UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4310
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHAWNETTA BELTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Terry L. Wooten, Chief District
Judge. (3:14-cr-00299-TLW-1)
Submitted: December 28, 2015 Decided: February 1, 2016
Before MOTZ, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James P. Rogers, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Winston David Holliday, Jr.,
Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Shawnetta Belton appeals her conviction and the sentence
imposed by the district court after she pled guilty to
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute
oxycodone, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C),
846 (2012). Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that he has found no
meritorious grounds for appeal but raising potential issues
regarding the validity of Belton’s plea and the sufficiency of
the court’s explanation of her sentence. Belton has filed a pro
se supplemental brief asserting several errors in her plea and
sentence and arguing that trial counsel was ineffective. We
affirm.
Having reviewed the transcript of Belton’s plea colloquy,
we conclude that the district court substantially complied with
the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, and that any errors in
the colloquy did not affect her substantial rights. See United
States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 2009)
(providing standard).
With respect to Belton’s sentence, we conclude that the
district court did not err in adopting the uncontested factual
allegations of the PSR. See United States v. Powell, 650 F.3d
388, 394 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that district court may
summarily adopt information in PSR unless defendant makes
2
affirmative showing that it is inaccurate). Any error in
calculating the Guidelines range was harmless because the court
expressly stated that it would have imposed the same sentence
even if its calculations were erroneous, and the 120-month
sentence imposed by the district court was reasonable. United
States v. Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 382 (4th Cir.) (providing
harmless error standard), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 305 (2014).
Finally, the court’s thorough explanation of its sentence was
adequate. See United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th
Cir. 2009).
To the extent Belton argues that trial counsel was
ineffective, we conclude that she has not made the requisite
showing to assert an ineffective assistance claim on direct
appeal and that this claim should be raised, if at all, in a
motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012). United States v. Benton,
523 F.3d 424, 435 (4th Cir. 2008) (“Ineffective assistance
claims are generally not cognizable on direct appeal . . .
unless it conclusively appears from the record that defense
counsel did not provide effective representation.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record for any meritorious grounds for appeal and have found
none. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Belton, in writing, of
3
her right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Belton requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on his client. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4