MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jan 29 2016, 8:58 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE
Bradley J. Harris
New Castle, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Bradley J. Harris, January 29, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
89A01-1505-CR-524
v. Appeal from the Wayne Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Gregory A. Horn,
Appellee-Plaintiff Special Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
89C01-0301-FC-001
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Bradley Harris appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for jail time credit.
Because the Department of Correction (the DOC) applied Harris’ 249-day pre-
sentence confinement jail-time credit to his sentence, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Harris was arrested on January 21, 2003, and incarcerated until May 1, 2003,
which is one hundred days. After being out on bond, Harris was incarcerated
from September 1, 2005, the date of his conviction, for two counts of Class A
felony child molesting, until January 27, 2006, the date of his sentencing, which
is an additional one-hundred and forty-nine days. At the time of sentencing,
the trial court awarded Harris the two-hundred and forty-nine days of pre-
sentence confinement jail-time credit that he had earned.
[3] At some point in 2015, Harris advised the Indiana Department of Correction
(the DOC) that his two-hundred and forty-nine days of jail-time credit had not
been applied to his sentence. Randy Short, a DOC classification-division
representative, advised Harris that his credit had been properly applied, and
that his earliest possible release date is May 23, 2016. In May 2015, Harris filed
a motion for jail-time credit, which the trial court denied. Harris appeals.
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Discussion and Decision
[4] At the outset we note that Harris proceeds pro se. A litigant who proceeds pro se
is held to the rules of procedure that trained counsel is bound to follow. Smith
v. Donahue, 907 N.E.2d 553, 555 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied, cert.
dismissed. One risk a litigant takes when he proceeds pro se is that he will not
know how to accomplish all the things an attorney would know how to
accomplish. Id. When a party elects to represent himself, there is no reason for
us to indulge in any benevolent presumption on his behalf or to waive any rule
for the orderly and proper conduct of the appeal. Foley v. Mannor, 844 N.E.2d
494, 502 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
[5] We further note that the State has failed to file an appellate brief in this matter.
In cases where the appellee fails to submit a brief, we will not undertake the
burden of developing arguments on its behalf. Orlich v. Orlich, 859 N.E.2d 671,
673 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Instead, we apply a less stringent standard of review
and will reverse upon a showing of prima facie error, which is error “at first
sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id.
[6] Under Indiana Code section 35-50-6-4, “[a] person who is not a credit restricted
felon and who is imprisoned for a crime or confined awaiting trial or sentencing
is initially assigned to Class I” for the purposes of assigning credit. In Class I, a
person “earns one (1) day of credit time for each day the person is imprisoned
for a crime or confined awaiting trial or sentencing.” Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3.
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[7] Because pre-sentence jail-time credit is a matter of statutory right, trial courts
generally do not have discretion in awarding or denying credit. Molden v. State,
750 N.E.2d 448, 449 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). However, those sentencing
decisions not mandated by statute are within the discretion of the trial court and
will be reversed only upon a showing of abuse of that discretion. Id. An abuse
of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic
and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d
1230, 1237 (Ind. 2012).
[8] Here, Harris claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
motion for jail-time credit. Specifically, he contends that the trial court should
have granted the motion because the DOC did not apply his credit time to his
sentence. In support of his contention, he directs us to a computer print-out
that shows a zero under the column for adjusted earned credit time.
Appellant’s App. p. 7. However, our review of the print-out shows that the
DOC did apply the 249 days to Harris’ sentence. Specifically, the print-out lists
the “initial action” date as May 23, 2005. The initial action date is the date the
DOC uses to begin computing an offender’s sentence. Harris’ sentencing date
was January 27, 2006, which is 249 days after the initial action date used by the
DOC. Had the DOC used Harris’ sentencing date as the initial action date and
given him 249 days of credit for time served, his release date would be the
same. In other words, the DOC used different dates to calculate the credit, but
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the amount of the credit was the same either way, and Harris received it. The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Harris’ motion.
[9] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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Bradley J. Harris v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Combined Opinion