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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
STEPHEN VINCENT BIDGOOD
Appellant No. 649 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 24, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0000285-2014
BEFORE: BOWES, OTT, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 11, 2016
Appellant, Stephen Vincent Bidgood, appeals from the March 24, 2015
judgment of sentence of forty-eight hours to six months’ imprisonment
entered in Luzerne County following his bench conviction for driving under
the influence-high rate of alcohol (“DUI”).1 Appellant contests the trial
court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.
On August 6, 2013, Corporal Anthony Doblovasky, of the Pennsylvania
State Police, was filling his vehicle with gas, when he heard “loud screaming
and yelling.” N.T., 2/5/15, at 3-5. Corporal Doblovasky turned around and
observed a male occupant of a Jeep Wrangler with his hand out of the
window, moving it up and down. Id. at 5. He further observed the vehicle
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(b).
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did not have doors. Id. Corporal Doblovasky proceeded to get in his patrol
vehicle and pull over the jeep, driven by Appellant. Id. at 9. After
approaching the jeep, Corporal Doblovasky observed Appellant, a male
passenger in the front seat, and a female passenger in the back seat. Id.
at 10. Corporal Doblovasky then inquired if the passengers needed
assistance and asked for Appellant’s license and registration. Id. He
detected an odor of alcohol emanating from the vehicle, observed Appellant
had glassy eyes, and noticed Appellant’s speech was slurred, slow, and
lethargic. Id. Following these observations, Corporal Doblovasky performed
two field sobriety tests and determined Appellant was too impaired to
operate a vehicle safely. Id. at 11-13.
On April 1, 2014, by criminal information, the Commonwealth charged
Appellant with DUI-high rate of alcohol, DUI-general impairment,2 and
operating his vehicle in an unsafe condition.3 Appellant filed a motion to
suppress evidence, based on a lack of reasonable suspicion or probable
cause to stop his vehicle, on August 4, 2014.4 On February 5, 2015, the
trial court held a hearing on Appellant’s motion to suppress. Corporal
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
2
75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1).
3
75 Pa.C.S. § 4107(b)(2).
4
Appellant filed an identical motion to suppress evidence on September 4,
2014.
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Doblovasky testified as follows, relevant to his decision to stop Appellant
after he initially observed the vehicle.
[The Commonwealth]:
Q. [W]hat did this behavior coupled with the
observation of no doors on the Jeep lead you to
believe?
[Corporal Doblovasky]:
A. I thought he may be in need of some
assistance, definitely trying to get my attention.
That was my first thought, that he wanted me. I
wanted to make sure he was okay. And also, he was
in violation of the vehicle code as well without the
doors on the Wrangler.
* * *
Q. In relation to the behavior that you saw that
night, what did you think about the behavior?
A. It’s not normal, that he’s obviously trying to
get my attention. Being that I had a marked car,
marked uniform and, you know, observed him yelling
in my direction, that, you know, someone wants you
if that happens.
Q. Have you ever been in a situation where
you witnessed this type of behavior before?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. And on those occasions, what did you do?
A. People were in need of help. There was a
domestic in the car, things of that nature. But, yes,
I’ve been flagged down like that before.
Q. Once you left the gas station, what did you
do?
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A. There was a lady at the gas station -- as I
was observing the car as it continued down the road
– she was telling me that they were trying to get
your attention –
* * *
A. [A]s I continued to watch the vehicle with
screaming and yelling and actually carry on pass my
location, the lady was sort of stunned. And she said,
I think he was yelling at you or towards you. And I
said, I think so. And at that point, I quickly tried to
put the gas cap on and get the gas out, pull out in …
traffic, pull out into traffic. I did also notice that
when I was – had that conversation with her, it
appeared he sped his vehicle up a little quicker.
N.T., 2/5/15, at 6-8. On cross-examination, Corporal Doblovasky
unambiguously articulated his reasons for initiating the traffic stop: “I pulled
him over for two reasons. I said he was in distress and also because there
was no doors on the vehicle and that the vehicle needed doors[.]” Id. at 26.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court made the following
findings of fact.
[The trial] court: Findings of fact, on August 6th,
2013, at approximately 9:50 p.m., the officer was
engaged . . . fueling his vehicle, the vehicle driven
by [Appellant] passed the location. And the driver or
other passenger of the vehicle appeared to call out
to the officer a distress signal which the officer
interpreted and other bystanders interpreted as a
distress signal. The officer also advised that the
vehicle was being operated without doors.
The officer proceeded to follow [Appellant] and
stop [Appellant] to inquire about what appeared to
him to be a distress call and also what appeared in
his observation to be a violation of the vehicle,
operation of a vehicle in an unsafe manner because
the vehicle did not have doors.
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Id. at 49-50; see also Trial Ct. Op., 6/10/15, at 3-4.
Appellant immediately proceeded to a stipulated non-jury trial, and the
trial court found Appellant guilty of DUI-high rate of alcohol and acquitted
Appellant of the remaining two charges. On March 24, 2015, the trial court
sentenced Appellant to a term of imprisonment of forty-eight hours to six
months, plus a $500 fine. Thereafter, on April 13, 2015, Appellant filed a
timely notice of appeal. Appellant filed a court-ordered statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 1925(b), and the trial court filed a responsive Rule 1925(a)
opinion.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for our consideration.
Whether the trial court erred by denying
[Appellant]’s [m]otion to [s]uppress where
[Appellant] was illegally stopped by [o]fficers who
lacked probable cause for the pulling over [of] his
vehicle and all evidence resulting from said illegal
seizure, including all physical evidence, were fruit of
the poisonous tree?
Appellant’s Brief at 2.
Appellant argues that he was subject to an illegal seizure, and
therefore, the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion. Id. at 6.
Specifically, Appellant avers that Corporal Doblovasky conducted an
investigatory detention without the requisite reasonable suspicion. Id. at 7.
He posits that because Corporal Doblovasky did not witness Appellant
commit a traffic violation or “immediately ask [Appellant] if anything was
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wrong[,]” there was not reasonable suspicion for the stop.5 Id. For the
reasons that follow, we disagree.
When considering the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, this
Court employs the following standard of review.
[An appellate court’s] standard of review in
addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression
motion is limited to determining whether the
suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn
from those facts are correct. Because the
Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression
court, we may consider only the evidence of the
Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the
defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the
context of the record as a whole. Where the
suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
the record, [the appellate court is] bound by [those]
findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal
conclusions are erroneous. Where . . . the appeal of
the determination of the suppression court turns on
allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s
legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate
court, whose duty it is to determine if the
suppression court properly applied the law to the
facts. Thus, the conclusions of the courts below are
subject to [] plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526-27 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(citation omitted).
It is well-established that “[t]he Fourth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect
5
While Appellant suggests in his “statement of question involved” that
Corporal Doblovasky lacked probable cause to effectuate the seizure, his
argument solely focuses on a lack of reasonable suspicion without any
discussion of the probable cause standard. See Appellant’s Brief at 2, 6-8.
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individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Commonwealth v.
Walls, 53 A.3d 889, 892 (Pa. Super. 2012). In analyzing the
constitutionality of police-citizen interactions, we look to the nature of the
exchange between an officer and a citizen, which are categorized as follows.
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has led to the
development of three categories of interactions
between citizens and the police. The first of these is
a “mere encounter” (or request for information)
which need not be supported by any level of
suspicions, but carries no official compulsion to stop
or respond. The second, an “investigative detention”
must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it
subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of
detention, but does not involve such coercive
conditions as to constitution the functional equivalent
of an arrest. Finally, an arrest or “custodial
detention” must be supported by probable cause.
Commonwealth v. Gutierrez, 36 A.3d 1104, 1107 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(citation omitted).
Reasonable suspicion is a less stringent standard
than probable cause necessary to effectuate a
warrantless arrest, and depends on the information
possessed by police and its degree of reliability in
the totality of the circumstances. In order to justify
the seizure, a police officer must be able to point to
specific and articulable facts leading him to suspect
criminal activity is afoot. In assessing the totality of
the circumstances, courts must also afford due
weight to the specific, reasonable inferences drawn
from the facts in light of the officer’s experience and
acknowledge that innocent facts, when considered
collectively, may permit the investigative detention.
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Commonwealth v. Clemens, 66 A.3d 373, 379 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation
omitted). Moreover, the level of suspicion required specifically for vehicle
stops is as follows.
Whenever a police officer . . . has reasonable
suspicion that a violation of this title is occurring or
has occurred, he may stop a vehicle upon request or
signal, for the purpose of checking the vehicle’s
registration, proof of financial responisbilty, vehicle
identification number or engine number or the
driver’s license, or to secure other information as the
officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to
enforce the provisions of this title.
Commonwealth v. Ibrahim, ___ A.3d ___, ___ 2015 WL 6777602, at *3
(Pa. Super. 2015) (citing 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b)). Further, “[t]raffic stops
based on a reasonable suspicion: either of criminal activity or a violation of
the Motor Vehicle Code under the authority of Section 6308(b) must serve a
stated investigatory purpose.” Id.
Instantly, the record supports the trial court’s findings of fact.
Compare N.T., 2/5/15 at 6-8, with N.T., 2/5/15 at 49-50; Trial Ct. Op.,
6/10/15, at 3-4; see also Gutierrez, 36 A.3d at 1107. Furthermore, the
record amply demonstrates that Corporal Doblovsky had sufficient
reasonable suspicion to effectuate an investigative detention, as he
articulated an investigatory purpose for the stop. See Clemens, 66 A.3d at
379; Ibrahim, ___ A.3d at ___, 2015 WL6777602, at *3. Specifically,
Corporal Clemens related that when he heard yelling and screaming coming
from Appellant’s vehicle, he believed, in light of his experience as a police
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officer, the occupants may be in need of assistance. N.T., 2/5/2015 at 5-7.
This belief was further bolstered by an eyewitness’ interpretation of the
yelling, i.e., that the occupants of the vehicle were seeking police assistance.
Id. at 7-8. Moreover, Corporal Doblovasky testified he believed Appellant
was in violation of the Motor Vehicle Code, and such testimony was credited
by the trial court. See Trial Ct. Op., 2/5/15, at 4 (“This [c]ourt found the
testimony of Pennsylvania State Police Corporal Anthony Doblovasky to be
credible.”); accord 75 Pa.C.S.§ 6308(b) (stating a police officer may stop a
vehicle upon “reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is occurring or
has occurred[.]”).
Based on the foregoing discussion, we conclude the trial court properly
denied Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence. See Jones, 121 A.3d at
526-27. Therefore, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
Judgement of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/11/2016
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Com. v. Bidgood, S.
Combined Opinion