United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
June 12, 2003
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 02-51126
Summary Calendar
MARIA GOMEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. SA-01-CV-880
Before GARWOOD, WIENER and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Maria Gomez appeals from the affirmance of the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security denying her application for
disability and supplemental security income (SSI) benefits. Gomez
contends that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred by relying
on the biased opinions of doctors employed by insurers for workers
compensation purposes; that the ALJ erred by not crediting medical
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5 the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Expert Dr. Ernest Gregory’s opinion regarding Gomez’s need to
elevate her leg; that the ALJ failed to make clear what evidence
was credited, or discredited, and why; that the ALJ misstated the
medical record and substituted his lay opinion for medical opinion;
that the ALJ erred in his assessment of Gomez’s residual functional
capacity; and that the ALJ posed a defective hypothetical question
to Vocational Expert Patricia Collins.
Any inherent biases in physicians’ opinions are a matter for
the Commissioner to determine when deciding what weight and
credibility to give to the evidence. This court will not disturb
such determinations. See Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 295
(5th Cir. 1992). Moreover, Gomez has not shown how any alleged
inherent biases in Texas’s workers’ compensation laws influenced
the physicians in her case.
Regarding Dr. Gregory’s testimony, Gomez seeks to have this
court undermine the Commissioner’s determinations regarding the
weight and credibility of the evidence, something this court will
not do. See Anthony, 954 F.2d at 295. Moreover, the ALJ noted
that no other physician had indicated an ankle-lifting limitation,
and observed that Gomez had sat at her hearing for fifty-five
minutes seemingly without difficulty. The ALJ thus had some basis
for rejecting Dr. Gregory’s testimony. Cf. Frank v. Barnhart, 326
F.3d 618, 622 (5th Cir. 2003) (ALJ impermissibly drew medical
conclusions but any error was harmless).
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Gomez’s contention that the ALJ did not make clear what
medical evidence was credited, and what evidence was not, is
without merit. The ALJ’s decision contains detailed analysis based
on the administrative record, allowing this court to review the
decision.
The MRI report that Gomez alleged the ALJ misread expressly
stated that a chronic ankle injury “appears to be a predominantly
healed commuted fracture” (emphasis added). Gomez is correct that
the MRI showed that the injury was not entirely healed due to the
lack of solid osseous bridging. However, the ALJ did not
misinterpret the MRI by emphasizing that the MRI suggested that
Gomez’s ankle injury had improved. Indeed, it had “predominantly
healed.” The ALJ thus did not impermissibly engage in “playing
doctor[,]” Frank, at 622, by making his own independent medical
assessment about Gomez’s condition.
The ALJ explained his credibility determination regarding
Gomez’s subjective symptoms adequately. Falco v. Shalala, 27 F.3d
160, 163-64 (5th Cir. 1994). Moreover, Gomez’s testimony at her
administrative hearing that Naproxen eased her pain and that she
had sought treatment infrequently provided substantial evidence
supporting the ALJ’s credibility finding. Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971).
The October 1999 residual functional capacity assessment and
the report of the March 1999 functional testing both indicated that
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Gomez had physical capabilities beyond those found by the ALJ. The
ALJ’s findings regarding Gomez’s residual functional capacity thus
were supported by substantial evidence. Id.
A hypothetical question is adequate if it “reasonably
incorporate[s] the disabilities recognized by the ALJ[.]” Morris v.
Bowen, 864 F.2d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1988). Gomez does not contend
that the ALJ did not incorporate the disabilities he recognized
into the hypothetical. Rather, she contends that he neglected to
incorporate factors that he should have incorporated. This is
unavailing because the evidence did not require the ALJ to find any
further disabilities beyond those he incorporated into the
hypothetical.
The only past relevant work Collins indicated Gomez could
perform under the limitations found by the ALJ was as a sewing
machine operator. Gomez’s work history indicated that she had
worked as a seamstress from 1974 to 1985, and again from 1987 to
1991, within fifteen years before the hearing. Because that was
the only job identified by Collins as past relevant work to which
Gomez could return, Gomez’s contention regarding a fifteen-year
limitation is unavailing.
Gomez’s contention that there was no discussion regarding the
specific limitations of her past relevant work is premised on Dr.
Gregory’s testimony that she needed to occasionally lift her foot
off of the ground. However, the ALJ discredited Dr. Gregory’s
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testimony. Collins therefore need not have taken that limitation
into account. See Morris, 864 F.2d at 336. Moreover, Dr. Gregory
testified that while seated any necessary elevation could be
accomplished by putting “a box or something under her feet” and
Collins testified “that’s not a problem” vocationally with respect
to the seated jobs considered. Because Collins ruled out other
past relevant work under the limitations ultimately found by the
ALJ, none of the requirements of those jobs needed to be addressed
by Collins.
AFFIRMED.
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