In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 15‐2553
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
AMBROSE L. CLAYTON,
Defendant‐Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 13‐CR‐2 — Rudolph T. Randa, Judge.
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SUBMITTED JANUARY 7, 2016 — DECIDED JANUARY 28, 2016
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Before RIPPLE, WILLIAMS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. Ambrose “Lamont” Clayton sought to re‐
duce his 91‐month prison sentence based on Amend‐
ment 782 to the federal sentencing guidelines. That amend‐
ment retroactively reduced the guideline range for his con‐
After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral
argument is unnecessary. The appeal is submitted on the briefs and rec‐
ord. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
2 No. 15‐2553
viction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute co‐
caine and heroin. The district court declined to reduce the
sentence. Because the district court did not abuse its discre‐
tion, we affirm the judgment.
A federal investigation revealed that Clayton and his as‐
sociates sold drugs and laundered the proceeds for at least
two years. He later pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and
heroin, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, and conspiracy to
launder money, see 18 U.S.C. § 1956. Using the 2013 Sentenc‐
ing Guidelines, the district court found Clayton responsible
for at least five kilograms of cocaine and one kilogram of
heroin, which added up under the Guidelines to the equiva‐
lent of 2,000 kilograms of marijuana, and calculated a base
offense level of 32. The district court added four levels for
Clayton’s aggravating role as an organizer or leader and
subtracted three levels because Clayton accepted responsi‐
bility, yielding a total offense level of 33. (The conviction for
money laundering was grouped with the drug conviction,
and the latter’s offense level applied to the group because it
was so much higher. See U.S.S.G. §§ 3D1.2, 3D1.3). Coupled
with his category I criminal history, Clayton’s guideline im‐
prisonment range was 135 to 168 months.
The district court sentenced Clayton to 91 months in
prison. It recognized the seriousness and duration of the of‐
fense, the violent danger it poses to the public, and Clayton’s
role in it. The court also recognized Clayton’s positive at‐
tributes. Because of Clayton’s cooperation and the govern‐
ment’s 5K1.1 motion for a below‐minimum sentence based
on his substantial assistance, Clayton’s sentence was 42
months below the low end of the guideline range and 29
No. 15‐2553 3
months below the 120‐month statutory minimum.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. At the hearing,
Clayton and the government discussed the then‐pending
proposal from the Sentencing Commission to lower the base
offense levels for drug offenses, including Clayton’s, by two
levels. Aware that the proposal would drop the low end of
his range to 108 months, the district court stated that even “if
there was a change, this [91‐month] sentence would still be
the appropriate sentence, given what I’ve just talked about.”
After sentencing, the Sentencing Commission amended
the base offense level for drug offenses exactly as was dis‐
cussed at Clayton’s sentencing hearing. Amendment 782,
which is retroactive, reduced the offense levels assigned to
Clayton’s drug quantities, resulting in a base offense level of
30 instead of 32. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d); U.S.S.G. supp. to
app. C, amends. 782, 788 (2014). With the adjustments he re‐
ceived, Clayton’s new total offense level would be 31 rather
than 33, resulting in a guidelines range of 108 to 135 months
rather than 135 to 168 months.
Two days after Amendment 782 became effective, Clay‐
ton moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2). He asked for a reduction to 72 months in prison.
That would be, like his original sentence, 33 percent below
the low end of the applicable guideline range. The district
court denied Clayton’s request, explaining that “based upon
the severity of the offense, the Court’s original below‐
guideline sentence and its rationale in imposing such sen‐
tence, and despite Clayton’s current eligibility for reduction,
the Court will not alter the original sentence.”
On appeal Clayton argues that the district court abused
its discretion in denying him a reduction. He contends that
4 No. 15‐2553
the court failed to comply fully with the two‐step process
mandated in Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010), for
motions under § 3582(c)(2). Step one requires the court to
determine the amended guideline range, the prisoner’s eli‐
gibility for a sentence modification, and the extent of the re‐
duction authorized. Dillon, 560 U.S. at 827. At step two, a
court must consider any applicable § 3553(a) factors and de‐
termine whether, in its discretion, a reduction is warranted.
Id.
The court committed no reversible error in step one. At
the original sentencing, the parties and the court correctly
anticipated that the proposed guideline would reduce Clay‐
ton’s base offense level by two, with a new low end of 108
months. While the district court did not itself state the new
range when Clayton moved for a sentencing reduction, it
acknowledged, as step one contemplates, that the amend‐
ment reduced Clayton’s offense level and that he was eligi‐
ble for a reduction in sentence. The purpose of step one was
anticipated and then achieved. Further, at the original sen‐
tencing hearing, the district court explained that it would not
reduce Clayton’s sentence any further based on the antici‐
pated new guideline. Any error in not stating the new range
explicitly after the amendment actually took effect would
have been harmless. See United States v. Hill, 645 F.3d 900,
912 (7th Cir. 2011).
Clayton next contends that the district court erred in the
second step. He accuses the court of failing to consider every
§ 3553(a) factor, the low risk his early release would pose to
the public, and his conduct while imprisoned. But in decid‐
ing a motion under § 3582(c)(2), the district court is not re‐
quired to analyze extensively every § 3553(a) factor; it suffic‐
No. 15‐2553 5
es that its explanation is consistent with § 3553(a). See United
States v. Purnell, 701 F.3d 1186, 1190 (7th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Marion, 590 F.3d 475, 477–78 (7th Cir. 2009). That
happened here. During the original sentencing, the district
court considered the § 3553(a) factors and the serious risk
that Clayton posed to public safety, and it referred to that
rationale in the § 3582 decision. While the district court’s or‐
der could have considered Clayton’s post‐conviction behav‐
ior, see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, cmt. n.1(B)(iii), Clayton presented
no such evidence to the district court.
Clayton replies that his attorney incompetently failed to
request and submit this evidence. But there is no right to
counsel in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings. See United States v. John‐
son, 580 F.3d 567, 569 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Tidwell,
178 F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 1999). And where there is no right
to counsel, there is no right to effective counsel. See Anderson
v. Cowan, 227 F.3d 893, 901 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991)); Wainwright v. Torna, 455
U.S. 586, 587–88 (1982).
United States v. Marion directs district courts, on § 3582 motions for
sentence reductions, to “at least address briefly any significant events
that may have occurred since the original sentencing.” 590 F.3d at 477. If
nothing noteworthy changed concerning the basis for the original sen‐
tence, “some simple explanation to that effect will apprise both the de‐
fendant and this court of that fact.” Id. The government suggests that this
direction may be limited to situations when the district court does not
supply any reasons for its decision and when many years have inter‐
vened between sentencing and the § 3582 motion. Marion does not con‐
tain this limitation, but even so the absence of any discussion by the dis‐
trict court of events since sentencing does not require a remand in this
case. Clayton did not submit information on any significant events since
his original sentencing with his § 3582 motion; a discussion was unnec‐
essary.
6 No. 15‐2553
We have considered Clayton’s remaining arguments and
none has merit. His request for appointment of counsel on
appeal is denied. The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.