FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT February 8, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 13-8055
v. (D.C. Nos. 1:08-CV-00097-SWS &
2:00-CR-00059-NDF-1)
RAYMOND DEAN BROWN, (D. Wyo.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before HARTZ, McKAY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
Raymond Dean Brown appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse and remand.
I. Background
Mr. Brown was convicted after a jury trial of being a felon in possession of a
firearm, unlawfully possessing a machine gun, and carrying a machine gun during
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. He was ultimately sentenced to 30 months
on the first two counts and 360 months for the third count, to be served
consecutively.
Mr. Brown subsequently sought relief from his convictions and sentences by
filing a § 2255 motion. The district court denied that motion and it also denied
Mr. Brown’s request for a certificate of appealability (COA). Mr. Brown then filed a
COA application in this court. We granted a COA on three issues, appointed counsel
for Mr. Brown, and ordered supplemental briefing.
All three of the claims for ineffective assistance of counsel at issue on appeal
relate to information Mr. Brown provided to state authorities that he alleges led to his
federal charges and convictions for firearm violations. As we explained in our COA
order:
Prior to being charged with federal crimes, Mr. Brown was
charged with violations of state drug and firearms laws. While his state
charges were pending, Mr. Brown met with state authorities and
provided information about his criminal activities to receive
consideration in his plea negotiations [(“the proffer meeting”)]. The
state authorities informed Mr. Brown at the meeting that any
information he provided would not be used against him in state court,
but that the state could not bind federal authorities. Dennis Claman, one
of the state agents present at the meeting, later repeated inculpatory
statements made by Mr. Brown at the meeting to federal agents.
Mr. Brown subsequently entered a plea of no contest in Wyoming state
court to charges of possession of a controlled substance and operation of
an unlawful clandestine laboratory.
The week following his state proceedings, a federal grand jury
returned an indictment charging Mr. Brown with three firearms
offenses. Before trial, Mr. Brown moved to suppress the statements he
made at the meeting with the state authorities, arguing that the use of
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those statements would violate his Wyoming immunity agreement. The
district court reserved ruling on the motion. Mr. Brown did not renew
his suppression motion at trial and the government presented his
statements through the testimony of Agent Claman without any defense
objection. In our decision in Brown I, we reviewed the suppression
issue for plain error and concluded that the district court did not err in
admitting the statements[.]
United States v. Brown, No. 13-8055, at 3-4 (10th Cir. Jan. 14, 2015) (unpublished
COA order).
On appeal, Mr. Brown argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to object to the admission of evidence from the proffer meeting, which he asserts
should have been excluded under Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.1 He
also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his immunity
agreement with the state and for failing to raise that as a basis for precluding the
1
Rule 410 provides as follows:
(a) Prohibited Uses. In a civil or criminal case, evidence of the
following is not admissible against the defendant who made the plea or
participated in the plea discussions:
(1) a guilty plea that was later withdrawn;
(2) a nolo contendere plea;
(3) a statement made during a proceeding on either of those pleas under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 or a comparable state procedure;
or
(4) a statement made during plea discussions with an attorney for the
prosecuting authority if the discussions did not result in a guilty plea or
they resulted in a later-withdrawn guilty plea.
Fed. R. Evid. 410.
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admission of evidence in his federal trial regarding statements he made during the
proffer meeting. Finally, he contends that his state counsel provided ineffective
assistance during the proffer meeting by not protecting him from making self-
incriminating statements that subsequently led to him being charged and convicted of
federal crimes.
II. Discussion
“We review the district court’s legal rulings on a § 2255 motion
de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. A claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel presents a mixed question of fact and law, which we review de novo.”
United States v. Orange, 447 F.3d 792, 796 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
A) Trial Counsel’s Failure to Make a Rule 410 Objection
In ground two of his § 2255 motion, Mr. Brown argued that his trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of testimony about statements he
made during the proffer meeting.2 The government argued below that the failure to
make a Rule 410 objection did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel
because any such objection would have been futile as Rule 410 would not apply to
2
In his § 2255 motion, Mr. Brown alleged that admitting his statements from the
proffer meeting violated Rule 11 of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure. That
rule is substantially similar to Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Both the
government and the district court construed his argument as also alleging that
admitting his statements violated Rule 410, as that is the rule that applies to trials in
federal court. See R., Vol. I at 846-47, 847 n.4; id. at 1589-91, 1590 n.3.
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Mr. Brown because he had ultimately pled guilty to the state charges. In denying
Mr. Brown’s claim, the district court adopted the government’s reasoning.
The government now concedes on appeal that Mr. Brown did not in fact plead
guilty to the state charges, but instead entered a no contest plea, and therefore the
district court’s ruling is incorrect. The government goes on, however, to provide an
alternative argument for denying Mr. Brown’s claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. But the problem is that this alternative argument was never presented to the
district court.
Although we have discretion to affirm on any ground adequately supported by
the record, the exercise of that discretion is guided by three considerations: (1) was
the alternate ground “fully briefed and argued here and below”; (2) did the parties
have “a fair opportunity to develop the factual record”; and (3) “whether, in light of
factual findings to which we defer or uncontested facts, our decision would involve
only questions of law.” Elkins v. Comfort, 392 F.3d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir. 2004)
(brackets omitted).
The argument the government is now making was not briefed or argued below
and Mr. Brown did not have a chance to respond to it below. As noted above, claims
for ineffective assistance of counsel present mixed questions of law and fact, Orange,
447 F.3d at 796, and the government’s new argument raises factual issues about
defense counsel’s trial strategy. The parties have not had a chance to develop a
factual record on those issues.
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Under these circumstances, the best course is to reverse the district court’s
disposition of this claim and to remand for further proceedings. See Evers v. Regents
of Univ. of Colo., 509 F.3d 1304, 1310 (10th Cir. 2007) (remanding to the district
court and explaining that instead of “examining and resolving the merits of [the
defendant’s alternate] contentions, . . . [the court would] adopt the better practice of
leaving the matter to the district court in the first instance”).
B) Trial Counsel’s Failure to Investigate and Litigate the Immunity Agreement
In ground twelve of his § 2255 motion, Mr. Brown argued that his trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate his immunity agreement with
the state and by failing to raise that as a basis for not admitting evidence of
statements he made during the proffer meeting during his trial (which led to the issue
being reviewed on appeal for plain error). The government argued that this issue was
raised and resolved on direct appeal and therefore it could not be raised again in a
§ 2255 motion. In denying this claim, the district court adopted the government’s
reasoning.
Courts typically do not review § 2255 claims if they have been raised and
resolved on direct appeal. See Abernathy v. Wandes, 713 F.3d 538, 549-50 (10th Cir.
2013) (“[U]nder the law-of-the case doctrine, courts ordinarily . . . refuse to
reconsider arguments presented in a § 2255 motion that were raised and adjudicated
on direct appeal.”). Although Mr. Brown did raise on appeal an issue regarding the
admissibility of certain statements and whether their admission violated his immunity
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agreement, he did not raise this claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. See
United States v. Brown, 400 F.3d 1242, 1255-56 (10th Cir. 2005). It would have
been unusual for Mr. Brown to do so—and we would likely have declined to consider
such a claim if he did—because we do not generally consider claims for ineffective
assistance of counsel on direct review. See United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239,
1242 (10th Cir. 1995) (explaining that only “rare claims [of ineffective assistance of
counsel,] which are fully developed in the record” may be brought on direct appeal).
Instead, the proper course is to raise those claims in a collateral proceeding, as
Mr. Brown did here. See id. (“The rule in this circuit . . . is that claims of
constitutionally ineffective counsel should be brought on collateral review, in the
first petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.”).
On appeal, the government no longer argues that this claim should be denied
because it was raised in Mr. Brown’s direct appeal. Instead, the government argues
the claim should be denied on the merits. Because Mr. Brown’s claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel was not raised and resolved on direct appeal, the district court
erred in denying it on that basis. As the court never reached the merits of this claim
due to its procedural dismissal, the claim should be remanded for the district court to
consider the merits in the first instance. Remand is especially appropriate here
because ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are fact intensive and the district
court is “the forum best suited to developing the facts necessary to determining the
adequacy of representation,” Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505 (2003).
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C) State Counsel’s Failure to Protect Mr. Brown at the Proffer Meeting
In the supplement to ground twelve in his § 2255 motion, Mr. Brown argued
that his state counsel provided ineffective assistance during the proffer meeting by
not protecting him from making self-incriminating statements that subsequently led
to him being charged and convicted of federal crimes. This issue was properly raised
in Mr. Brown’s § 2255 motion, but the government did not address this claim in its
response to the motion and the district court likewise did not discuss this claim in its
decision.3 The district court therefore erred in failing to address the merits of this
claim.
The government argues on appeal that this claim should be denied on the
merits. But again, as with the other two claims for ineffective assistance of counsel,
it is not appropriate for us to resolve this claim on the merits in the first instance. We
therefore remand this claim to the district court for further consideration.
III. Conclusion
We reverse and vacate that portion of the district court’s decision denying
Mr. Brown’s claims for ineffective assistance of counsel addressed in this appeal
(grounds two, twelve, and the supplement to ground twelve). We remand for further
proceedings consistent with this order and judgment. On remand, the district court
3
Although Mr. Brown refers to this claim as a “supplement” to ground twelve, it was
filed as part of his initial § 2255 motion and is appended to the end of his section on
grounds twelve, thirteen, and fourteen. See R., Vol. I at 539-51 (grounds twelve,
thirteen, and fourteen); id. at 552-55 (supplement to grounds twelve, thirteen, and
fourteen).
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should consider appointing counsel for Mr. Brown, providing both parties an
opportunity to file supplemental briefs, and holding an evidentiary hearing if
necessary.
We also grant Mr. Brown’s unopposed motion for leave to file his
supplemental reply brief out of time.
Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh
Circuit Judge
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