FOURTH DIVISION
BARNES, P. J.,
RAY and MCMILLIAN, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
February 12, 2016
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A15A1994. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY
SYSTEM OF GEORGIA v. JORDAN et al.
A15A1995. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY
SYSTEM OF GEORGIA v. BRADLEY et al.
A15A2125. MCG HEALTH, INC. et al. v. JORDAN et al.
A15A2126. MCG HEALTH, INC. et al. v. BRADLEY et al.
RAY, Judge.
The parents of Cayleb Drayton and the parents of Jonathan White (“the
plaintiffs”) filed separate lawsuits in DeKalb County asserting claims for negligence
under the Georgia Tort Claims Act against the Board of Regents of the University
System of Georgia (“BOR”) and MCG Health, Inc., MCG Health System, Inc., the
Medical College of Georgia Physician Practice Group Foundation, and Georgia
Regents Medical Associates, Inc. (collectively “MCG”) arising out of the medical
care and treatment that their children received at the Children’s Hospital of Georgia
(Georgia Regents Medical Center) in Richmond County. After undergoing surgical
procedures there, the children were transferred to Children’s Healthcare of Atlanta
in DeKalb County, where they underwent multiple corrective surgeries requiring
lengthy hospitalization. Although the alleged negligent acts or omissions that form
the bases of the lawsuits occurred solely in Richmond County, the plaintiffs filed their
respective complaints in DeKalb County, where a substantial portion of their resulting
losses occurred. The trial court denied BOR and MCG’s motions to transfer the cases
to Richmond County, finding that venue was proper in DeKalb County pursuant to
OCGA § 50-21-28. These interlocutory appeals ensued. As the issues of venue
presented in Case Nos. A15A1994, A15A1995, A15A2125, and A15A2126 are
identical, we consolidate the cases for the purposes of appellate review. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s ruling on the motions to transfer.
1. BOR and MCG contend that the trial court erred in concluding that venue
is proper in DeKalb County, where a substantial portion of the plaintiffs’ losses
occurred. We disagree.
Here, the underlying facts relating to the issue of venue are undisputed.
Therefore, the trial court’s application of the law to the undisputed facts is subject to
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de novo review. See HD Supply, Inc. v. Garger, 299 Ga. App. 751, 751 (683 SE2d
671) (2009).
When an action is brought under the Georgia Tort Claims Act against a State
entity, even when the State entity is not the sole tortfeasor, the mandatory venue
provision of OCGA § 50-21-28 applies. See Dean v. Tabsum, Inc., 272 Ga. 831, 834
(536 SE2d 743) (2000). OCGA § 50-21-28 provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ll tort
actions against the state under this article shall be brought in the state or superior
court of the county wherein the loss occurred[.]” Thus, the determinative factor in the
cases before us is the situs of loss.
The term “loss,” as used in the Georgia Tort Claims Act, is defined in OCGA
§ 50-21-22 (3) as “personal injury; disease; death; damage to tangible property,
including lost wages and economic loss to the person who suffered the injury, disease,
or death; pain and suffering; mental anguish; and any other element of actual
damages recoverable in actions for negligence.” (Emphasis supplied.) Had the
legislature intended to limit venue for claims under the Georgia Tort Claims Act to
the county where the negligent acts or omissions giving rise to the damages occurred,
instead of where the “loss” occurred, it could have so provided. When the language
of a statute is plain and unambiguous and does not lead to an absurd result, it supplies
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the sole evidence of legislative intent, and it must not be contravened. See Hall
County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Peachtree Doors, 214 Ga App. 613, 614 (448 SE2d
476) (1994). Upon a plain reading of OCGA §§ 50-21-22 (3) and 50-21-28, it is clear
that the legislature intended to allow a tort action to be brought against the State in
the county where economic loss, pain and suffering, mental anguish, and other
elements of actual damages occurred. Since it is undisputed in the cases before us that
the plaintiffs incurred losses in DeKalb County, venue is proper in DeKalb County.
Furthermore, in Dept. of Transp. v. Evans, 269 Ga. 400 (499 SE2d 321) (1998),
our Supreme Court has addressed the question of whether a literal interpretation of
OCGA § 50-21-28 would subject the State to numerous lawsuits in different counties
arising out of the same occurrence, depending on where the various losses occurred.
The Court found that, in such a case, “there is no concern of an absurd result in the
event of multiple claims derived from personal injuries to the same individual, each
constituting a loss as contemplated in OCGA § 50-21-28, because [joinder of the
claims may be required and] nothing in the statute precludes the plaintiff’s election
of venue among the locations of loss.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 401.
For the above reasons, the trial court’s denial of the motions to transfer venue
is affirmed.
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2. In Case No. A15A1995, BOR also asked us to consider the merits of another
interlocutory ruling by the trial court regarding the applicable limits of BOR’s
liability for monetary damages under OCGA § 50-21-29 (b) (1). We decline to
consider the merits of that interlocutory ruling at this time because the trial court’s
ruling will not impair BOR’s ability to present its defense on the merits of the
plaintiffs’ claims at trial and because the issue may become moot upon the final
disposition of the case. Nevertheless, BOR’s right to appeal this issue is preserved,
and the issue may be raised by BOR in any future appellate review available to it.
Judgments affirmed in Case Nos. A15A1994, A15A1995, A15A2125, and
A15A2126. Barnes, P. J., concurs. McMillian, J., concurs in judgment only as to
Division 2 and concurs fully otherwise.
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