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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-10692
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 0:12-cv-61580-JAL
BLANCO GMBH + CO. KG,
Plaintiff -
Counter Defendant -
Appellee,
versus
VLANCO INDUSTRIES, LLC, et al.,
Defendants,
VITO ANTONIO LAERA,
Defendant -
Counter Claimant -
Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(February 4, 2016)
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Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In August 2012 Blanco GmbH + Co. KG, a German corporation and
manufacturer of kitchen fixtures and accessories, brought a trademark infringement
lawsuit against Vito Antonio Laera and two corporations of which he was
president (collectively “Laera”). The parties ultimately reached a settlement and,
in April 2013, jointly filed a stipulation of dismissal and a request for the court to
enter a final judgment. Based on those filings, the district court entered a consent
judgment, which set forth the parties’ respective duties and obligations, provided
for various remedies in the event of a breach, and stated that the district court
retained jurisdiction to ensure the parties’ compliance.
Soon after the ink dried on that judgment, Laera violated it blatantly,
egregiously, and repeatedly. When Blanco discovered those violations, it filed two
motions to hold Laera in contempt. The district court did so, and we affirmed. See
Blanco GmbH + Co. KG v. Laera, 620 F. App’x 718 (11th Cir. 2015). In the
interim, Blanco filed two additional motions to hold Laera in contempt because of
new violations. It also moved for attorney’s fees and sanctions. Laera responded
with five motions to hold Blanco in contempt and a motion for an injunction
against it.
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The magistrate judge issued a report that recommended granting all of
Blanco’s motions and denying all of Laera’s. The report provided the parties with
fourteen days to file objections. On the deadline for filing objections, Laera filed
twenty-nine pages of objections, which exceeded the twenty-page limit mandated
by local rules, without seeking the court’s permission to do so. The district court
struck Laera’s objections for that reason but provided him with an additional
fourteen days to file new objections that complied with the page limits. On the
deadline for refiling his objections, Laera instead filed a motion for leave to file a
twenty-nine page objection, which the district court denied. Laera never filed
objections that complied with the local rules. The district court adopted the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. Thereafter, Blanco moved for
entry of judgment. The district court granted that motion and directed the clerk to
enter judgment in favor of Blanco. This is Laera’s pro se appeal.
As we construe his notice of appeal, Laera appeals the district court’s order
adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation.1 He first contends
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Laera filed his notice of appeal on February 18, 2015. It identified only the district
court’s order granting Blanco’s motion for entry of judgment. In his initial appellate brief,
however, Laera purports to appeal a host of orders and other court actions, including an order
that was issued in 2013, the consent judgment, the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation, and “[a]ll motions/ orders/ matters [sic] in this case, including any and all
pending motions or future motions . . . .” Although we liberally construe a pro se defendant’s
pleadings, “we nevertheless have required them to conform to procedural rules.” Moton v.
Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337, 1340 n.2 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted). We will therefore
not review any orders or judgments that were not specified in Laera’s notice of appeal. See
Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Industries, Inc., 825 F.2d 1521, 1528 (11th Cir. 1987) (“[A]n
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that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that “the
court ha[d] no jurisdiction to hold [him] in civil contempt.” That argument fails.
District courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions arising under an act of
Congress relating to trademarks, see 28 U.S.C. § 1338, and Blanco’s complaint
stated claims under federal trademark law.
Laera next contends that the district court erred by failing to consider his
objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, and that the
district court clearly erred in its factfinding. When a party fails to object to the
findings of fact in a magistrate judge’s report, “those findings are adopted by the
district court and the party may not challenge them on appeal in the absence of
plain error or manifest injustice.” Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hallmark Builders,
Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993). Despite having two opportunities to do
so, Laera failed to timely file objections to the magistrate judge’s report that
complied with the local rules regarding page limits. Although he is entitled to
some leeway as a pro se litigant, Laera is not exempt from the requirements of
procedural rules. See Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337, 1340 n.2 (11th Cir. 2011).
appellate court has jurisdiction to review only those judgments, orders or portions thereof which
are specified in an appellant’s notice of appeal.”). Even if he had specified them, we would not
consider his untimely appeal of orders or judgments from 2013. See Fed. R. App. P. (4)(a)(1)(A)
(“In a civil case . . . the notice of appeal . . . must be filed with the district court within 30 days
after the entry of the judgment or order appealed from.”); Green v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 606 F.3d
1296, 1300 (11th Cir. 2010) (“The timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a
jurisdictional requirement.”) (quotation marks and alteration omitted).
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Because he failed to timely object to the magistrate judge’s factfindings in a
document meeting the requirements of the local rules and has not shown plain error
or manifest injustice, Laera cannot now challenge those factfindings on appeal.
Resolution Trust Corp., 996 F.2d at 1149.
Finally, Laera contends that Blanco failed to show that he acted in contempt
because it did not establish that the consent judgment was “valid and lawful.”
Putting aside the fact that we already upheld the validity of the consent judgment
in Laera’s previous appeal, see Blanco GmbH + Co. KG, 620 F. App’x at 725–26,
we adhere to the general rule that “a party normally has no standing to appeal a
judgment to which he or she consented,” Reynolds v. Roberts, 202 F.3d 1303,
1312 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted). Because Laera consented to the
consent judgment, he cannot now challenge its validity on appeal. And while he
asserts that the district court “expanded [the consent judgment] beyond the
meaning of its terms,” he fails to explain how it did so.
Laera makes various conclusory allegations that several judges involved in
this case violated his due process rights as well as the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Aside from baldly asserting those violations, however, he has “fail[ed] to elaborate
or provide any citation of authority in support of [his] allegation[s].” Flanigan’s
Enters., Inc. v. Fulton County, 242 F.3d 976, 987 n.16 (11th Cir. 2001). He has
therefore waived those arguments. See id.
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AFFIRMED.
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