[Cite as State v. Peterson, 2016-Ohio-307.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
State of Ohio, :
Plaintiff-Appellee :
No. 15AP-577
v. : (C.P.C. No. 14CR-187)
George J. Peterson, : (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Defendant-Appellant :
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on January 28, 2016
Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Laura Swisher, for
appellee.
Todd Barstow, for appellant.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
TYACK, J.
{¶ 1} George J. Peterson is appealing from his convictions on charges of improper
handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle and of having a weapon under disability. He
assigns a single error for our consideration:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND DEPRIVED APPELLANT
OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS GUARANTEED BY THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE ONE SECTON TEN OF
THE OHIO CONSTITUTION BY FINDING HIM GUILTY OF
IMPROPER HANDLING OF FIREARM IN A MOTOR
VEHICLE AND HAVING WEAPON UNDER DISABILITY AS
THOSE VERDICTS WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY
No. 15AP-577 2
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND WERE ALSO AGAINST THE
MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶ 2} Sufficiency of the evidence is the legal standard applied to determine
whether the case should have gone to the jury. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,
386 (1997). In other words, sufficiency tests the adequacy of the evidence and asks
whether the evidence introduced at trial is legally sufficient as a matter of law to support a
verdict. Id. "The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d
259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307
(1979). The verdict will not be disturbed unless the appellate court finds that reasonable
minds could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier of fact. Jenks at 273. If the
court determines that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law, a judgment of
acquittal must be entered for the defendant. See Thompkins at 387.
{¶ 3} Even though supported by sufficient evidence, a conviction may still be
reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence. Thompkins at 387. In so
doing, the court of appeals, sits as a " 'thirteenth juror' " and, after " 'reviewing the entire
record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of
witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly
lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.' " Id. (quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175
(1st Dist.1983)); see also Columbus v. Henry, 105 Ohio App.3d 545, 547-48 (10th
Dist.1995). Reversing a conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence
No. 15AP-577 3
should be reserved for only the most " 'exceptional case in which the evidence weighs
heavily against the conviction.' " Thompkins at 387.
{¶ 4} As this court has previously stated, "[w]hile the jury may take note of the
inconsistencies and resolve or discount them accordingly, see [State v.] DeHass [10 Ohio
St.2d 230 (1967)], such inconsistencies do not render defendant's conviction against the
manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence." State v. Nivens, 10th Dist. No. 95APA09-
1236 (May 28, 1996). It was within the province of the jury to make the credibility
decisions in this case. See State v. Lakes 120 Ohio App. 213, 217 (4th Dist.1964), ("It is
the province of the jury to determine where the truth probably lies from conflicting
statements, not only of different witnesses but by the same witness.")
{¶ 5} See State v. Harris, 73 Ohio App.3d 57, 63 (10th Dist.1991), (even though
there was reason to doubt the credibility of the prosecution's chief witness, he was not so
unbelievable as to render verdict against the manifest weight).
{¶ 6} Applying the legal standards to the facts in this case, we overrule the
assignment of error.
{¶ 7} Peterson was a passenger in a motor vehicle which was pulled over for
having improperly functioning taillights. The driver and the owner of the vehicle, Roland
Adams, Jr., had a suspended operator's license.
{¶ 8} The police officers involved removed Peterson, Adams, and Adams' wife
from the vehicle. At the jury trial on the charges, one of the officers testified that he felt he
had seen Peterson place something under his seat, which was the front passenger seat.
After the occupants had been removed from the vehicle, the officers found a loaded
firearm on the floor of the vehicle. Subsequent DNA testing indicated that Peterson could
have touched the firearm.
No. 15AP-577 4
{¶ 9} Roland Adams, Jr. testified that neither he nor his wife owned a firearm,
including this specific firearm. The DNA testing indicates 1 in 66 individuals could have
provided the DNA found in swabs from the firearm and the clip in the firearm.
{¶ 10} The DNA evidence in this case is not strong or particularly helpful.
However, it does not prove that Peterson did not touch the weapon or its clip. The DNA
evidence indicates that hundreds of thousands of people in Central Ohio could have
touched the firearm.
{¶ 11} The verdicts in all likelihood rested upon the facts that Peterson was the
front seat passenger and the firearm was under the seat with the barrel of the firearm
facing toward the rear of the vehicle, which would be consistent with Peterson placing the
firearm under the seat as the police officers approached the vehicle. Again, one of the
officers testified that Peterson had bent forward as police approached the vehicle and that
Peterson seemed to be placing something under the seat. This testimony was combined
with the testimony from Roland Adams, Jr. that neither Adams nor his wife owned any
firearm. Thus, the verdict was consistent with the manifest weight of the evidence and
supported by sufficient evidence.
{¶ 12} The sole assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
BROWN and SADLER, JJ., concur.
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