nev. 790, 800-01, 8
P.3d 126, 132-33 (2000). On appeal, this court reviews questions of law de
novo and the district court's factual findings for substantial evidence. In
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re Parental Rights as to A.L., 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 91, 337 P.3d 758, 761
(2014).
Appellant first contends that the district court erroneously
applied the presumptions under NRS 128.109 that if the child has been
placed outside of the home and has resided there for 14 of any 20
consecutive months, it must be presumed that the parent has
demonstrated only token efforts and that termination of parental rights is
in the child's best interest. NRS 128.109(1)(a), (2) (1999). Appellant
argues that the child was physically removed from the home in December
2011, and the parental termination petition was filed just 10 months later
in October 2012. We conclude that the presumptions applied because the
child had resided outside of the home for almost 16 consecutive months by
the time of trial in April 2013. Cf. In re Parental Rights as to A.P.M, 131
Nev., Adv. Op. 66, 356 P.3d 499, 504 (2015) (applying presumptions where
the children had been outside the home for 17 consecutive months at the
time the termination hearing commenced).
Appellant also contends that respondent rushed to terminate
his parental rights to make the child available for adoption by
nonrelatives without first considering the paternal grandmother as an
alternative placement or finding that placement with a family member
would be detrimental. This argument is also without merit. Respondent
initially placed the child with the paternal grandmother for over two
months, yet the paternal grandmother was unable to abide by the safety
plan because her home remained unsanitary and unsafe, she allowed
unsupervised contact between the child and the parents, and she allowed
appellant to continue using drugs in the home. See J.W.M. v. Cleburne
Cty. Dep't of Human Res., 980 So. 2d 432, 439 (Ala Civ. App. 2007)
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(recognizing that in parental termination cases, a child should not be
placed with a relative who would expose the child to an unfit parent).
Appellant next challenges the district court's findings of
parental fault. See NRS 128.0126 (defining a failure of parental
adjustment as being unable or unwilling within a reasonable time to
correct substantially the circumstances that led to the child's removal);
NRS 128.105(2)(f) (1999) (defining token efforts to include efforts by the
parent to prevent neglect or to avoid being unfit); NRS 128.106(4)
(requiring court to consider a parent's excessive use of controlled
substances that renders the parent consistently unable to care for the
child when determining neglect or unfitness). He argues that he
consistently visited the child before his inpatient treatment and had
substantially complied with his case plan and made more-than-token
efforts to maintain his sobriety because he was engaged in treatment and
drug-free by the time of trial.
The record demonstrates that appellant had a pervasive and
extensive history of drug use. Appellant testified at trial that he began
using drugs at age 11, admitted to being a heroin addict, and stated that,
aside from inpatient treatment, his longest period of sobriety was about
two weeks. From respondent's initial intervention in October 2011,
appellant continued to use drugs for over one year before he entered
treatment under the threat of incarceration. While in the rehabilitation
facility, appellant made little effort to contact the child. Thus, we conclude
that the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings of
parental fault. See In re Parental Rights as to D.R.H., 120 Nev. 422, 428-
31, 92 P.3d 1230, 1234-36 (2004) (upholding findings of parental fault
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based on the mother's persistent drug abuse and neglect of her children's
needs when they were placed in harm's way).
Finally, appellant challenges the district court's finding that
the child's best interest would be served by termination of his parental
rights. Appellant argues that the district court failed to reasonably
evaluate his bond with the child, including evidence that he had a positive
relationship with her and had maintained consistent visitation before his
inpatient treatment. The record demonstrates that appellant had spent
little time in rehabilitation compared with his extensive history of drug
use, and he failed to pursue rehabilitation in earnest until the child had
been with the adoptive family for over one year. Although appellant
testified he loved the child and he was making progress on his sobriety at
the time of trial, he recognized that he was ill-equipped to care for himself,
let alone the child. The evidence further showed that the adoptive family
was stable and provided a suitable home, and the child had bonded with
the foster parents, calling them "mamma" and "dada," and developed a
relationship with their two children. This court has recognized the
importance of seeking permanent placement for children and not allowing
them to drift for an indefinite time in foster care. D.R.H., 120 Nev. at 427,
92 P.3d at 1233. Thus, the district court's findings as to the child's best
interest are supported by substantial evidence.
We recognize that parental termination cases where a parent
battles substance abuse are some of the most difficult, but "Nile primary
consideration in any proceeding to terminate parental rights must be
whether the best interests of the child will be served by the termination."
NRS 128.105 (1999). "At some point the child's need for permanency and
stability overcomes the parent's right to continued rehabilitation." R.T.B.
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v. Calhoun Cty. Dep't of Human Res., 19 So. 3d 198, 206 (Ala. Civ. App.
2009). We have considered the parties' arguments and the record before
us, and for the reasons set forth herein, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
C.J.
Parraguirre
J.
J.
cc: Hon. Robert Teuton, District Judge, Family Court Division
Ballard Spahr, LLP
Clark County District Attorney/Juvenile Division
Eighth District Court Clerk
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