IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
Sandra Denise Lawton, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. N12C-07-008 JRJ
)
Cox Auto Group, Inc., et al., )
Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs, )
)
v. )
)
Bianca Blackstock, et al., )
Third-Party Defendants. )
ORDER
AND NOW TO WIT, this 11th day of February, 2016, the Court having
duly considered Third-Party Defendant Bianca Blackstock’s Motion for Summary
Judgment; Defendants Cox Auto Group, Inc. and HCAC, LLC’s Response to
Third-Party Defendant Bianca Blackstock’s Motion for Summary Judgment; and
Third-Party Defendant Bianca Blackstock’s Reply Motion for Summary Judgment;
IT APPEARS THAT:
1. This action arises from a single vehicle automobile accident on
July 3, 2010. 1 After purchasing a 2001 Ford Explorer from Defendants
Cox Auto Group, Inc. and HCAC, LLC (“Defendants”) on July 2, 2010, Plaintiff
Hermaine Jackson (“Plaintiff Jackson”) took the vehicle on a trip from Delaware to
1
Complaint (“Compl.”) (Trans. ID. 45120443).
South Carolina.2 Accompanying Plaintiff Jackson were Bianca Blackstock
(“Blackstock”) and Plaintiffs Sandra Denise Lawton, Devon Isiah Lawton,
Shaelise Thybulle, and Malachi Jackson.3 Plaintiff Jackson drove for the majority
of the trip but, upon entering South Carolina, permitted Blackstock to drive the
vehicle.4 While Blackstock was operating the vehicle, the left rear tire failed, and
Blackstock lost control of the vehicle and exited the roadway. 5 The vehicle
overturned, resulting in serious personal injuries to Plaintiffs. 6
2. On July 2, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against the Defendants
alleging that Defendants breached: (a) the implied warranty of merchantability
under 6 Del. C. § 2314; (b) the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
under 6 Del. C. § 2315; and (c) all express warranties under 6 Del. C. § 2313.
These allegations stem from the Defendants’ sale of the 2001 Ford Explorer to
Plaintiff Jackson.
3. Defendants filed a Third-Party Complaint against Blackstock alleging
that Blackstock’s negligence caused the accident. Defendants assert that
Blackstock: (a) operated a motor vehicle in a careless or imprudent manner without
2
Id. ¶¶ 8–10.
3
Id. ¶ 10.
4
Id. Defendants Cox Auto Group, Inc. and HCAC, LLC’s Response to Third-Party Defendant
Bianca Blackstock’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. A Bianca Blackstock Deposition at 7–
10 (“Blackstock Dep.”) (Trans. ID 57585349).
5
Compl. ¶ 11; Blackstock Dep. at 12–14.
6
Compl. ¶ 11; Blackstock Dep. at 12–14.
2
due regard for road, weather or traffic conditions then existing; (b) failed to give
full time and attention to the operation of her motor vehicle and failed to keep a
proper lookout; (c) failed to exercise reasonable care in the operation of a motor
vehicle; (d) operated a vehicle at such a speed so as to not be capable of controlling
it upon the roadway; and (e) was otherwise negligent as may be found throughout
the discovery process. 7
4. On a motion for summary judgment all facts must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, and the moving party must establish that
there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that he is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.8 Generally, issues of negligence are not susceptible
of summary adjudication.9 “Therefore, a court can grant a plaintiff’s motion for
judgment as a matter of law only where the facts are so clear and undisputed as to
allow the jury only one reasonable conclusion in favor of the plaintiff.”10
5. Blackstock maintains that she is entitled to summary judgment because
there is no evidence in the record that she was negligent.11 Blackstock argues that
she had a valid New York driver’s license, had no reason to believe the vehicle
7
Defendants Cox Auto Group, Inc. and HCAC, LLC’s Answer to the Complaint with
Affirmative Defenses, Counterclaim Against Hermaine Jackson and Third-Party Complaint
Against Bianca Blackstock ¶¶ 71–72. (Trans. ID. 46726781).
8
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56; Kold, LLC v. Croman, 2014 WL 7008431, at *2 (Del. Super. 2014).
9
Manerchia v. Kirkwood Fitness & Racquetball Clubs, Inc., 2010 WL 1114927, at *2 (Del.
2010) (TABLE); Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 469 (1962).
10
Samson v. Somerville, 2006 WL 686586, at *1 (Del. 2006) (TABLE).
11
Third-Party Defendant Bianca Blackstock’s Motion for Summary Judgment at ¶ 4 (Trans. ID.
57402207).
3
was unsafe, and neither the investigating officer nor the other occupants of the
vehicle have testified that Blackstock was speeding or not paying attention. 12
6. Blackstock testified that her family was taking a long trip to South
Carolina and that she had been awake for most of the trip.13 Prior to the accident,
Blackstock had been driving for about an hour while all of the vehicle occupants
were sleeping.14 Defendants point to evidence in the record that Blackstock was an
inexperienced driver who drove infrequently, was driving a vehicle that she had
never driven before, was driving 70 miles per hour, and does not remember if she
had two hands on the steering wheel at the time of the accident.15 Viewing the
facts in the light most favorable to Defendants, there are genuine issues of material
fact in dispute as to whether Blackstock was negligent and whether her negligence
was a proximate cause of the accident.
WHEREFORE, Third-Party Defendant Bianca Blackstock’s Motion for
Summary Judgment is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_____________________________
Jan R. Jurden, President Judge
12
Id.
13
Blackstock Dep. at 7–9.
14
Id. at 7–10.
15
Id. at 7, 20, 28–34, 45–47, 55–56, 62.
4