United States v. Samuel Parris

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-7021

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

SAMUEL PARRIS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger,
District Judge. (1:08-cr-00063-MR-7)

Argued: December 8, 2015 Decided: February 11, 2016

Before AGEE and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and Theodore D. CHUANG,
United States District Judge for the District of Maryland,
sitting by designation.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished opinion. Judge Agee wrote
the opinion, in which Judge Harris and Judge Chuang joined.

ARGUED: Joshua B. Carpenter, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH
CAROLINA, INC., Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy
Elizabeth Ray, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville,
North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Ross Hall Richardson,
Executive Director, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA,
INC., Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jill
Westmoreland Rose, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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AGEE, Circuit Judge:

Samuel Parris appeals the district court’s order denying

his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion for a sentence reduction based

on an amendment to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. We vacate

and remand the district court’s order because the court

erroneously found that it the lacked legal authority to reduce

Parris’ sentence below the statutory minimum term of

incarceration.

I.

A.

In 2008, Parris pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to

distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and

846. This offense carries a mandatory-minimum sentence of 120

months imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). 1 The

probation office prepared a presentence report that calculated

Parris’ offense level at 29 and his criminal history category at

VI, resulting in a guideline range of 151-188 months

imprisonment.

Before sentencing, the Government moved, pursuant to

“Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines and Title 18, United

1
This opinion omits internal marks, alterations, citations,
emphasis, or footnotes from quotations unless otherwise noted.

3
States Code, Section 3553(e),” for a downward departure from the

applicable guideline range to reflect Parris’ substantial

assistance. J.A. 28 (emphasis added). The Government’s motion

recommended that Parris receive a four-level departure, thereby

putting his guideline range at 110-137 months, with the low-end

of that range below the statutory minimum sentence of 120

months.

A substantial-assistance motion authorizes a sentencing

court to deviate from the guideline range should it deem that

course appropriate under the sentencing factors. Such a motion

under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) authorizes the court to sentence a

defendant below the term otherwise required by an applicable

statutory minimum sentence. See United States v. Williams, 687

F.3d 283, 286-87 (6th Cir. 2012). A motion under § 5K1.1, by

contrast, only authorizes a departure from the calculated

guideline range, but not below the statutory minimum sentence

otherwise required. See United States v. Johnson, 393 F.3d 466,

470 n.4 (4th Cir. 2004). In other words, “[a] § 3553(e) motion

allows the district court to depart below both the statutory

minimum sentence and the low-end of the Guideline range.

However, a § 5K1.1 motion does not allow the court to depart

below the statutory minimum sentence.” Id. “When a statutory

minimum sentence is involved in the case, a § 5K1.1 motion is

less defendant-friendly than a § 3553(e) motion.” Id.

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 At Parris’ sentencing hearing, the court heard argument

from the Government in support of its substantial assistance

motion. The court then granted the Government’s motion without

limitation:

For the reasons set forth in the written
motion for downward departure, as well as
those orally articulated by the U.S.
attorney, the court determines that the
motion for downward departure should be and
the same is allowed. And the court
concludes that a final offense level of 25,
criminal history category VI with a
guideline range of 110 to 137 months is
correct in this case.

J.A. 21. Following further argument, the court imposed a

sentence of 120 months, equal to a 21% reduction below the

original guideline range, but at the statutory minimum.

Although the sentencing court granted the Government’s

motion in full during the hearing, the corresponding docket

entry stated “MOTION for Downward Departure pursuant to U.S.S.G.

5K1.1 – granted.” J.A. 4. In the statement of reasons form,

the sentencing court checked the box indicating that a mandatory

minimum sentence was entered, and a separate checkbox indicating

that the sentence was below the mandatory minimum pursuant to a

§ 3553(e) motion went unmarked. Thus, in contrast to the

court’s ruling stated ore tenus from the bench at the sentencing

hearing, the court’s written judgment arguably indicates that

the Government’s motion was granted only under § 5K1.1.

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 This distinction is relevant because this case ultimately

centers on whether the sentencing court granted the Government’s

substantial-assistance motion under § 3553(e), § 5K1.1, or both.

In turn, that finding governs whether the district court abused

its discretion in ruling on the current § 3582(c)(2) motion

under the belief it lacked the power to depart below the

statutory minimum sentence.

B.

Parris filed the instant motion seeking a sentence

reduction under Amendment 782 to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines,

which generally reduces by two points the offense levels

assigned to the drug quantities described in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1.

The probation office prepared a resentencing report that

indicated Parris’ offense level fell to 27 using Amendment 782,

resulting in a new guideline range of 130-162 months. The

report further noted that, because Parris’ current sentence was

below the original guideline range based on his assistance to

the Government, he was eligible for a comparable reduction below

the new guideline range. Finally, the report explained that

Parris also qualified for a revised sentence below the mandatory

minimum because the substantial-assistance motion was based on §

3553(e). The probation report ultimately recommended a

comparable sentence reduction to 103 months.

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 The Government filed a response in which it agreed with the

probation report’s recommendation, noting that “[s]ince Parris

received a downward departure pursuant to the Government’s §

3553(e) and § 5K1.1 motion, a reduction comparably less to the

low-end of Parris’ amended Guidelines range results in a term of

imprisonment of 103 months.” J.A. 74.

As the judge who originally sentenced Parris had since

retired, the current sentencing proceeding was assigned to

another judge. The assigned judge denied Parris’ motion,

concluding he lacked authority to depart from the existing

sentence of 120 months because it was a statutory minimum

sentence. In relevant part, the court held:

Defendant is not eligible for a reduction.
He received the mandatory minimum sentence.
It is true that the Government moved for a
downward departure pursuant to USSG § 5K1.1
and for a sentence below the mandatory
minimum pursuant to 18 USC § 3553(e). It
appears, however, that only the 5K1.1 was
granted. There is nothing in the record to
show that the 3553(e) was granted. The text
order of January 28, 2009, reflects only the
granting of the 5K1.1, and the Statement of
Reasons does not show any § 3553(e) motion
being granted. Most tellingly, the
Government had moved for the Court to depart
downward to 110 months, which is below the
mandatory minimum, but the Court nonetheless
imposed a sentence at the mandatory minimum
of 120 months. . . . In sum, Defendant has
pointed to nothing in the record showing
that any § 3553(e) motion was ever granted.

Since Defendant received the mandatory
minimum sentence and no motion has been

7
 granted allowing a sentence below that
mandatory minimum, Defendant is not eligible
for any relief pursuant to 18 USC § 3582.

J.A. 38. In sum, the district court determined that it lacked

authority to depart any further from the current sentence

because it was the statutory minimum and the original sentencing

court had not granted the Government’s § 3553(e) motion which

would have permitted a departure below that threshold.

Parris timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291.

II.

Parris challenges the district court’s judgment on two

grounds. First, he disputes the court’s legal conclusion that a

§ 3553(e) motion must be granted before a sentence may be

reduced below the statutory minimum under Amendment 782 and the

applicable regulations. Alternatively, he contests the court’s

finding that the sentencing judge did not grant the Government’s

§ 3553(e) motion. We address only the latter argument because

it is dispositive of this appeal.

The district court’s finding at issue -- that the

Government’s § 3553(e) motion was never granted –- is based on

its interpretation of the sentencing court’s earlier judgment.

Our case law instructs that the interpretation of a prior order

is ultimately a legal question with substantial deference

8
afforded to the district court’s construction. See Anderson v.

Stephens, 875 F.2d 76, 80 n.8 (4th Cir. 1989). This

“substantial deference” essentially amounts to abuse of

discretion review. See Wolfe v. Clarke, 718 F.3d 277, 284 (4th

Cir. 2013) (“[W]e review a district court’s interpretation of

its own orders for abuse of discretion.”); see also United

States v. Luskin, 16 F. App’x 255, 262 (4th Cir. 2001). 2

A district court abuses its discretion if its decision is

guided by erroneous legal principles or rests upon clearly

erroneous factual findings. See United States v. Barber, 119

F.3d 276, 283 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc). We are authorized to

review the record and reasons offered by the district court and

reverse if the “appellate court has a definite and firm

conviction that the court below committed a clear error of

judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the

relevant factors.” Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 561 F.2d

494, 506 (4th Cir. 1977).

To be sure, we will afford a wide berth to a trial court

interpreting its own prior judgment and will question that

2There is out of circuit authority suggesting that de novo
review without any degree of deference is more appropriate when
the reviewing judge did not direct or author the first judgment,
as is the case here. See, e.g., United States v. Spallone, 399
F.3d 415, 423-24 (2d Cir. 2005). We need not wade into that
issue today because Parris prevails even applying the abuse of
discretion standard.

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interpretation only in rare cases. This, however, is such a

case. The district court abused its discretion here by failing

to give appropriate deference to the sentencing court’s oral

findings stated from the bench.

Although a court speaks through its judgments and orders,

in federal criminal cases the general rule is that the oral

pronouncement of the sentence governs. See Rakes v. United

States, 309 F.2d 686, 687-88 (4th Cir. 1962). 3 Consequently, a

court “should carry out the true intention of the sentencing

judge as this may be gathered from what he said at the time of

sentencing.” United States v. Morse, 344 F.2d 27, 30 (4th Cir.

1965); see also United States v. Schultz, 855 F.2d 1217, 1225

(6th Cir. 1988) (“[W]hen an oral sentence conflicts with the

written sentence, the oral sentence controls.”). Only in the

event of an unresolvable ambiguity at the sentencing hearing

have we before authorized turning to the criminal judgment and

other written evidence to discern intent. See United States v.

Osborne, 345 F.3d 281, 283 n.1 (4th Cir. 2003); see also United

States v. Villano, 816 F.2d 1448, 1450 (10th Cir. 1987) (en

banc) (“When an orally pronounced sentence is ambiguous,

3 While the rule is the opposite in many state courts, see
Amin v. Cty. of Henrico, 63 Va. App. 203, 209 (2014) (“Because
a circuit court speaks only through its orders, we look to the
sentencing order . . . to discern its holding.”), the federal
rule is clear.

10
however, the judgment and commitment order is evidence which may

be used to determine the intended sentence.”).

Instead of letting the oral pronouncements of the

sentencing court guide its analysis, the district court below

turned immediately to the written clerical record and statement

of reasons, remarking that they “reflect[ed] only the granting

of the 5K1.1.” J.A. 38. The court’s conclusion rested entirely

on its observation that the original written sentencing order

and corresponding docket entries did not evidence the

Government’s § 3553(e) motion. This approach is contrary to the

controlling case law and is an abuse of the district court’s

discretion. See United States v. Pembrook, 609 F.3d 381, 383

(6th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a “district court abuses its

discretion when it . . . applies the law improperly”).

Focusing on the sentencing colloquy, as we must, we have

little trouble concluding that the sentencing judge granted the

§ 3553(e) motion. The Government’s substantial assistance

motion unequivocally cited both § 3553(e) and § 5K1.1 as grounds

for departure. At the sentencing hearing, the court made no

distinction between the statutory and guidelines grounds for

departure, and instead endorsed the Government’s motion “[f]or

the reasons set forth in the written motion.” J.A. 21. The

clear conclusion to be drawn from the sentencing court’s oral

ruling is that the court, in fact, granted the Government’s

11
motion on both grounds. See United States v. Taylor, 414 F.3d

528, 533 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he intent of the sentencing court

must guide any retrospective inquiry into the term and nature of

a sentence.”).

Moreover, after granting the Government’s substantial

assistance motion without qualification, the court recited the

applicable guideline range as 110-137 months. The lower end of

this range plainly falls below the statutory minimum of 120

months. The court’s conclusion that the applicable sentencing

range was below the statutory minimum sentence reflects that the

court did not consider itself constrained to the statutory

sentencing floor, which could only be the case if the court had

granted the § 3553(e) motion. As Parris points out, “[i]f the

court had considered itself bound by the mandatory minimum . . .

it would have stated here that the low end of the range was 120

months, not 110 months.” Opening Br. 17. We find Parris’

observation on point. See United States v. Glover, 686 F.3d

1203, 1204 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Because the statutory mandatory

minimum sentence was greater than the otherwise applicable

guidelines range, the statutory mandatory minimum . . . became

the guidelines range . . . .”).

On appeal, the Government has changed its position from

that taken below. It now maintains that the district court

correctly looked to the written materials in this case because

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the record is ambiguous about the outcome of its § 3553(e)

motion. The sentencing court did not “explicitly state that

[he] was granting the . . . § 3553(e) motion,” the Government

contends. Response Br. 17. As recited above, however, the

sentencing judge wholly adopted the Government’s motion that

expressly invoked § 3553(e). That motion plainly states that

the Government moves pursuant to “Section 5K1.1 of the

Sentencing Guidelines and Title 18, United States Code, Section

3553(e)” for a downward departure to reflect Parris’ substantial

assistance. J.A. 28 (emphasis added). In turn, the district

court’s ruling ore tenus was explicit: “For the reasons set

forth in the written motion for a downward departure . . . the

court determines that the motion for downward departure should

be and the same is allowed.” Id. at 21. Nothing in the

sentencing court’s bench ruling indicates anything but a grant

of the substantial assistance motion on the grounds pled: §

5K1.1 and § 3553(e). In the context of sentencing, we often

uphold orders that are granted by reference to a written

submission without added clarification, see, e.g., United States

v. Brame, 448 F. App'x 364, 367 (4th Cir. 2011); United States

v. Trotman, 406 F. App’x 799, 806 (4th Cir. 2011), and we see no

reason to require more here.

Alternatively, the Government argues that the fact that the

judge imposed a sentence of 120 months, which falls right at the

13
statutory minimum, indicates that the § 3553(e) motion was not

granted. We are unpersuaded this point creates ambiguity, let

alone a discrepancy sufficient to allow the district court to

consult only the written record. See Equitable Life Assur. Soc.

of U.S. v. Deem, 91 F.2d 569, 575 (4th Cir. 1937) (“[I]t is not

permissible for courts by a strained and over-refined

construction of ordinary words to create an ambiguity which

would not otherwise exist.”). The fact that the sentencing

court imposed the statutory minimum sentence does not prove that

the sentencing judge, who had just granted the Government’s

motion and recited a guideline range below the statutory

minimum, thought that he lacked the authority to impose a lesser

sentence. The Government fails to appreciate that nothing from

the sentencing transcript hints that the sentencing judge

thought himself constrained to impose the statutory minimum

sentence. Instead, as described, the court specifically

identified the applicable guideline range as falling below the

statutory minimum due to the Government’s motion. On this

record, we find it more likely that the sentencing judge simply

found 120 months to be the most appropriate sentence, not that

he silently rejected the § 3553(e) motion.

In sum, the district court erred when it failed to focus on

the sentencing court’s oral ruling in its inquiry as to whether

the sentencing court granted the Government’s § 3553(e) motion.

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Instead, it looked only to the written record to find an

ambiguity, and with this view of the evidence, wrongly surmised

that the § 3553(e) motion was never granted. Applying the

correct framework, we must reach the opposite conclusion: the

substantial assistance motion was granted under § 3553(e) and

therefore the district court was authorized to depart below the

statutory minimum sentence. Accordingly, the district court

abused its discretion in rejecting Parris’ 18 U.S.C. §

3582(c)(2) motion on the ground that it lacked legal authority

to award a sentence reduction. See Williams, 687 F.3d at 285-

86.

Parris appears to suggest that we should forge ahead and

award the downward departure ourselves. This we cannot do.

Parris’ eligibility for a reduction does not entitle him to a

lower sentence. Whether, and to what extent, a reduction is

warranted here are decisions left to the discretion of the

district court, as guided by the applicable sentencing factors.

See United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 253, 263 (4th Cir.

2015).

III.

Pursuant to the foregoing, we vacate the judgment of the

district court and remand this case for further proceedings.

VACATED AND REMANDED

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