J-S03021-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JOSEPH WATSON
Appellant No. 986 EDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order March 23, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1206401-1998
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OTT, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 16, 2016
Joseph Watson appeals pro se from the order entered March 23, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, that dismissed as
untimely his third petition for relief, filed pursuant to the Pennsylvania Post
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546. Watson claims the
PCRA court erred “in dismissing appellant[’s] PCRA petition/application for
reinstatement of his appellate rights, that was not addressed by the court.”
Watson’s Brief at 6. We affirm.
The PCRA court summarized the procedural history of this case as
follows:
On February 4, 2000, following a jury trial, [Watson] was
convicted of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, aggravated
assault, and possession of an instrument of crime. On
September 22, 2000, [Watson] was resentenced to an aggregate
term of twenty-two and a half to forty-five years’ incarceration.
On September 12, 2003, following a direct appeal, the Superior
J-S03021-16
Court affirmed the judgment of sentence.2 [Watson] did not file
for allowance of appeal.
On April 15, 2004, [Watson] filed a timely PCRA petition. On May
11, 2005, the PCRA court denied the petition. The Superior
Court affirmed [the PCRA] court’s denial of [Watson’s] petition
on September 29, 2006.3 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
denied his petition for allowance of appeal on April 13, 2007.4
On July 8, 2009, [Watson] filed his second PCRA petition.
Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907,
[Watson] was served notice of the [PCRA] court’s intention to
dismiss his PCRA petition on July 19, 2010. On June 13, 2011,
the [PCRA] court dismissed [Watson’s] petition as untimely. On
December 13, 2012, following a direct appeal, the Superior
Court affirmed the dismissal of [Watson’s] PCRA petition.5
On June 4, 2014, [Watson] filed his third pro se PCRA petition,
the dismissal of which is the subject of the current appeal. On
September 26, 2014, the PCRA court issued notice of intent to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 907.
_______________________________________
2
Commonwealth v. Watson, [835 A.2d 838] 3150 EDA
2000 (unpublished memorandum) (Pa. Super. Sept. 12,
2003).
3
Commonwealth v. Watson, [911 A.2d 188] 1465 EDA
2005 (unpublished memorandum) (Pa. Super. Sept. 29,
2006).
4
Commonwealth v. Watson, [921 A.2d 496] 602 EAL
2006 (Pa. Apr. 13, 2007).
5
Commonwealth v. Watson, [64 A.3d 18] 1733 EDA
2011 (unpublished memorandum) (Pa. Super. Dec. 13,
2012).
_____________________________________________
PCRA Court Opinion, 4/22/2015, at 1–2. On March 23, 2015, the court
dismissed Watson’s PCRA petition as untimely. This timely appeal followed.
-2-
J-S03021-16
Watson was not ordered to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors
complained of on appeal.
The principles that guide our review are well settled:
Our standard of review of an order denying PCRA relief is
whether the record supports the PCRA court’s determination and
whether the PCRA court’s decision is free of legal error.
Commonwealth v. Phillips, 2011 PA Super 231, 31 A.3d 317,
319 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Berry, 2005
PA Super 219, 877 A.2d 479, 482 (Pa. Super. 2005)). The PCRA
court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support
for the findings in the certified record. Id. (citing
Commonwealth v. Carr, 2001 PA Super 54, 768 A.2d 1164,
1166 (Pa. Super. 2001)).
We must first address whether Appellant satisfied the timeliness
requirements of the PCRA. The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a
jurisdictional threshold and may not be disregarded in order to
reach the merits of the claims raised in a PCRA petition that is
untimely. Commonwealth v. Murray, 562 Pa. 1, 753 A.2d 201,
203 (Pa. 2000). Effective January 16, 1996, the PCRA was
amended to require a petitioner to file any PCRA petition within
one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final. 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence “becomes final
at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review
in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking
the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Where a petitioner’s
judgment of sentence became final on or before the effective
date of the amendment, a special grace proviso allowed first
PCRA petitions to be filed by January 16, 1997. See
Commonwealth v. Alcorn, 703 A.2d 1054, 1056-1057 (Pa.
Super. 1997) (explaining application of PCRA timeliness proviso).
However, an untimely petition may be received when the
petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that any of the three
limited exceptions to the time for filing the petition, set forth at
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii), are met. A petition
invoking one of these exceptions must be filed within sixty days
of the date the claim could first have been presented. 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). In order to be entitled to the exceptions
to the PCRA’s one-year filing deadline, “the petitioner must plead
-3-
J-S03021-16
and prove specific facts that demonstrate his claim was raised
within the sixty-day time frame” under section 9545(b)(2). Carr,
768 A.2d at 1167.
Commonwealth v Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4–5 (Pa. Super. 2014) (footnote
omitted).
In its opinion, the PCRA court found that Watson’s present PCRA
petition was untimely. The PCRA court also determined that, although
Watson advanced a claim based upon the new constitutional right
announced in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), Watson
failed to file his petition within 60 days of the date the claim could have been
presented, as required by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). See PCRA Court
Opinion, 4/22/2015, at 3. Further, the PCRA court found Watson failed to
satisfy the “newly recognized constitutional right” exception to the PCRA’s
bar, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii), since Alleyne has not been afforded
retroactive effect by our Supreme Court or the United States Supreme
Court. See PCRA Court Opinion, supra at 3–4, citing Commonwealth v.
Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 995 (Pa. Super. 2014). Finally, the PCRA court
determined that Watson’s remaining claims, including ineffective assistance
of counsel, malicious prosecution, trial court error, and fraud — which we
interpret as the claims presented in support of his request for reinstatement
of direct appeal rights — do not satisfy any exception to the PCRA’s
timeliness requirements. Accordingly, the PCRA court concluded it lacked
jurisdiction to entertain Watson’s third PCRA petition.
-4-
J-S03021-16
Having carefully reviewed the record, the applicable law, and the well-
reasoned opinion of the PCRA court, we agree that Watson’s present petition
is untimely and that no timeliness exception applies. The PCRA court’s
opinion aptly addresses Watson’s claims. Accordingly, we affirm on the
basis of the PCRA court’s opinion.
Order affirmed.1
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/16/2016
____________________________________________
1
In the event of further proceedings, we direct the parties to attach a copy
of the PCRA court’s 4/22/2015 Opinion to this memorandum.
-5-
Circulated 01/19/2016 04:27 PM