FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 29 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JONATHAN E. SAMUELS, No. 12-56322
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:11-cv-06067-PSG-PJW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WELLS FARGO BANK, NA,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Philip S. Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 20, 2016**
Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Jonathan E. Samuels appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action arising from foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
341 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.
The district court properly concluded that Samuels’ action was barred by the
California Superior Court’s earlier judgment in Wells Fargo’s unlawful detainer
action against Samuels. See City of Martinez v. Texaco Trading & Transp., Inc.,
353 F.3d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth requirements for application of res
judicata under California law); Malkoskie v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 115 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 821, 825-27 (Ct. App. 2010) (judgment in unlawful detainer action
brought under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code section 1161a necessarily resolves validity of
title).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Samuels’ leave to
file a third amended complaint because amendment would have been futile. See
Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth
standard of review and explaining that a district court may deny leave to amend
where amendment would be futile); see also Chodos v. West Publ’g Co., Inc., 292
F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen a district court has already granted a
plaintiff leave to amend, its discretion in deciding subsequent motions to amend is
particularly broad.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
AFFIRMED.