UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4406
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JAHBOU RUDOLPH DRAKES,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 15-4407
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JAHBOU RUDOLPH DRAKES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (3:14-cr-00062-JFA-1; 3:15-cr-00079-JFA-1)
Submitted: January 19, 2016 Decided: February 2, 2016
Before AGEE and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Katherine E. Evatt, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States
Attorney, James Hunter May, Assistant United States Attorney,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Jahbou Rudolph Drakes pled guilty to possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012), and, in
a separate criminal case, to violating certain terms of
supervised release. The matters were consolidated for
sentencing. Drakes was sentenced to 71 months for the firearm
offense and 27 months, consecutive, for violating supervised
release. Drakes appeals both sentences; the appeals have been
consolidated.
I
Drakes first claims that the district court erred when
calculating his Guidelines range for the firearm offense.
Specifically, he contends that the court wrongly enhanced his
offense level by two levels based on reckless endangerment, see
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.2 (2014). We evaluate
Drakes’ legal claim de novo and review relevant factual findings
for clear error. United States v. Shell, 789 F.3d 335, 346 (4th
Cir. 2015).
The record reveals that, on January 14, 2014, Drakes was
involved in a car accident. Following the accident, Drakes
threw a loaded firearm over a fence. Drakes was transported to
a hospital. When officers went to the hospital to arrest
Drakes, who was a prohibited person, they discovered that he had
left the hospital against medical advice.
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On April 16, 2014, officers went to Drakes’ residence in
response to a suspicious/wanted person call. Responding
officers were advised of the existence of both state and federal
warrants relating to Drakes’ possession of the pistol in
January. When officers confronted Drakes, he resisted arrest by
pulling away when an officer attempted to put a handcuff on his
right wrist. An officer pulled out a taser and ordered Drakes
to put his hand behind his back. When Drakes complied, the
officer holstered the taser, and Drakes pulled away again, this
time reaching for the officer’s handgun.
Drakes chiefly contends that his actions on April 14 were
too remote in time from the underlying § 922(g) offense, which
occurred in January, for the § 3C1.2 enhancement to be proper.
Resolution of Drakes’ claim requires us to read USSG § 3C1.2
together with USSG § 1B1.3, which provides in relevant part:
[A]djustments in Chapter Three . . . shall be
determined on the basis of . . . all acts and
omissions committed . . . by the defendant . . .
[t]hat occurred . . . in the course of attempting to
avoid detection or responsibility for [the] offense.
USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). While we have not previously addressed
the precise issue before us, the Eleventh Circuit has observed
that “nothing in the Guidelines establishes that conduct ceases
to be relevant after a specified period of time.” United
States v. Rivera-Gomez, 634 F.3d 507, 513 (9th Cir. 2010). We
conclude that, given the plain language of the Guidelines, the
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enhancement was correctly applied. Drakes resisted the
officers’ attempt to arrest him for possession of the firearm.
It is immaterial that the arrest occurred some three months
after he possessed that firearm.
II
The 27-month sentence for the release violation runs
consecutively to the sentence for the firearm offense. Drakes
contends that the court erred by imposing consecutive, rather
than concurrent, sentences.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing
sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United
States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). We will
affirm a revocation sentence that is within the prescribed
statutory range and not plainly unreasonable. United States v.
Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006).
We find no merit to Drakes’ claim. The relevant policy
statement provides:
Any term of imprisonment imposed upon the revocation
of . . . supervised release shall be ordered to be
served consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment
that the defendant is serving, whether or not the
sentence of imprisonment being served resulted from
the offense that is the basis of the revocation of
. . . supervised release.
USSG § 7B1.3(f) (p.s.).
Thus, in ordering that the supervised release sentence
would run consecutively to the § 922(g) sentence, the district
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court deferred to the policy statement. Such deference, while
not required, was proper. See United States v. Thompson, 595
F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Moulden, 478
F.3d 652, 656-57 (2007). Further, in the face of such a clear
policy statement, the court was not obligated to explain its
decision to impose consecutive sentences. See, e.g., Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356-57 (2007). (“[W]hen a judge
decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case,
doing so will not necessarily require lengthy explanation.”).
III
We therefore affirm. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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