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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CV-15-815
MICHELLE MULLIN Opinion Delivered February 24, 2016
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
V. COMMISSION [NOS. G104088 &
G303872]
DUCKWALL ALCO and SEDGWICK
CLAIMS
APPELLEES AFFIRMED
PHILLIP T. WHITEAKER, Judge
Michelle Mullin appeals an Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission
(Commission) opinion that found she failed to prove entitlement to ongoing medical
treatment for her compensable neck, shoulder, and back injuries and to temporary-total-
disability (TTD) benefits. Mullin argues that there was insufficient evidence to support those
findings. We affirm.
On appeal in workers’ compensation cases, we view the evidence and all reasonable
inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission’s findings and
will affirm if those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Myers v. City of Rockport,
2015 Ark. App. 710, ___ S.W.3d ___. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. The issue on appeal
is not whether we might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would have
supported a contrary finding; if reasonable minds could reach the Commission’s conclusion,
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we must affirm its decision. Id. Where a claim is denied, the substantial-evidence standard
requires us to affirm the Commission if its opinion displays a substantial basis for the denial
of relief. Id. With these standards in mind, we look to the evidence before the Commission.
The facts are these. Mullin has a history of shoulder and back problems (including two
prior lumbar surgeries and an incident in March 2011 in which she injured her shoulder after
being body-slammed to the floor by her developmentally disabled adult son). She also
sustained two work-related injuries while employed with Alco.
The first injury occurred on April 11, 2011. Mullin injured her back, neck, and left
shoulder while unloading freight from the back of a semi-truck. Her injuries were deemed
compensable, and she was provided with medical treatment for her shoulder following this
incident, including surgery for a rotator-cuff tear. She was released to full duty as of December
8, 2011, with no impairment rating. Her treating physician at the time, Dr. Birk, refused to
assign an impairment rating, noting that Mullin had been “very difficult and dishonest” about
her condition and had “faked residual symptoms, faked a frozen shoulder and as a result took
advantage of the system for longer than necessary and received benefits beyond the actual time
of injury and recovery.” Mullin was discharged by Dr. Birk with a “[z]ero rating.”
After being discharged by Dr. Birk, Mullin continued to seek treatment for her neck,
back, and shoulder pain. At some unspecified point during her treatment, her employment
was terminated. Eventually, Mullin was rehired by Alco in February 2013.
The second injury occurred on May 3, 2013, approximately three months after she had
been rehired. Mullin was injured while trying to load a trampoline into a customer’s vehicle.
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She again complained of shoulder, neck, and back pain, as well as headaches.1 Her injuries
were again deemed compensable by her employer. She was again provided with medical
treatment. Her treating physician, Dr. Larey, diagnosed cervicothoracic and left-shoulder
strain, tension headaches, and chronic back pain. She was treated conservatively and
ultimately referred to Dr. Schlesinger, a neurosurgeon.
Dr. Schlesinger reviewed an MRI conducted on July 2, 2013, and recent X-rays. He
noted moderately severe to severe degenerative changes in the cervical spine.2 Dr. Schlesinger
gave Mullin the differential diagnoses of low back pain, neck pain and arm pain. He could
not specify the exact cause of Mullin’s complaints, but opined that her pain could have many
etiologies, including the degenerative changes noted in her MRI and x-rays. Despite the
uncertain etiologies of Mullin’s complaints, Dr. Schlesinger proposed epidural steroid
injections for her cervical-disc degeneration and neck pain, but did release her to light-duty
work. At that point, Alco contested her claim for additional medical treatment and benefits,
and Mullin filed a claim with the Commission.
A hearing was held on November 20, 2014. Mullin testified, and her medical records
were introduced. On February 17, 2015, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued an
opinion denying Mullin’s claim for additional medical treatment and TTD benefits. Mullin
filed a timely appeal to the Full Commission, which affirmed and adopted the opinion of the
ALJ. It is from this decision that Mullin now appeals.
1
She informed her physician that she had had similar headaches prior to her back
surgery.
2
A previous MRI of the cervical spine conducted on January 4, 2013, also revealed
degenerative changes. The recommended treatment at that time was steroid injections.
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On appeal, Mullin argues that the Commission erred in finding that the steroid
injections prescribed by Dr. Schlesinger were not reasonable, necessary, or causally related to
her admittedly compensable injury because there had been no indication that the objective
findings of injury had disappeared. She further argues that there was no evidence that her
employer provided her with light-duty work within her restrictions. She claims that she has
not reached maximum medical improvement, that she has ongoing treatment
recommendations that have not been completed, and that she should be allowed to complete
said treatment and receive further TTD benefits.
We first address Mullin’s arguments relating to her claim for additional medical
treatment. Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-508(a) (Repl. 2012) requires an employer
to provide an injured employee such medical services as may be reasonably necessary in
connection with the injury received by the employee. When the primary injury is shown to
have arisen out of and in the course of employment, the employer is responsible for any
natural consequence that flows from that injury. Ingram v. Tyson Mexican Original, 2015 Ark.
App. 519, at 5–6. However, for this rule to apply, the basic test is whether there is a causal
connection between the injury and the consequences of such. Id. The burden is on the
employee to establish the necessary causal connection. Id. The determination of whether a
causal connection exists between two episodes is a question of fact for the Commission. Id.
Here, Mullin’s medical records revealed that many of her complaints were chronic
conditions that had existed over the past 10–15 years and clearly predated the May 2013
incident. The ALJ found that Mullin suffered from degenerative conditions and had a history
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of chronic back, neck, and shoulder problems with accompanying headaches. Admittedly, the
employer initially accepted compensability for Mullin’s May 2013 injury, and medical
treatment was provided. However, when Mullin was examined by Dr. Schlesinger, he
diagnosed her injuries as cervical-disc degeneration, neck pain, headache, and low back pain
and indicated that the precise etiology of those symptoms was unknown. These findings were
noted by the ALJ. As a result, the ALJ determined that Mullin had failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that her need for medical treatment was causally related to her
2011 and 2013 work-related incidents. While Mullin testified that the conditions worsened
after the May 2013 incident, her credibility was clearly in issue. It is the function of the
Commission to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight given to their
testimony. Myers v. City of Rockport, supra. The Commission is not required to believe the
testimony of the claimant or any other witness, but may accept and translate into findings of
fact only those portions of the testimony it deems worthy of belief. Id. In assessing credibility,
the ALJ noted that Mullin had been released from care after her 2011 accident because her
treating physician found her to be dishonest in her reporting and that she had been
malingering. We hold that there is substantial evidence of record to support the denial of
additional medical treatment as not related to her 2011 or 2013 work injuries. Her recent
compensable strain injuries were deemed resolved after nearly five months of treatment.
Therefore, we affirm the denial of additional medical treatment as not reasonably necessary
in relation to her compensable injury.
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Next, we address Mullin’s argument that she was entitled to TTD benefits. To be
entitled to TTD benefits, the claimant must prove that he remains within his healing period
and suffers a total incapacity to earn wages. RPC, Inc. v. Hargues, 2011 Ark. App. 264.
Disability means “incapacity because of compensable injury to earn, in the same or any other
employment, the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the compensable
injury.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(8). The healing period is “that period for healing of an
injury resulting from an accident.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(12). Mullin was released by
Dr. Schlesinger to perform light-duty work, and there was no evidence presented that Mullin
was totally incapable of earning wages. Thus, there was substantial evidence presented to
support the Commission’s decision that she was not entitled to TTD benefits.
Affirmed.
KINARD and HIXSON, JJ., agree.
Gary Davis, for appellant.
Anderson, Murphy & Hopkins, L.L.P., by: Randy P. Murphy and Seth A. White, for
appellees.
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