J-S67017-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
K.M.W. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
C.S.
Appellant No. 85 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered December 16, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
Domestic Relations at No(s): 00669 S2002
PACSES #639104710
K.M.S. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
C.S.
No. 102 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered December 16, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
Domestic Relations at No(s): 00669 S 2002
PACSES NO. 639104710
BEFORE: BOWES, J., PANELLA, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED FEBRUARY 09, 2016
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S67017-15
In this consolidated cross-appeal, K.M.W. (“Mother”) and C.S.
(“Father”)1 contend that the trial court erred in its calculation of child
support for the parties’ child. After careful review, we affirm.
In 2007, a panel of this Court described the procedural history of this
case as “long and tortured.” See K.M.J. v. C.S., No. 1452 MDA 2005, at 1
(Pa. Super. 2007) (unpublished memorandum). Suffice it to observe that
the history has not gotten any shorter or less tortured over the intervening
years. After that panel affirmed the award of counsel fees to Mother from
Father, the parties agreed to a suspension of child support payments from
Father to Mother. See K.M.S. v. C.S., No 263 MDA 2014, at 4 (Pa. Super.
2014) (unpublished memorandum). As the subsequent panel of this Court
observed,
[e]verything between the Parties remained relatively calm until
July 2, 2012, when [Mother] filed a new Complaint for child
support. After the initial conference, [Father] was found to owe
child support to [Mother]. Due to the complexity of the case,
[Mother] was permitted discovery in order to prepare for the de
novo hearing. [Father] initially failed to comply with these
discovery requests, requiring [Mother] to file a Motion to Compel
and a Motion for Sanctions. After a hearing in front of the
Support Master, [Father] was assessed a support obligation in
the amount of $509.00 per month, plus $51.00 per month on
arrears. Both parties filed exceptions …
See id., at 4-5. That panel also affirmed an award of counsel fees to Mother
from Father.
____________________________________________
1
Father is proceeding pro se in this appeal.
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Currently before this panel is the trial court’s order denying Father’s
exceptions to the Support Master’s recommendations, and granting in part
and denying in part Mother’s exceptions. We will address Father’s appeal
first, and then Mother’s cross-appeal.
Our standard of review of modifications to a child support award is well
settled. A trial court’s decision regarding the modification of a child support
award will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion or a
misapplication of the law. See Morgan v. Morgan, 99 A.3d 554, 559 (Pa.
Super. 2014), appeal denied, 113 A.3d 280 (Pa. 2015). “We will not
interfere with the broad discretion afforded the trial court absent an abuse of
discretion or insufficient evidence to sustain the support order.” Id. (citation
omitted). “[A]n abuse of discretion requires proof of more than a mere
error of judgment, but rather evidence that the law was misapplied or
overridden, or that the judgment was manifestly unreasonable or based on
bias, ill will, prejudice or partiality.” Portugal v. Portugal, 798 A.2d 246,
249 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations omitted).
An award of support, once in effect, may be modified via petition at
any time, provided the petitioning party demonstrates a material and
substantial change in their circumstances warranting a modification. See
Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.19(a). “The burden of demonstrating a material and
substantial change rests with the moving party, and the determination of
whether such change has occurred in the circumstances of the moving party
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rests within the trial court’s discretion.” Kimock v. Jones, 47 A.3d 850,
855 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted).
Father raises nine issues for our review. The first three each involve
an argument that the trial court erred in changing the manner by which it
calculated Father’s income available for child support purposes. First, Father
argues that the coordinate jurisdiction rule required the trial court to use the
same method used when child support was calculated in 2005. Second, he
contends that collateral estoppel prohibited the trial court from changing the
method of calculation. Finally, Father asserts that the trial court erred by
not following the law of the case doctrine and continuing to calculate his
income as it had originally been calculated in 2005.
All three issues are premised upon Father’s belief that a prior trial
court order in 2005 limited Father’s available income to the pass-through
income he received from a corporation of which he was the sole owner. In
all three arguments, Father argues that the trial court committed error by
instead engaging a cash flow analysis of Father’s income.
We conclude that none of these three arguments merits any relief.
The trial court accurately highlighted the fatal flaw in each of these three
arguments.
However, [Father] is mistaken. The May 18, 2005, Order and
Opinion by Judge Hess did not hold that [Father’s] pass through
income was the only income to be considered. Rather, the
opinion stated that any repayment to [Father] of money he
loaned his business would not be considered income to [Father.]
Furthermore, on appeal of that Order our Superior Court found
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that [Father] had waived the specific question of whether his
pass through income should be considered his only income
because [Father] had not cited to any applicable case or
statutory law. While at the time this decision may have, for all
practical purposes, made [Father’s] pass through income his
only income available for support purposes, it was not
specifically held that only his pass through income would be used
for support purposes in perpetuity.
Trial Court Order and Opinion, 12/15/14, at 13 (citations and footnotes
omitted). Thus, Father’s belief that the 2005 order explicitly limited the
income subject to consideration to his pass-through income is not supported
by the record. We further conclude that even if the order could be
reasonably read to support Father’s interpretation, the trial court was
empowered to perform a cash flow analysis as Mother established that a
cash flow analysis better reflected Father’s current income. See 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 4352(a); Krebs v. Krebs, 944 A.2d 768, 774–75
(Pa.Super.2008) (court has power to correct support award based upon prior
misrepresentation of income).
In a related issue, nominally his fifth, Father contends that the trial
court erred in its application of the cash flow analysis. Specifically, Father
argues that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that some of the
expenses claimed by Father on his federal tax returns were not really
business expenses, but expenses for the personal benefit of Father.
This Court has consistently held that
the net income of a defendant as shown on income tax returns is
not to be accepted in a support case as the infallible test of his
earning capacity. Particularly is this true where the defendant is
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in business for himself and is allowed substantial business
“expenses,” items of depreciation and sundry other deductions
which enable him to live luxuriously before spending his taxable
income.
Murphy v. Murphy, 599 A.2d 647, 651 (Pa. Super. 1991) (citations
omitted). Here, the trial court found that Father’s corporate tax return
utilized deductions for expenses such as Father’s monthly gym membership
fee, personal medical expenses, child support payments, and other
miscellaneous expenses for the benefit of Father. These findings are amply
supported by the record, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that such “expenses” should not be excluded from Father’s
available income.
In his fourth issue on appeal, Father argues that the trial court erred in
failing to include $10,000 Mother received from her husband’s sale of his
prior residence in calculating Mother’s income available for support. In
2013, Mother’s husband sold his residence to move in with Mother, and
recognized a gain on the sale. It is undisputed that Mother used
approximately $10,000 of this gain to pay her debts. See Mother’s Brief, at
17.
Father contends that the trial court was required to include this
amount in its calculation of Mother’s income available for child support in
2013. Mother argues, without any citation to authority, that this sum does
not constitute income, primarily based upon an allusion to federal income
taxation rules. However, in support matters, income includes “gains derived
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from dealings in property[,] … income from discharge of indebtedness[,] …
[and] other entitlements to money[.]” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4302. We therefore
agree with Father that the $10,000 used by Mother to retire debt is not
statutorily excluded from her income.
We do, however, conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding the $10,000 from its calculation of Mother’s available
income. There is no evidence of record that this was more than a one-time
occurrence. While the trial court could have considered this one-time event
in calculating Mother’s income for 2013, we cannot conclude that it was an
abuse of the trial court’s discretion to disregard it in this matter. See, e.g.,
Portugal, 798 A.2d at 251.
In issue six, Father argues that the trial court erred in failing to reduce
his child support payments according to the existing custody order which
provides for equal physical custody of the child. However, as the trial court
properly notes, it is not the language of the order which entitles a obligor to
a reduction in his support obligations, but the time he actually spends with
physical custody of the subject child. See Riley v. Foley, 783 A.2d 807,
814 (Pa. Super. 2001). Here, Father has never contradicted Mother’s
assertion that the child spends no time in Father’s custody. He merely
argues that the custody order controls over the de facto circumstances. We
therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to reduce
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Father’s support liability pursuant to the explicit award of shared physical
custody.
Next, Father asserts, in a broad claim, that the trial court erred in
dismissing his exceptions to the master’s report and recommendation. This
argument does not raise any arguments that are independent of his other
arguments on appeal. As we find that none of Father’s issues on appeal
merit relief, we conclude that this issue similarly merits no relief.
In his eighth issue on appeal, Father contends that the trial court erred
in failing to reduce his support obligation due to the financial benefit
received by Mother from her husband. We note that this Court has
previously stated:
Above all, we are mindful of the general principle that a parent’s
duty to support his minor children is absolute, and the purpose
of child support is to promote the children’s best interests. The
court has no legal authority to eliminate an obligor’s support
obligation, where the obligor can reasonably provide for some of
the children’s needs.
Silver, 981 A.2d at 296 (citation omitted). Father has made no claim that he
cannot afford to pay his child support obligation. The trial court was
empowered to find that the fact Mother’s household receives a subsidy from
her husband impacted Father’s support obligation. However, this
consideration is within the discretion of the trial court, and we will not assail
that discretion absent an abuse. We cannot say that the trial court’s
decision was an abuse of its discretion, as Father’s duty to support his child
is absolute. Therefore, Father’s eighth issue merits no relief.
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In his final issue, Father argues that the trial court erred in its
treatment of the parties’ child’s counseling expenses. However, Father fails
to provide any argument in support of this issue in either of the argument
sections of his principal or reply brief. We therefore find this issue waived.
Turning to Mother’s cross-appeal, we note that Mother’s arguments all
center on contentions that the trial court erred in calculating Father’s income
available for support. In fact, Mother supports all three issues with a single
section of argument. We therefore address all three issues as a single
challenge.
All of Mother’s arguments assail the trial court’s credibility
determinations. Our review of the record indicates that, while there is
certainly ambiguity in the amount of income earned by Father, and that this
ambiguity is almost certainly due to Father’s obfuscation, the trial court’s
findings are supported by the record, and constitute a reasonable attempt at
setting Father’s income in a non-confiscatory manner. We therefore cannot
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. Mother’s issues on appeal
merit no relief.
Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/9/2016
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