UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4371
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JONATHAN PAUL JOHNSON, a/k/a Hardtime,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Margaret B. Seymour, Senior
District Judge. (3:04-cr-00545-MBS-1)
Submitted: January 27, 2016 Decided: February 2, 2016
Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David B. Betts, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.
William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, Jimmie Ewing, Stacey
Denise Haynes, Assistant United States Attorneys, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jonathan Paul Johnson appeals the district court’s judgment
revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to 30 months’
imprisonment. Johnson argues that the district court erred by
finding him guilty of second-degree assault and battery, a Grade
B violation, rather than third-degree assault and battery, a
Grade C violation.
“We review a district court’s ultimate decision to revoke a
defendant’s supervised release for abuse of discretion,” and its
“factual findings underlying a revocation for clear error.”
United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 494 (2015). To revoke supervised release, a
district court need only find a violation of a condition of
supervised release by a preponderance of the evidence. 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012); United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d
829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992). “‘[I]f the district court’s account
of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in
its entirety,’ we will not reverse the district court’s finding
simply because . . . we would have decided the fact
differently.” United States v. Stevenson, 396 F.3d 538, 542
(4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470
U.S. 564, 574 (1985)).
In order to find that Johnson committed second-degree
assault and battery rather than third-degree assault and
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battery, the district court was required to find that “moderate
bodily injury to another person result[ed] or . . . could have
resulted” from the battery. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-600(D)(1)(a)
(2014). At the time of the offense, the statute defined
“moderate bodily injury” as
physical injury requiring treatment to an organ system
of the body other than the skin, muscles, and
connective tissues of the body, except when there is
penetration of the skin, muscles, and connective
tissues that require surgical repair of a complex
nature or when treatment of the injuries requires the
use of regional or general anesthesia.
§ 16-3-600(A)(2). Having reviewed the record, we find that the
district court’s conclusion that such injury could have resulted
from Johnson’s actions is plausible. Although the object that
Johnson admitted using in the assault was not unusually
dangerous, the district court found the force and duration of
the assault severe enough to create a real danger of moderate
bodily injury, and the record contains sufficient evidence to
support this conclusion.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We deny
as moot Johnson’s motion to expedite. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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