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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JOHNNY MARCELLUS COLLINS
Appellant No. 631 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 25, 2012
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0006085-2010
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OTT, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED FEBRUARY 19, 2016
Appellant, Johnny Marcellus Collins, appeals nunc pro tunc1 from the
judgment of sentence entered July 25, 2012, after he was convicted on
various charges, including possession of crack cocaine with intent to deliver
(“PWID”). Collins contends that the evidence obtained during his arrest
should have been suppressed due to a violation of the Municipal Police
Jurisdiction Act (“MPJA”). We conclude that the “hot pursuit” exception
applied, and that therefore the arrest was legal under the MPJA. We thus
affirm the judgment of sentence.
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1
Collins’s direct appeal rights were restored via a Post Conviction Relief Act
petition on March 20, 2015, and Collins filed this appeal on April 7, 2015.
However, the trial court did not enter the order on the docket until June 23,
2015. Therefore, Collins’s notice of appeal is treated as being timely filed on
June 23, 2015. See Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5).
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On appeal, Collins’s sole argument is that the trial court erred in failing
to suppress evidence obtained during his arrest. We review the denial of a
motion to suppress physical evidence as follows.
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial
court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
whether the factual findings are supported by the record and
whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are
correct.
[W]e may consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so
much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted
when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the
record supports the findings of the suppression court, we are
bound by those facts and may reverse only if the court erred in
reaching its legal conclusions based upon the facts.
Further, [i]t is within the suppression court’s sole province as
factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight
to be given their testimony.
Commonwealth v. Houck, 102 A.3d 443, 455 (Pa. Super. 2014) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
The Commonwealth presented the following evidence at the hearing on
Collins’s pre-trial motion. Detective Jason Paul of the Harrisburg City Vice
Unit contacted Detective Corey Dickerson of the Dauphin County Drug Task
Force with a tip that Collins would be selling crack cocaine at a specific
location in Harrisburg. See N.T., Suppression Hearing, 9/20/11, at 36.
Detective Dickerson later informed detective Paul that he had arranged for a
confidential informant to make a purchase from Collins on September 16,
2010. See id., at 36-37. Detective Dickerson completed the necessary
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paperwork, and turned the case file over to Detective Paul for any further
actions. See id., at 37.
A little over a month later, a confidential informant told Detective Paul
that he had seen Collins with a large amount of crack cocaine and a weapon
in a gold Oldsmobile. See id., at 38. The informant also supplied the license
plate number of the vehicle. See id., at 38-39.
Detective Paul spent the morning searching for Collins, eventually
finding the Oldsmobile in the neighborhood where he knew Collins’s mother
lived. See id., at 41. After he circled in his unmarked vehicle to reach a spot
from which to surveil the Oldsmobile, he discovered that it had already
pulled out and left. See id., at 42. Detective Paul was not able to
immediately locate the Oldsmobile again. See id.
Detective Paul then met with Officer Tyrone Meik from the Harrisburg
Bureau of Police and requested that Officer Meik arrest Collins if he was
seen. See id., at 42-43. After returning to the streets, Detective Paul was
able to locate the Oldsmobile in the same area that the confidential
informant had purchased crack cocaine from Collins. See id., at 43. He
observed a white male and a black male standing next to the Oldsmobile,
engaged in what Detective Paul believed to be a crack cocaine transaction.
See id., at 43-44.
Detective Paul contacted Officer Meik and requested his assistance to
pull over the Oldsmobile. See id., at 45. While he was contacting Officer
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Meik, the Oldsmobile pulled out and left the area. See id. He proceeded to
follow the Oldsmobile until Officer Meik arrived. See id. Shortly thereafter,
the Oldsmobile left Harrisburg and entered Swatara Township. See id.
Detective Paul contacted the Swatara communication center to alert
them to his presence. See id. At that time, the Oldsmobile pulled into a local
restaurant. See id., at 45-46. Officer Meik and Detective Paul then blocked
the Oldsmobile and proceeded to arrest Collins. See id., at 46. Upon
searching Collins, they located one bag of marijuana and three bags of crack
cocaine. See id., at 46-47.
Collins argues that since the stop and arrest occurred in Swatara
Township, neither Officer Meik nor Detective Paul had jurisdiction. The
statewide MPJA provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) General rule.--Any duly employed municipal police officer
who is within this Commonwealth, but beyond the territorial
limits of his primary jurisdiction, shall have the power and
authority to enforce the laws of this Commonwealth or otherwise
perform the functions of that office as if enforcing those laws or
performing those functions within the territorial limits of his
primary jurisdiction in the following cases:
…
(3) Where the officer is in hot pursuit of any person for
any offense which was committed, or which he has
probable cause to believe was committed, within his
primary jurisdiction and for which the officer continues in
fresh pursuit of the person after the commission of the
offense.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8953(a)(3). The “hot pursuit” exception contained in
subsection 3 requires that some investigation and tracking of the suspect
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occur, and that pursuit be immediate, continuous and uninterrupted. See
Commonwealth v. Peters, 965 A.2d 222, 225 (Pa. 2009) (footnote
omitted). If the officer is found to have acted outside his jurisdictional
authority the exclusionary rule may apply and any evidence obtained by the
officer may be suppressed, even if the officer acted in good faith or his or
her actions would have been lawful if performed within his jurisdiction.
Commonwealth v. Brandt, 691 A.2d 934, 939 (Pa. Super. 1997).
However, the MPJA is to be liberally construed “to promote public
safety while maintaining police accountability to local authority; it is not
intended to erect impenetrable jurisdictional walls benefit[ing] only criminals
hidden in their shadows.” Peters, 965 A.2d at 225 (citation and quotation
marks omitted). Thus, the “hot pursuit” exception does not mandate a
“fender smashing Hollywood style chase scene. Hot pursuit simply requires a
chase.” Commonwealth v. McPeak, 708 A.2d 1263, 1266 (Pa. Super.
1998) (citations and quotations omitted). The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has held that an investigation of an abandoned vehicle
involved in an accident that utilized extraneous evidence to locate the
missing driver an hour later satisfied the “hot pursuit” exception. Peters,
965 A.2d at 225-226.
Collins argues that there was no “hot pursuit” in this case, highlighting
the fact that he never actually fled from police, the disjointed nature of
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Detective Paul’s pursuit, and the staleness of the controlled purchase by the
confidential informant employed by Detective Dickerson.
We conclude that the trial court’s finding that Detective Paul was in hot
pursuit is supported by the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.
Detective Paul had authority to arrest Collins on sight due to the information
relayed by Detective Dickerson. When Detective Paul located the Oldsmobile
he had reason to believe contained Collins, he began following the vehicle.
He radioed for assistance from a marked police cruiser, and followed the
Oldsmobile out of his jurisdiction. When the Oldsmobile pulled into a parking
lot, Detective Paul and Officer Meik immediately initiated the arrest.
While it is true that there was not a true “chase,” as Collins was
unaware of their pursuit, there is certainly sufficient evidence to establish
that Detective Paul’s pursuit of Collins was initiated within his own
jurisdiction and was immediate, continuous, and uninterrupted after he had
located the Oldsmobile for the last time. Thus, there was no error in the trial
court’s conclusion that the “hot pursuit” exception in the MPJA applied, and
Collins’s sole argument on appeal merits no relief.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/19/2016
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