Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 124
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No.CR-15-453
Opinion Delivered: FEBRUARY 24, 2016
CORTEZ LAMONT GOULD APPEAL FROM THE FAULKNER
APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CR-12-961]
V.
HONORABLE CHARLES E. CLAWSON,
JR., JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE AFFIRMED
KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge
Appellant Cortez Gould appeals his convictions for aggravated robbery and theft of
property, which sentences were enhanced due to his use of a firearm during the commission
of the crimes. Appellant was sentenced to forty years in prison. For his sole point on appeal,
appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial due to
alleged juror misconduct. We affirm.
The standard of review is well settled. A mistrial is an extreme and drastic remedy
that will be resorted to only when there has been an error so prejudicial that justice cannot
be served by continuing with the trial or when the fundamental fairness of the trial has been
manifestly affected. Harrison v. State, 371 Ark. 652, 269 S.W.3d 321 (2007). The trial court
has broad discretion in granting or denying a motion for mistrial, and on appeal, we will
not overturn the circuit court’s decision absent an abuse of that discretion. Id. Declaring a
mistrial is proper only when the error is beyond repair and cannot be corrected by any
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curative relief. McClinton v. State, 2015 Ark. 245, 464 S.W.3d 913. The presiding trial
judge is in a better position than anyone else to evaluate the impact of any alleged errors.
Id. Thus, this discretion will not be disturbed except where there is an abuse of discretion
or manifest prejudice to the movant. Stewart v. State, 320 Ark. 75, 894 S.W.2d 930 (1995).
Following allegations of juror misconduct, the moving party bears the burden of
proving both juror misconduct and a reasonable probability of resulting prejudice. Butler v.
State, 349 Ark. 252, 82 S.W.3d 152 (2002). Our court will not presume prejudice in such
situations. Id. Jurors are presumed unbiased and qualified to serve, and the burden is on
the appellant to show otherwise. Id. Whether prejudice occurred is also a matter for the
sound discretion of the trial court. Id.
In keeping with these legal principles, the following is an analysis of the events at
trial. Appellant was accused of committing armed robbery at a Cricket cellular store in
Conway, Arkansas, on September 7, 2012. A jury was seated, with one alternate juror
available. The jurors were instructed on the rules to follow while serving as a juror, and
among the admonitions was the following: “First, do not talk among yourselves about this
case or about anyone involved with it until the end of the case when you go to the jury
room to decide on your verdict.”
During trial, the owner of the Cricket store testified, explaining that she provided a
general description of the perpetrator to the police, telling them that he was an African
American male, estimated to be 5’6” tall, and she said he was clean shaven. The police
presented her with a photographic lineup five days after the crime took place, on September
12, wherein she identified appellant as the person who robbed the store. During a Conway
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police detective’s testimony, the detective said that two pictures of appellant—State’s
Exhibits 52 and 43—were taken on different days for purposes of the photographic lineup,
but it appeared that appellant was coincidentally wearing the same shirt in both pictures.
The photographs were passed to the jury.
At the conclusion of the detective’s testimony, defense counsel brought two jurors
to the trial court’s attention: Deborah Creswell and Vicky Campbell. Appellant had
reported to his attorney that he heard the two women discussing the two photos of appellant
as they were published to the jury. Appellant said that one of the women, later determined
to be Vicky Campbell, commented that the shirts in the photos were not the same, to which
the other woman disagreed. The prosecutor admitted that he heard the two women speak
to each other, but he only heard one juror respond “no” or “not.” This drew a motion for
mistrial, given that this was deemed by appellant as improper inter-juror communication.
Defense counsel argued that there was only one alternate juror available, and defense counsel
did not know how to remedy the fact that there was improper conversation between jurors
without removal of both jurors.
The prosecutor suggested that the trial judge question the two jurors, and if there
was improper communication, to issue a curative instruction to them. The prosecutor
maintained, though, that there was no resulting prejudice from the alleged comments. After
taking a brief recess, the trial judge denied the request for the extreme remedy of mistrial.
In order to provide a complete record, and in renewal of the mistrial motion, defense
counsel asked that the trial judge conduct an inquiry of these jurors to see if they were
qualified as fair and impartial jurors to continue with jury duty. Defense counsel argued
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that it was unfair to continue when two jurors were talking about a piece of evidence. The
trial judge agreed to conduct an in camera inquiry.
Vicky Campbell stated to the trial judge that Deborah Creswell mentioned that the
shirt collar in one picture did not look the same as the other, but she (Campbell) disagreed
with Creswell. Campbell left the judge’s chambers. Deborah Creswell was then called into
chambers. Creswell said that Campbell mentioned that she thought the shirts were different
in the two pictures, to which she (Creswell) said that she agreed the shirts were not the
same, but she did not mean to respond aloud. Creswell apologized.
The trial judge found that Campbell was the one who made the initial comment,
which was in line with what appellant had reported. The trial judge agreed with defense
counsel that fairness and the appearance of fairness were paramount, but noted that the
substantive issue was whether there had been resulting prejudice requiring a mistrial. The
trial judge decided that “if” there had been any violation of the court’s admonitions, it was
Campbell. The trial judge removed Campbell from the jury, seating the alternate juror, and
mistrial was denied. The State had rested its case, the defense did not present any evidence,
and the jury was dismissed for lunch. Before releasing the jurors, the trial judge again
reminded the jurors of the admonition not to discuss anything about this case or anyone
involved with it until the case was submitted for jury deliberation.
Appellant argues that Creswell’s responsive comment to Campbell in the jury box,
made in violation of the jury instruction not to do that, constituted denial of a fair trial and
resulted in prejudice, requiring a mistrial. We disagree that appellant demonstrated
prejudice from Creswell looking at properly admitted evidence and briefly stating
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disagreement with a witness on whether the shirts in the two photographs were the same.
Any juror misconduct by Creswell, if there were any, appears to have had no discernible
effect on Creswell’s ability to decide appellant’s guilt or innocence in a fair and impartial
manner. Creswell expressed remorse for any errant behavior. The trial judge again
admonished the jury not to discuss anything about this case until deliberations. A juror is
presumed unbiased and qualified to serve, and whether prejudice resulted from alleged juror
misconduct is a matter of the trial court’s sound discretion. Butler v. State, supra; Shamlin v.
State, 23 Ark. App. 39, 743 S.W.2d 1 (1988) (affirming the removal of a juror who made
an improper comment to two other jurors during trial about whether Shamlin was guilty,
replacing that juror with the only alternate, and allowing the two other jurors to remain).
If a juror is shown to have prejudged a defendant to be guilty prior to hearing all the
evidence and being instructed on the law, then this demonstrates that the defendant was
deprived a fair and impartial jury, entitling the defendant to a new trial. See Conway v. State,
2012 Ark. 420. Such is not the case in the appeal before us today. Because appellant has
failed to demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability of resulting prejudice here in
having Creswell remain on the jury, we affirm the trial court’s denial of mistrial as not
manifesting an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
KINARD and WHITEAKER, JJ., agree.
Ronald L. Davis, Jr. Law Firm, PLLC, by: Ronald L. Davis, Jr., for appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Brooke Jackson, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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