UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-2106
CHARLES A. BROWN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Graham C. Mullen,
Senior District Judge. (1:13-cv-00096-GCM)
Submitted: January 26, 2016 Decided: February 9, 2016
Before GREGORY and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Charlotte W. Hall, CHARLES T. HALL LAW FIRM, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Jill W. Rose, Acting United States
Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina; John J. Engel, Special
Assistant United States Attorney, Boston, Massachusetts, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Charles A. Brown appeals the district court’s order
upholding the Commissioner’s denial of Brown’s applications for
disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income.
On appeal, Brown primarily argues that the district violated
Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288 (4th Cir. 2013), when affirming
the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) finding that Brown’s heart
condition does not meet or equal the criteria of Listing 4.04C.
Specifically, Brown contends that the ALJ failed to explain
sufficiently his finding that Brown’s impairment does not meet
or equal the Listing criteria and that the district court erred
by mining facts from the medical record to support the ALJ’s
decision. We agree that the ALJ’s explanation was inadequate
and that the district court erred in its analysis. Accordingly,
we vacate the district court’s judgment and direct the court to
remand the case to the agency for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
“We will affirm the Social Security Administration’s
disability determination when an ALJ has applied correct legal
standards and the ALJ’s factual findings are supported by
substantial evidence.” Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634 (4th
Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Substantial
evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. It consists of more than a
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mere scintilla of evidence but may be less than a
preponderance.” Pearson v. Colvin, ___ F.3d ___, No. 14-2255,
2015 WL 9204335, at *3 (4th Cir. Dec. 17, 2015) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). We do not “reweigh
conflicting evidence[] [or] make credibility determinations” in
evaluating whether a decision is supported by substantial
evidence; rather, “[w]here conflicting evidence allows
reasonable minds to differ,” we defer to the Commissioner’s
decision. Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The Commissioner uses a five-step process to evaluate a
disability claim. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4)
(2015). Pursuant to this process, the Commissioner asks, in
sequence, whether the claimant: (1) worked during the alleged
period of disability; (2) had a severe impairment; (3) had an
impairment that met or equaled the severity of a listed
impairment; (4) could return to his past relevant work; and
(5) if not, could perform any other work in the national
economy. Id. The claimant bears the burden of proof at Steps
One through Four, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at
Step Five. Pearson, 2015 WL 9204335, at *3. If a decision
regarding disability can be made at any step of the process,
however, the inquiry ceases. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4),
416.920(a)(4).
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Brown argues that the ALJ’s Step Three analysis was grossly
inadequate under our holding in Radford. In explaining his
decision at Step Three — that Brown’s heart condition does not
meet or equal the level of severity of Listing 4.04C — the ALJ
stated only that:
The medical evidence of record does not establish the
presence of objective findings that would meet or
equal any impairment listed in the Listing of
Impairments as found in Appendix 1, Subpart P of
Regulations No. 4. This is consistent [with] the
State Agency opinion considering Listing[] 4.04
(Ischemic Heart Disease).
We found a substantially similar explanation deficient in
Radford because it was “devoid of reasoning” and rendered
impossible the task of determining whether the ALJ’s finding was
supported by substantial evidence. 734 F.3d at 295.
The Commissioner contends that, despite the similarity in
the cursory explanations provided by the ALJ here and the ALJ in
Radford, we should not remand for further proceedings because,
unlike the medical record in Radford, the medical record here
clearly establishes that Brown’s heart condition does not meet
or equal the criteria of Listing 4.04C. We conclude that
Brown’s medical record is not so one-sided that one could
clearly decide, without analysis, that Listing 4.04C is not
implicated. Further, we do not accept Brown’s and the
Commissioner’s invitations to review the medical record de novo
to discover facts to support or refute the ALJ’s finding at Step
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Three, and it was error for the district court to do so.
Instead, we remand to avoid engaging in fact-finding “in the
first instance” and to allow the ALJ to further develop the
record so that we can conduct a meaningful judicial review in
the event the case returns to us. Radford, 734 F.3d at 296.
Brown also argues on appeal that the district court erred
in concluding that the ALJ properly accorded less than
controlling weight to the opinion of one of Brown’s treating
cardiologists. However, in view of our decision to vacate the
decision and remand on Step Three of the sequential analysis, we
decline to address this issue.
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s judgment and
remand with instructions to remand the case to the agency for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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