[Cite as Robinson v. Cuyahoga Cty. Common Pleas Court, 2016-Ohio-497.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 103589
JODY ROBINSON
RELATOR
vs.
CUYAHOGA COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT:
COMPLAINT DISMISSED
Writ of Mandamus
Motion No. 489959
Order No. 492559
RELEASE DATE: February 8, 2016
FOR RELATOR
Jody E. Robinson, pro se
Inmate No. 0191006
Cuyahoga County Jail
P.O. Box 5600
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: James E. Moss
Assistant County Prosecutor
The Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
By: Willie Mitchell
Assistant County Prosecutor
4261 Fulton Parkway
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
MARY J. BOYLE, J.:
{¶1} Jody E. Robinson has filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in order to
compel the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to issue rulings on 12 pro se
motions that were filed in State v. Robinson, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-15-598539. We
decline to issue a writ of mandamus on behalf of Robinson.
{¶2} Initially, we find that Robinson’s complaint for a writ of mandamus is
defective for the following reasons:
1) Failure to comply with R.C. 2969.25(A), which mandates that any inmate that
commences a civil action against a government entity or employee must file an affidavit
that contains a description of each civil action or appeal of a civil action that an inmate
has filed in the previous five years in any state or federal court. Clarke v. McFaul, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89447, 2007-Ohio-2520.
2) Failure to comply with R.C. 2969.25(C), which provides that any inmate that
files a complaint against a government entity or employee must include a statement that
sets forth the balance in his inmate account for the preceding six months, as certified by
the institutional cashier. State ex rel. White v. Bechtel, 99 Ohio St.3d 11,
2003-Ohio-2262, 788 N.E.2d 634. It must also be noted that the subsequent filing of the
statement does not cure the defect. Fuqua v. Williams, 100 Ohio St.3d 211,
2003-Ohio-5533, 797 N.E.2d 982.
3) Failure to comply with R.C. 2731.04, which provides that a party filing an
original action for mandamus must bring the action in the name of the state on relation of
the person applying. Rust v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 108 Ohio St.3d 139,
2005-Ohio-5795, 841 N.E.2d 766.
4) Failure to comply with Civ.R. 10(A), which requires that the addresses of all
parties be listed in the caption of the original action. State ex rel. Tate v. Callahan, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 85615, 2005-Ohio-1202.
{¶3} Finally, Robinson has failed to establish that he is entitled to a writ of
mandamus in order to compel the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to render
rulings on 12 motions that were filed between September 9, 2015, and September 22,
2015. An extraordinary writ of mandamus, to compel rulings on motions that have been
pending less than 120 days, is premature. See Sup.R. 40(A)(3); Majid v. Sutula, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97019, 2011-Ohio-3993; State ex rel. Huffman v. Ambrose, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 95546, 2010-Ohio-5376.
{¶4} It must also be noted that even if more than 120 days had lapsed since the
filing of Robinson’s pro se motions, this court is not required to issue a writ of mandamus
to compel rulings on the motions.
Moreover, even the passing of one hundred twenty days may still not
compel a mandamus to issue. The rule may impose upon the trial court the
duty to rule upon motions within one hundred twenty days for purposes of
efficient court administration. That, however, does not necessarily mean
that a corresponding right is created for litigants to force a trial judge to rule
upon any motion within one hundred twenty days, regardless of the posture
of the litigation. The need for discovery, the issues presented, the possibility
of settlement, other motions pending in the case, and even other matters
pending before the court could all, inter alia, be sufficient reason for the
trial court within its proper discretion not to rule upon a motion within one
hundred twenty days. Furthermore, allowing litigants to enforce such a rigid
rule risks depriving other litigants of due process, invites gamesmanship in
litigation, and could frustrate the policy of deciding cases on their merits
and not on procedural technicalities. State ex rel. Richard v. Gorman
(Aug. 19, 1992), Cuyahoga App. No. 63333, unreported.
Moreover, a court has inherent power “to regulate procedure that
justice may be the result.” Aluminum Indus., Inc. v. Egan (1938), 61 Ohio
App. 111, 115, 14 O.O. 174, 176, 22 N.E.2d 459, 462. Recognizing a
litigant’s “right” to compel a judge to rule on any motion after the lapse of
one hundred twenty days could undermine the court’s power. This is not
to say that a trial court may leave a motion unresolved indefinitely. Given
the proper circumstances, mandamus will lie to compel the exercise of
discretion. However, mandamus does not lie to control that discretion, State
ex rel. Butler v. Demis (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 123, 20 O.O.3d 121, 420
N.E.2d 116, and in certain instances prematurely compelling a court to rule
on a matter would be to usurp a judge’s discretion.
State ex rel. Rodgers v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 83 Ohio App.3d 684,
685, 615 N.E.2d 689 (8th Dist.1992).
{¶5} Accordingly, we grant the motion to dismiss filed by the Cuyahoga County
Court of Common Pleas. Costs to Robinson. The court directs the clerk of courts to
serve all parties with notice of this judgment and the date of entry upon the journal as
required by Civ.R. 58(B).
{¶6} Complaint dismissed.
MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE
TIM McCORMACK, P.J., and
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR