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14-P-717 Appeals Court
LYNNE BLANCHARD & others1 vs. STEWARD CARNEY HOSPITAL, INC., &
others.2
No. 14-P-717.
Suffolk. January 14, 2015. - February 24, 2016.
Present: Katzmann, Sullivan, & Blake, JJ.
"Anti-SLAPP" Statute. Constitutional Law, Right to petition
government. Practice, Civil, Standing, Motion to dismiss.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
May 24, 2013.
A special motion to dismiss was heard by Linda E. Giles, J.
Jeffrey A. Dretler (Katharine A. Crawford & Joseph W.
Ambash with him) for the defendants.
Dahlia C. Rudavsky for the plaintiffs.
KATZMANN, J. In this case we consider whether the
defendants' special motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' defamation
1
Gail Donahoe, Gail Douglas-Candido, Kathleen Dwyer, Linda
Herr, Cheryl Hendrick, Kathleen Lang, Victoria Webster, and
Nydia Woods.
2
Steward Hospital Holdings, LLC; Steward Health Care
System, LLC; and William Walczak.
2
claim pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 59H, widely known as the
"anti-SLAPP"3 statute, was properly denied. The central question
is whether, during a period of crisis when Steward Carney
Hospital (Carney Hospital or hospital) faced the loss of its
license to operate an in-patient adolescent psychiatric unit
(unit) because of purported patient abuse and neglect,
statements quoted in a newspaper made by the president of the
hospital, and an electronic mail message (e-mail) the president
sent to hospital staff announcing the dismissal of unnamed
employees in the unit under review, constituted protected
petitioning activity. A judge in the Superior Court denied the
motion because she found that the statements upon which the
claim was based did not qualify as protected petitioning
activity and, therefore, the defendants could not seek
protection of the anti-SLAPP statute. We conclude that the
statements quoted in the newspaper constitute protected
petitioning activity, but that the internal e-mail does not.
Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
Background. The key facts of this case, as derived from
the judge's decision below, the newspaper articles at issue,
affidavits by those involved in the investigation, testimony in
a related arbitration proceeding (see note 4, infra), and
3
"'SLAPP' is an acronym for Strategic Lawsuit Against
Public Participation." Office One, Inc. v. Lopez, 437 Mass.
113, 121 n.13 (2002).
3
relevant reports, are as follows. The plaintiffs are all
registered nurses (RNs) who had been working in the unit for a
number of years. In April, 2011, complaints were made
concerning four incidents of alleged patient abuse or neglect
within the unit. None of the alleged incidents involved abuse
or neglect of a patient by any of the plaintiffs (or any other
RN). The incidents were reported to the Department of Mental
Health (DMH), the Department of Public Health (DPH), and the
Department of Children and Families (DCF) by unit RNs or other
staff. The unit is licensed by DMH and DPH. After the April
complaints, the agencies, especially DMH, were regularly on site
to investigate the incidents and to determine whether to revoke
the license to operate the unit. The director of licensing at
DMH reported making unannounced visits on different occasions,
including weekends and holidays, so that she could "see in fact
what was happening."
In late April, 2011, in response to the incidents, Carney
Hospital placed all mental health counselors, all regularly
assigned unit RNs (including the plaintiffs), and two managers
on paid administrative leave. The hospital then hired Attorney
Scott Harshbarger and his law firm, Proskauer Rose, LLP
(Proskauer defendants), to conduct an overall management review
of the unit and make recommendations. Harshbarger interviewed
unit staff, including each of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs
4
identified specific issues that affected patient care and areas
for improvement. On May 13, 2011, Harshbarger made an oral
report of his conclusions to the hospital's then president,
William Walczak; Harshbarger submitted his written report on May
26, 2011. In the report, which made no specific allegations of
abuse or neglect against any of the individual plaintiffs or any
member of the nursing staff, Harshbarger recommended that the
hospital "rebuild" the unit by replacing all of its personnel.
The report cited "serious weaknesses" in the supervisory and
managerial structure of the unit, including, inter alia, "lack
of a clear reporting structure, lack of accountability,
oversight of patient care and quality, patient and staff safety
concerns, and a flawed and rarely invoked disciplinary process."
The report cited a "code of silence" as one of the underlying
sources and causes of operational and performance dysfunction.
"This code results in a failure to report issues or concerns,
and to reinforce a general attitude that reporting can trigger
retaliation, intimidation, and/or be ignored or unsupported by
others." The report concluded that "it would be prudent to
replace the current personnel in order to ensure quality care"
for the patients.
The day that Walczak received Harshbarger's report, he sent
a letter to each plaintiff terminating her for her "conduct at
5
work."4 On May 27, 2011, Walczak sent an e-mail to all hospital
staff, which stated in pertinent part:
"As you all know, Carney Hospital has a rich tradition of
providing excellent care to our patients. Our performance
on national quality and safety standards is exceptional,
and in many cases superior to competing hospitals. The
reason for this performance is simple -- you[,] the
employees and caregivers at Carney [Hospital], are
dedicated to providing the best possible care to every
patient that comes through our doors. It is your
dedication that makes Carney Hospital such a special place.
"Recently, I have become aware of alleged incidents where a
number of Carney [Hospital] staff have not demonstrated
this steadfast commitment to patient care. I have
thoroughly investigated these allegations and have
determined that these individual employees have not been
acting in the best interest of their patients, the
hospital, or the community we serve. As a result, I have
terminated the employment of each of these individuals."
The following day, on May 28, 2011, the Boston Globe
published an article stating that Walczak said he had hired
Harshbarger to investigate an allegation that an employee had
allegedly sexually assaulted a teenager on the locked adolescent
4
In their complaint against the hospital, two related
entities, and Walczak (Steward defendants), alleging defamation,
the plaintiffs stated that the Massachusetts Nurses Association,
a union representing the plaintiffs, had filed grievances on
their behalf, that the hospital had denied those grievances, and
that an arbitrator had "found that [the Steward defendants] had
violated the [collective bargaining agreement] by discharging
the grievants." According to the complaint, the arbitrator
stated that "the concept of collective guilt and responsibility
does not suffice to establish just cause to terminate any
particular member of the group," and ordered reinstatement,
removal of any allegations or findings of wrongdoing from the
grievants' personnel files, and payment to them of all lost back
wages and benefits, with interest. The complaint stated that
the Steward defendants have appealed the award and have not
reinstated any of the plaintiffs.
6
psychiatry unit, and that Harshbarger had recommended "to start
over on the unit." The article included Walczak's statement
that Harshbarger's report "described 'serious concerns about
patient safety and quality of care.'" The article reported that
Walczak further stated, "We will have top-notch employees
replace those who left. My goal is to make it the best unit in
the state." In the article, a spokesman for the Massachusetts
Nurses Association, a union representing the plaintiffs, said
that the "hospital fired 29 employees, including 13 nurses who
are members of the union."
In June, 2011, DMH issued reports on the incidents, finding
wrongdoing by a single mental health counsellor for the first
three incidents and finding improper actions by unspecified
staff for the fourth incident. In a June 22, 2011, Boston Globe
article, it was reported that the firing of twenty-nine nurses
and mental health counsellors at Carney Hospital followed five
complaints of abuse or neglect in the adolescent psychiatry
unit, not just the one complaint as initially disclosed, and
that four of the complaints had been validated. While declining
to provide details on the cases, Walczak was quoted in the
article as stating that "[t]he Harshbarger report indicated that
it wasn't a safe situation." The article explained that Walczak
based his decision to fire the entire staff "on an investigation
by former Attorney General Scott Harshbarger and his law firm."
7
The article quoted a letter from the Massachusetts Nurses
Association to Carney Hospital nurses as stating that the nurses
"adamantly deny any allegations of wrongdoing."
On May 24, 2013, the plaintiffs filed their defamation
claims against the Proskauer defendants5 and against Carney
Hospital, two related entities, and Walczak (collectively,
Steward defendants).6 Relevant to the instant appeal, pursuant
to the anti-SLAPP statute, the Steward defendants filed a
special motion to dismiss count 3 of the complaint (defamation),
which alleged that Walczak "made false and defamatory statements
about the plaintiffs to the general public in his remarks in the
5
Counts 4 and 5 of the complaint were against the Proskauer
defendants, for defamation and infliction of emotional distress.
The defamation claim was based on Harshbarger's statements in
his written report and oral presentation to the Steward
defendants. The Proskauer defendants filed a special motion to
dismiss the defamation claim pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute.
The judge allowed this motion, finding that the statements
contained in Harshbarger's report, in the context in which they
were made, constituted petitioning activity protected under
G. L. c. 231, § 59H. Subsequently, all claims against the
Proskauer defendants were dismissed with prejudice on the
parties' stipulation; judgment entered for the Proskauer
defendants on May 27, 2014.
6
Counts 1-3 of the plaintiffs' complaint are against the
Steward defendants. Of these, only count 3 (defamation) is at
issue in this appeal. At the motion hearing, the Steward
defendants waived their motion to dismiss counts 1 and 2
pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974),
subject to renewal as a motion for summary judgment. (Count 1
alleges retaliatory discharge based on whistleblower activity;
count 2 alleges violations of G. L. c. 119, § 51A, for the
discharge of two of the plaintiffs after they reported abuse or
neglect of patients on the unit.)
8
Boston Globe articles of May 28, 2011, and June 22, 2011," and
"made false and defamatory statements about the plaintiffs to
Hospital staff in his email of May 27, 2011." The judge denied
this motion, finding that neither Walczak's statements to the
Boston Globe nor his e-mail to the hospital staff constituted
protected petitioning activity. The Steward defendants now
appeal from the denial of their motion.
Discussion. 1. Overview. a. The anti-SLAPP statute.
The anti-SLAPP statute, G. L. c. 231, § 59H, "protects the
'exercise of [the] right of petition under the constitution of
the United States or of the [C]ommonwealth,' by creating a
procedural mechanism, in the form of a special motion to
dismiss, for the expedient resolution of so-called 'SLAPP'
suits." Office One, Inc. v. Lopez, 437 Mass. 113, 121 (2002)
(Office One, Inc.). "In the preamble to 1994 House Doc. No.
1520, the Legislature recognized that . . . 'there has been a
disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the
valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech
and petition for redress of grievances.'" Duracraft Corp. v.
Holmes Prods. Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 161 (1998) (Duracraft).
Under the "well-established [two-part] burden-shifting test,"
Hanover v. New England Regional Council of Carpenters, 467 Mass.
587, 595 (2014), "[t]o invoke the statute's protection, the
special movant[s], [here, the Steward defendants, must] show, as
9
a threshold matter, through pleadings and affidavits, that the
claims against [them] are . . . 'based on' [their] petitioning
activities alone and have no substantial basis other than or in
addition to [their] petitioning activities." Office One, Inc.,
supra at 122, citing Duracraft, supra at 167-168. Wenger v.
Aceto, 451 Mass. 1, 5 (2008) (Wenger). This is the first prong
of the test. Under the second prong, if the special movants
make such a showing, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving
party to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the
moving party's activities were "devoid of any reasonable factual
support or any arguable basis in law" and that the petitioning
activities caused actual injury. Benoit v. Frederickson, 454
Mass. 148, 152-153 (2009) (Benoit), quoting from G. L. c. 231,
§ 59H.
"In order to determine if statements are petitioning, we
consider them in the over-all context in which they were made."
North Am. Expositions Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Corcoran, 452
Mass. 852, 862 (2009) (Corcoran). "'[P]etitioning' has been
consistently defined to encompass a 'very broad' range of
activities in the context of the anti-SLAPP statute." Id. at
861, citing Duracraft, supra at 161-162. "The statute
identifies five types of statements that comprise 'a party's
exercise of its right of petition':
10
'[1] [A]ny written or oral statement made before or
submitted to a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or
any other governmental proceeding; [2] any written or oral
statement made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or
judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; [3]
any statement reasonably likely to encourage consideration
or review of an issue by a legislative, executive, or
judicial body or any other governmental proceeding; [4] any
statement reasonably likely to enlist public participation
in an effort to effect such consideration; or [5] any other
statement falling within constitutional protection of the
right to petition government.' G. L. c. 231, § 59H."
(Emphasis added.)
Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 448 Mass. 242, 248 (2007) (Cadle
Co.). The second category is of particular relevance to the
instant case.
b. Standard of review. As has been stated, we review the
judge's decision to grant the special motion to dismiss for
abuse of discretion or error of law. See Marabello v. Boston
Bark Corp., 463 Mass. 394, 397 (2012); Hanover v. New England
Regional Council of Carpenters, 467 Mass. at 595. We note that
while this formulation appears in various anti-SLAPP decisions,
there are other cases where it is absent. See, e.g., Corcoran,
supra, 452 Mass. 852; Benoit, 454 Mass. 148; Ehrlich v. Stern,
74 Mass. App. Ct. 531 (2009) (Ehrlich). In any event, with
respect to the first prong of the test -- whether conduct as
alleged on the face of a complaint qualifies as protected
petitioning activity -- it does not appear that the courts have
deferred to the motion judge but rather have made a fresh and
11
independent evaluation. See, e.g., Corcoran, 452 Mass. at 863-
864 (discussing Cadle Co., 448 Mass. 242 [2007]); Plante v.
Wylie, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 151, 160-161 (2005) (Plante). Where
the motion judge's determination of the second prong of the two-
part test does not implicate credibility assessments, it is
arguable that appellate review should be similarly de novo.
See, e.g., Benoit, 454 Mass. at 154 n.7 (discussing the
appropriate standard of review with respect to the analysis of
the second prong of the two-part test).7
We conclude that whether we review the judge's denial of
the motion to dismiss de novo or with discretion, the ruling was
in error with respect to the statements to the Boston Globe, but
was not in error with respect to the e-mail sent to hospital
employees.
2. Standing. At the outset we briefly address and reject
the plaintiffs' standing argument. The plaintiffs contend that
7
In Benoit, the Supreme Judicial Court explained:
"The anti-SLAPP statute requires the judge to consider
the pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits. The
question to be determined by a judge in deciding a special
motion to dismiss is not which of the parties' pleadings
and affidavits are entitled to be credited or accorded
greater weight, but whether the nonmoving party has met its
burden (by showing that the underlying petitioning activity
by the moving party was devoid of any reasonable factual
support or arguable basis in law, and whether the activity
caused actual injury to the nonmoving party)."
454 Mass. at 154 n.7.
12
the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply because Walczak is not
personally aggrieved by the agencies' actions and was not
petitioning them on his own behalf. Keegan v. Pellerin, 76
Mass. App. Ct. 186, 191-192 (2010), is dispositive on this
issue. Here, Walczak, who engaged in petitioning activity on
behalf of the hospital while he was its president, is protected
by the anti-SLAPP statute because "when a nongovernmental person
or entity is the petitioner, the statute protects one who is
engaged to assist in the petitioning activity under
circumstances similar to those this record reveals." Id. at
192, citing Plante, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 156-157. See Office
One, Inc., 437 Mass. at 121-124. See also Corcoran, 452 Mass.
852 (2009) (underlying suit named defendants' principal, whose
statements were challenged, as individual defendant).8 Walczak
thus has standing.
3. The statements to the Boston Globe. By way of
overview, we note our conclusion, discussed below, that the
8
The cases upon which the plaintiffs rely to contest
standing -- Kobrin v. Gastfriend, 443 Mass. 327, 332 (2005);
Fisher v. Lint, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 360, 364-365 (2007); and
Moriarty v. Mayor of Holyoke, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 442, 447 (2008)
-- were specifically distinguished by the Keegan court because
those cases "rest on the commonsense principle that a statute
designed to protect the constitutional right to petition has no
applicability to situations in which the government petitions
itself." Keegan v. Pellerin, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 186, 192 (2010).
This is not a case in which the government was petitioning
itself; rather, Walczak was petitioning on behalf of his
employer, the hospital. See ibid.
13
judge erred in concluding that Walczak's statements to the
Boston Globe "can[not] be considered petitioning activity under
Massachusetts law." We disagree with the stark contrast the
judge drew between the Proskauer defendants' statements in the
report and the statements the Steward defendants made in the
Boston Globe articles. The judge, citing Kobrin v. Gastfriend,
443 Mass. 327, 333 (2005) (Kobrin), for the proposition that the
anti-SLAPP statute applies only where a "party seeks some
redress from the government," found it "clear that the
statements in Harshbarger's report constitute petitioning
activity in that they were aimed at persuading the regulatory
agencies involved not to revoke Carney Hospital's license." The
judge noted that, in response to DMH's threat to close the unit,
Harshbarger was recruited and was required to "interface with
the various regulatory agencies and personnel on behalf of
Carney Hospital and develop remedies so that the Hospital could
retain its license and prevent the Unit from being closed." The
pleadings and affidavits indicate that the Steward defendants'
overarching goal was the same as that of the Proskauer
defendants: to ensure that the hospital retained its license
and to prevent the unit from being closed.9 The strategy was to
9
The affidavit of Michael R. Bertoncini, deputy general
counsel of one of the Steward defendants during the relevant
time period, explained, "The leadership of [his client] and
Carney Hospital believed that swift and decisive action was
14
take a comprehensive approach to fixing the problems at the unit
to demonstrate to DMH that the unit should maintain its license.
In short, with respect to the statements to the Boston Globe, we
do not discern a consequential distinction between the conduct
of the Steward defendants and the Proskauer defendants.
Walczak's statements were made and designed to achieve the same
goal and also qualify as protected petitioning activity.
a. Specifically, the parties disagree as to whether
Walczak's statements in the Boston Globe articles on May 28,
2011, and June 22, 2011, qualify as protected petitioning
activity. We conclude, as this court did in Wynne v. Creigle,
63 Mass. App. Ct. 246, 254 (2005) (Creigle), that Walczak's
statements "were sufficiently tied to and in advancement of" the
maintenance of the license to operate the unit. In Creigle,
there were two independent bases on which the defendant's
statements to the newspaper were found to be protected
petitioning activity. One basis was that the statements "were
sufficiently tied to and in advancement of" the defendant's
necessary to ensure the safety of patients in the Unit, to
respond to the concerns of the DMH/DCF personnel on the scene,
and to work with and persuade the relevant regulatory agencies
not to suspend Carney Hospital's license to operate the Unit and
not to close the Unit." Bertoncini also stated that his client
and the hospital hoped that the hiring of Harshbarger to conduct
the review and the "corresponding response would provide clear
and convincing evidence and support for the position that the
Unit should not lose its license to operate, should not be
closed[,] and should be given the opportunity to effect a
comprehensive remedy."
15
petition for benefits then under consideration by the
Legislature, and, "thus, they fall within the ambit of
statements made 'in connection with' legislative proceedings
within the meaning of G. L. c. 231, § 59H, and constitute
protected petitioning activity on that basis." Ibid. The
second basis was that the context in which the defendant's
statements to the newspaper occurred was as a response to the
materials the plaintiff had earlier provided to the newspaper,
and the fact that the defendant's statements were "essentially
mirror images" of statements she had made in an earlier
governmental investigation of the plaintiff. Ibid. In Cadle
Co., 448 Mass. at 251, the court further emphasized the
importance of context when, in distinguishing Creigle, it noted
that unlike Creigle, in Cadle Co., there was "nothing in the
record [to] support a finding that the [defendant's] challenged
statements . . . were either a response to statements that [the
plaintiff] had made to the press or repetitions of statements
initially made in a governmental proceeding."
We similarly conclude from the content of the Boston Globe
articles, particularly the June 22 article, and from Walczak's
affidavit, which was not challenged by the plaintiffs, that the
"defendant's statements were not unsolicited," but, rather, were
responsive. In his affidavit, Walczak states that he
"understood that representatives from the nurses' union were
16
commenting to the media on the terminations and that the media
was also seeking commentary from current and former officials
from the very regulatory agencies who were in the process of
reviewing Carney Hospital's licensing status. As such, I felt
that it was important that I explain to the media, and hence to
the general public and the agencies themselves, why Carney
Hospital took the actions that it did, and what our plans were
for ensuring the safety and care of our patients going forward."
The relevant Boston Globe articles include statements and
perspectives from the nurses' representatives that demonstrate
that they were actively informing reporters about the nurses'
side of the story, denying any allegations of wrongdoing.
Harshbarger noted in his affidavit that there was public
pressure on the agencies to close the unit and withdraw its
license. Walczak's comments, when viewed in this context,
qualify as protected petitioning activity because the
investigation was ongoing, and it is clear that DMH, which was
regularly on site at the hospital, would be paying attention, or
at least would have access to these articles. If Walczak did
not respond, there would have been a serious risk that the
situation would be reported in a manner that did not take into
account the Steward defendants' perspective. Walczak's
statements to the Boston Globe were designed to communicate to
the regulatory agencies that the hospital was taking action to
17
avoid losing its license to operate the unit. Even within the
articles at issue here, professionals in the local health care
arena, including some former and current officials of the
reviewing agencies, commented on and evaluated Walczak's course
of action, commending the serious steps he took to address the
incidents, and noting DMH's approval of his actions. Indeed, in
Walczak's affidavit, he stated that it was his
"sincere belief that [his] comments to the media would
reach the regulators with the message that Carney Hospital
had taken the incidents very seriously, implemented
immediate remedial action, and developed a plan of action,
all of which would contribute to convincing the agencies
that patient safety was a priority and that the Unit should
remain licensed and open."
With the agencies continuously monitoring the situation and
the unavoidable publicity that developed around it, the media
essentially became a venue to express the perspectives of each
side; as such, the Boston Globe articles were available to, and
likely considered by, the regulatory agencies. The judge erred
in concluding that the statements to the Boston Globe were not
protected activity on the ground that the Steward defendants,
both directly and through Harshbarger, "already were in
communication with the agencies regarding their investigation."
This conclusion ignored Harshbarger's averments regarding those
communications. His affidavit stated, "At this point, DMH's
investigation was ongoing and the possibility that the Unit's
license to operate would be revoked and the Unit would be closed
18
was still not only being considered, but highly likely. There
was some public pressure on the agencies to close the Unit and
withdraw the necessary license."
Walczak's statements in the Boston Globe describing the
actions the hospital had taken -- particularly where there was
ongoing public pressure on the agencies to close the unit and to
withdraw the hospital's license to operate the unit -- were
important affirmations, as they came from the president of the
hospital himself in support of the urgent goal of influencing
DMH to preserve the license, and were thus legitimate protected
activity. Cf. Benoit, 454 Mass. at 153 (motion judge erred in
concluding that petitioning activities were not "legitimate").
In attempting to reach and educate through the media the
opponents in the public who had been pressuring the agencies to
revoke the license, Walczak's statements possessed the
characteristics of petitioning activity. Contrast Burley v.
Comets Community Youth Center, Inc., 75 Mass. App. Ct. 818, 823-
824 (2009) (Burley) (statements made to the defendant's
employees that the plaintiff was banned from a skating rink for
inappropriate behavior were not protected petitioning activity
where there was no link shown between the employees and the
relevant governmental body).
In context and in totality, Walczak's statements to the
Boston Globe were in furtherance of the overriding strategic
19
mission of bringing to bear upon the regulatory decisionmakers
the seriousness of the hospital's effort to reform the
institution. As such, the Steward defendants have satisfied
their burden of making a threshold showing that the plaintiffs'
"claims [are] 'based on' [the] petitioning activit[y] alone and
have no substantial basis other than or in addition to [the]
petitioning activit[y]." Office One, Inc., 437 Mass. at 122,
citing Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 167-168. Contrast Global NAPS,
Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc., 63 Mass. App. Ct. 600, 605
(2005) (Global NAPS, Inc.). That the statements in the media
were not made directly to the regulatory agencies does not
remove them from protected petitioning activity, given that the
ultimate audience was those agencies. Walczak's statements to
the Boston Globe were protected petitioning activity because
they were made "to influence, inform, or at the very least,
reach governmental bodies -- either directly or indirectly"
(emphasis added). Corcoran, 452 Mass. at 862, quoting from
Global NAPS, Inc., 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 605.
We also conclude that Walczak's statements in the Boston
Globe articles qualify as protected petitioning activity on the
alternative basis that they are "essentially mirror images" of
statements in the report. In essence, the plaintiffs argue that
in order to qualify as "mirror images," the statements in the
Boston Globe and the report must be identical. The case law,
20
however, indicates that the contested statements do not have to
be an exact match but rather must be only "essentially" mirror
images of the protected statements. Creigle, 63 Mass. App. Ct.
at 254. See Burley, 75 Mass. App. Ct. at 823. We interpret the
qualifier "essentially" as requiring only that the statements be
close to or very similar to the protected statements. While the
report is significantly more thorough and detailed, Walczak's
statements maintain the same tone and content, summarizing the
report to respond succinctly and effectively to press inquiries
and statements by the nurses' representatives. Walczak's
statements to the Boston Globe convey the content of the report,
which the hospital commissioned specifically to assure the
investigating agencies that it was taking the requisite action
to fix the problem. Taken in context, Walczak's repetition of
the report's content to the media also possessed the
characteristics of petitioning activity. See Creigle, supra at
253-254.
b. Our focus now shifts to the plaintiffs, because even
though we conclude that with respect to the statements to the
Boston Globe, the plaintiffs' claim was "based on" the
defendants' protected petitioning activity, the plaintiffs have
the opportunity to defeat the special motion to dismiss the
defamation count based on those statements by showing, "by a
preponderance of the evidence, that . . . the defendants'
21
petitioning activity [was] devoid of any reasonable factual [or
legal] support . . . and that . . . the activity caused the
plaintiffs actual harm." Office One, Inc., 437 Mass. at 123.
See Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 165; Wenger, 451 Mass. at 5, citing
G. L. c. 231, § 59H; Chiulli v. Liberty Mut. Ins., Inc., 87
Mass. App. Ct. 229, 233-234 (2015). See also Baker v. Parsons,
434 Mass. 543, 554-555 (2001) (Baker) (to defeat a special
motion to dismiss defamation claims, the plaintiff had the
burden of showing "by a preponderance of evidence that the
defendants lacked any reasonable factual support for their
petitioning activity").
The plaintiffs have failed to show that the defendants'
petitioning activity, as constituted by the statements to the
Boston Globe, was devoid of factual or legal support.10 "Because
the plaintiffs failed to show that the petitioning activity in
issue was devoid of any reasonable factual basis or basis in
law, it is not necessary to reach the question whether the
activity caused the plaintiffs actual injury." Office One Inc.,
437 Mass. at 124. See Creigle, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 255. See
10
The plaintiffs acknowledge that "no such showing was made
-- or attempted" because "they in fact supported Steward's
advocacy goal: the preservation of the Unit's license." We do
not agree that this explains the plaintiffs' silence on this
point. While the plaintiffs may have had an interest in
preservation of the license, they did not share the goal of
staffing the unit with new staff. It was thus incumbent upon
the plaintiffs to show the absence of factual or legal support
for the statements they assert were defamatory.
22
also Dickey v. Warren, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 585, 592 (2009). In
drafting G. L. c. 231, § 59H, the "Legislature intended to
immunize parties from claims 'based on' their petitioning
activities," Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 167, and we conclude that
the claims in the instant case concerning the Boston Globe
articles are exactly the type that the Legislature had in mind.
See Baker, 434 Mass. at 551 (noting that defamation is the "most
popular SLAPP cause of action," the court concluded that the
"initial showing by the defendants that the claims against them
were based on their petitioning activities alone is not defeated
by the plaintiff's conclusory assertion that certain statements
made by the defendants in petitions to government officials
constitute defamation" [quotation and citation omitted]).
4. The e-mail sent to Carney Hospital staff. We turn now
to the e-mail that Walczak sent on May 27, 2011, to the Carney
Hospital staff. In that e-mail, he noted the hospital's "rich
tradition of providing excellent care to our patients," that he
had "become aware of the alleged incidents where a number of
Carney [Hospital] staff have not demonstrated this steadfast
commitment to patient care," "that these individual employees
have not been acting in the best interest of their patients, the
hospital, or the community we serve," and that "[a]s a result, I
have terminated the employment of each of these individuals."
In his affidavit filed in the litigation below, Walczak avers
23
that the e-mail was sent "not only to communicate to the
hospital employees what was happening, but to give assurances to
the regulatory agencies who were in the process of determining
whether Carney Hospital's license to operate the Unit should be
revoked that the deficiencies which has [sic] been reported on
the Unit would not continue in that Unit or be tolerated in any
other part of Carney Hospital."11
Regarding whether the e-mail could qualify as petitioning
activity, the Superior Court judge ruled: "With respect to the
email which Walczak sent to the internal employees of Carney
Hospital, this communication cannot be considered petitioning
activity protected by G. L. c. 231, § 59H. The Steward
Defendants have not shown how the statements in the email,
communicated only to Carney Hospital employees, were intended to
influence, inform, or reach, directly or indirectly,
governmental agencies. See Global NAPS, Inc., 63 Mass. App. Ct.
at 605." (Emphasis added.)
During the hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss, the
judge appropriately indicated that she could "look at the[]
11
Walczak's affidavit further states:
"On May 27, 2011, I sent an email to all Carney Hospital
employees reaffirming Carney Hospital's commitment to
providing the best possible care to every patient that
comes through the doors and explaining the reasons why I
decided to terminate the employment of individuals who, in
my view, had not lived up to that standard."
24
affidavits." There was no allegation or averment in Walczak's
affidavit, or in any of the other affidavits presented to the
judge, that the e-mail sent to the Carney Hospital staff was
provided to the regulators, or that the regulators were told
about it. That the e-mail may have been part of an over-all
strategy to address the conditions in the unit in the hope of
influencing the regulators is not sufficient to qualify as
petitioning activity where there is no evidence in the record
that the e-mail was transmitted to the regulators or that they
were informed of that communication. In sum, we cannot say that
the judge erred in her determination that the Steward defendants
had "not shown [that] the statements in the email, communicated
only to Carney Hospital employees," qualified as protected
petitioning activity.12 Compare Burley, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 823
(moving party failed to show that statements to employees were
made "in conjunction with its protected petitioning activity").
Conclusion. The order of the Superior Court is reversed
insofar as it denied the Steward defendants' special motion to
dismiss count 3 of the plaintiffs' complaint (defamation) as to
12
Having determined that the Steward defendants have not
satisfied the first prong of the two-part test, we need not
address the second prong regarding proof of factual or legal
support.
25
Walczak's statements to the Boston Globe. In all other respects
the order is affirmed.13,14
So ordered.
13
See Wenger, 451 Mass. at 2, 9 (denying a special motion
to dismiss with respect to a G. L. c. 93A claim and allowing the
special motion to dismiss as to malicious prosecution and abuse
of process claims). Under the circumstances here, where the e-
mail and statements to the Globe were distinct actions clearly
set forth in the defamation count and could readily have been
the subject of separate counts, the complaint differs from that
presented in Ehrlich, 74 Mass. App. Ct. at 534, where such
delineation was absent. But see Burley, 75 Mass. App. Ct. at
821-824.
14
As count 3 survives in part, the Steward defendants'
motion for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the anti-SLAPP
statute is denied.
SULLIVAN, J. (concurring in the result). The motion judge
denied the special motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' defamation
claim against the Steward defendants1 because, in her judgment,
the defendants failed to meet their burden to show that the
count for defamation was based solely on petitioning activity.
See Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 167
(1998) (Duracraft) (moving party must make a threshold showing
that the complaint is based on petitioning activity "alone").
Because the judge did not make a clear error of law or judgment
in declining to dismiss the defamation claim with respect to the
e-mail, I agree that the special motion to dismiss must be
denied as to the e-mail. I do not agree that the statements
made to the Boston Globe constituted solely petitioning
activity. However, based on the "mirror image" doctrine, I also
must agree that the statements to the Boston Globe are
petitioning activity. I write separately to emphasize material
differences in the reasons for which I arrive at these
conclusions, reasons which impact both the standard of review of
decisions on "anti-SLAPP" motions and the scope of protection
afforded litigants in the Commonwealth under the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution.
1
Steward Carney Hospital, Inc. (Carney Hospital or
hospital); Steward Hospital Holdings, LLC; Steward Health Care
System, LLC; and William Walczak.
2
Standard of review. A threshold question is the proper
application of the standard of review. We review the motion
judge's decision for an abuse of discretion. See Kobrin v.
Gastfriend, 443 Mass. 327, 330-331 (2005) (Kobrin); Marabello v.
Boston Bark Corp., 463 Mass. 394, 397 (2012) (Marabello).2
Whether the appellate courts have functionally conducted (or
should conduct) a "fresh and independent evaluation" of anti-
SLAPP motions to dismiss, albeit under the umbrella of the abuse
of discretion standard, is a different question, one left
largely unanswered by existing precedent. See ante at . To
be sure, an appellate court reviews errors of law de novo, and
an error of law is an abuse of discretion. See Kobrin, supra at
330-331; Marabello, supra at 397. With some frequency the
existence of petitioning activity has been decided as a matter
of law on the basis of the complaint.3 See Fabre v. Walton, 436
2
See also Office One, Inc. v. Lopez, 437 Mass. 113, 121
(2002) (Office One, Inc.); Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 448 Mass.
242, 250 (2002) (Cadle); Hanover v. New England Regional Council
of Carpenters, 467 Mass. 587, 595 (2014).
3
For example, where a complaint is based solely on the
filing of a police report, the special motion to dismiss has
been allowed as a matter of law. See Benoit v. Frederickson,
454 Mass. 148, 153 (2009); Keegan v. Pellerin, 76 Mass. App. Ct.
186, 190 (2010). See also McLarnon v. Jokisch, 431 Mass. 343,
347 (2000) (application for an abuse prevention order). The
cases cited ante at arose as a question of law based on a
review of the complaint. The sole exception is North Am.
Exposition Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Corcoran, 452 Mass. 852, 854
& n.5 (2009), where the court supplemented its review of the
3
Mass. 517, 522-523 (2002); Office One, Inc. v. Lopez, 437 Mass.
113, 122-123 (2002) (Office One, Inc.); Wenger v. Aceto, 451
Mass. 1, 5 (2008) (Wenger); North Am. Expositions Co. Ltd.
Partnership v. Corcoran, 452 Mass. 852, 864-865 (2009)
(Corcoran). Where the pertinent allegations suggest that there
may be both petitioning activity and nonpetitioning activity,
the motion must be denied. See Garabedian v. Westland, 59 Mass.
App. Ct. 427, 432 (2003); Ehrlich v. Stern, 74 Mass. App. Ct.
531, 536-537 (2009) (Ehrlich); Burley v. Comets Community Youth
Center, Inc., 75 Mass. App. Ct. 818, 821-822 (2009) (Burley).
In this case, we also have the moving parties' affidavits.
How must those affidavits be treated? The answer lies in the
hornbook principle, as applicable in anti-SLAPP suits as in
other areas of the law, that the judge may look to the entire
record and is not required to credit a defendant's affidavit.
See Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 448 Mass. 242, 250-251 (2007)
(Cadle). In the context of an anti-SLAPP motion, this means
that the judge is not required to accept at face value either
party's "self-serving characterization" of conduct as
petitioning or nonpetitioning activity. See ibid. (holding that
the judge was permitted to determine as a factual matter that
the defendant had failed to meet his burden to show that the
allegations of the complaint, but with uncontested evidence
only. This case arises in a different posture.
4
purpose in setting up a litigation Web site was petitioning
rather than commercial).4 In my view, this determination on
appeal falls under the more deferential standard of review for
abuse of discretion, id. at 250, that is, whether the motion
judge made "a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors
relevant to the decision, . . . such that the decision [fell]
outside the range of reasonable alternatives." L.L. v.
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014) (quotation and
citation omitted).
The defamation claim. Turning to the defamation claim, the
complaint alleges and Walczak's affidavit confirms that he sent
an e-mail to all Carney Hospital employees. The e-mail
contained a stern warning about patient care, hospital
standards, and his reasons for the mass termination. There was
no allegation or averment in this or any other affidavit that
4
Alternatively, there is the approach taken in Benoit v.
Fredrickson, 454 Mass. at 154 n.7. In Benoit, the court
cautioned against fact finding on the second prong of the two-
part test. This caution makes sense in the context of ensuring
that the applicable standard -- whether the petitioning activity
is utterly devoid of reasonable factual support or an arguable
basis in law -- is not usurped by a shadow trial on the merits
on a motion to dismiss. The interest at stake in the first
prong of the test -- determining whether a defendant has met his
burden of proving that his statements were solely for
petitioning purposes -- is a different one. However, even if a
factual dispute were found to exist on the first prong, under
the Benoit approach, the dispute itself would be the basis for
denying the motion, because the existence of the dispute means
that the defendants have not met their burden to show that their
conduct was solely for a petitioning purpose.
5
the e-mail was provided to the regulators, or that the
regulators were told about it. The judge concluded that the
Steward defendants "have not shown how the statements in the
email, communicated only to Carney Hospital employees, were
intended to influence, inform, or reach, directly or indirectly,
governmental agencies. . . . The statements cannot be
considered petitioning activity merely because they communicated
to the Hospital staff what remedial action the Hospital was
taking as a response to a regulatory agency investigation."
The judge did not abuse her discretion. As a matter of
law, the hospital's decision to terminate the employment of all
employees in the adolescent psychiatric unit (unit) was conduct,
not speech, and is not entitled to the protection of the anti-
SLAPP statute. See Marabello, 463 Mass. at 398-400. The fact
that the hospital explained its actions to its employees does
not transform conduct into petitioning activity. A "tangential
statement[]" that "concerns a topic that has attracted
governmental attention . . . does not give that statement the
character contemplated by the statute." Global NAPS, Inc. v.
Verizon New England, Inc., 63 Mass. App. Ct. 600, 605, 607
(2005). That the e-mail may have been part of an over-all
strategy to address the conditions in the unit and thereby avoid
the wrath of the regulators is not enough. "[A]n over-broad
construction of the anti-SLAPP statute would compromise the
6
nonmoving party's right to petition -- the same right the
statute was enacted to protect." Kobrin, 443 Mass. at 335.5
It is not clear from the judge's decision whether she did
not credit Walczak's affidavit or whether, even if she accepted
it at face value, she found the affidavit was insufficient to
show that petitioning activity was the sole basis for the e-
mail, or both. See Wenger, 451 Mass. at 5, quoting from
Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 167-168 (movant must show that the claim
"[is] based on 'petitioning activities alone and ha[s] no
substantial basis other than or in addition to the petitioning
activities'"). The judge's decision is properly sustained on
either basis.
First, for the reasons stated above, the judge did not
abuse her discretion to the extent that she declined to credit
Walczak's affidavit. See Cadle, 448 Mass. at 250. The judge
considered the affidavit6 and found it unpersuasive in light of
the complete absence of any evidence that the e-mail was sent to
the regulators. In this factual context, the judge did not
5
It is particularly important to note that the e-mail went
further than the report prepared by Attorney Scott Harshbarger
and could be read to suggest that the fired employees were
responsible for the incidents leading to the investigation. It
is these statements in particular which the plaintiffs allege
were defamatory.
6
The affidavits were discussed at length in the motion
hearing, and the judge stated on the record her intention to
consider them.
7
engage in a clear error in judgment in concluding that the
affidavit, crafted after the fact for purposes of supporting the
special motion, failed to sustain the defendants' burden to show
that Walczak engaged in petitioning activity. The statements in
the affidavit concerning the defendants' motives and beliefs are
not relevant. "We care not whether a defendant seeking
dismissal under the anti-SLAPP statute is 'sincere' in his or
her statements; rather, our only concern, as required by the
statute, is that the person be truly 'petitioning' the
government in the constitutional sense." Kobrin, 443 Mass. at
338 n.14.
Second, even if the judge were to give weight to Walczak's
statement that he hoped to influence the regulators (which she
clearly did not in view of the lack of any indication that the
regulators knew of the e-mail's existence), or to simply accept
the statements at face value, Walczak also stated that he "sent
this email . . . to communicate to the hospital employees what
was happening."7 On its face, the e-mail served patient care and
7
In his affidavit, Walczak stated that he sent the e-mail
for the purpose of
"reaffirming Carney Hospital's commitment to providing the
best possible care to every patient that comes through the
doors and explaining the reasons why I decided to terminate
the employment of individuals who, in my view, had not
lived up to that standard. I sent this email not only to
communicate to the hospital employees what was happening,
but to give assurances to the regulatory agencies who were
8
labor relations purposes separate and independent of any claimed
attempt to influence regulators. The anti-SLAPP statute
protects a narrow range of conduct based solely and exclusively
on petitioning activity. See Ehrlich, 74 Mass. App. Ct. at 536-
537. See also Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 167-168. Even if one
were to accept the defendants' view that the e-mail must be
viewed as petitioning activity as a matter of law (which both
the majority and I do not), the e-mail also served
nonpetitioning purposes. Thus, the plaintiffs' complaint "[did]
not concern solely the defendants' pursuit of legal rights."
Ayasli v. Armstrong, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 740, 748 (2002), quoting
from Bell v. Mazza, 394 Mass. 176, 183 (1985).
For this reason above all others, the judge also correctly
ruled as a matter of law that the motion should be denied. It
bears remembering that the "sole purpose" doctrine came about as
a judicial gloss -- a gloss designed to save the statute from
constitutional infirmity.8 In Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 167, the
Supreme Judicial Court "adopt[ed] a construction of [the words]
in the process of determining whether Carney Hospital's
license to operate the Unit should be revoked that the
deficiencies which has [sic] been reported on the Unit
would not continue in that Unit or be tolerated in any
other part of Carney Hospital" (emphasis added).
8
The cases emphasizing the importance of the "sole purpose"
test are legion. See, e.g., Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. at 524;
Office One, Inc., 437 Mass. at 122; Cadle, 448 Mass. at 250;
Wenger, 451 Mass. at 5; Fustolo v. Hollander, 455 Mass. 861, 865
(2010); Ehrlich, 74 Mass. App. Ct. at 536-537.
9
'based on' that would exclude motions brought against
meritorious claims with a substantial basis other than or in
addition to the petitioning activities implicated" (emphasis
added). By limiting anti-SLAPP motions to those cases where the
only basis for the plaintiffs' complaint is the defendants'
nonfrivolous petitioning activity, the court resolved the
"conundrum [that had] troubled judges and bedeviled the
statute's application" -- that is, how to protect the
defendants' right to petition the government, provided the
petition is not a sham, while at the same time also protecting
an adverse party's right to petition. Id. at 166-167. See
Kobrin, 443 Mass. at 335.
The statements attributed to Walczak in the newspaper
articles suffer from precisely the same defects as the e-mail.
The judge found the statements to the Boston Globe to be
tangential, "particularly when the defendants already were in
communication with the agencies." In addition, the Walczak
affidavit states that his comments to the Globe were an appeal
to the public, an understandable purpose in light of the
potential impact of the allegations on the confidence of
patients, donors, insurers, and business partners, but still a
nonpetitioning purpose.9 On its face, the Walczak affidavit
9
In his affidavit, Walczak stated that he spoke to the
newspaper because "I felt that it was important that I explain
10
demonstrates that the statements to the press encompass
substantial nonpetitioning purposes.10
It matters not that the statements to the press (like the
e-mail) may have been part of an over-all strategic mission to
influence regulators. See ante at . Nor does it matter, for
First Amendment purposes, that a single act -- the statements to
the Globe -- may arguably serve both petitioning and
nonpetitioning purposes. If the conduct complained of serves a
substantial nonpetitioning purpose (such as persuading patients,
future patients, donors, future donors, insurers, and the public
at large of the quality of patient care), the complaint must go
forward. Otherwise, the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute would
expand exponentially to include protected First Amendment
petitioning activity. The result would be an interpretation of
the statute that renders it constitutionally infirm. See
Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 166-167; Kobrin, 443 Mass. at 335.
to the media, and hence to the general public and the agencies
themselves, why Carney Hospital took the actions that it did,
and what our plans were for ensuring the safety and care of our
patients going forward" (emphasis added).
10
In this regard, there is a "consequential distinction"
between Harshbarger and his law firm (Proskauer defendants) and
the Steward defendants. See ante at . The Proskauer
defendants were hired to assist in influencing the regulators.
The Steward defendants had safety, labor relations,
institutional, and commercial interests apart from the
regulatory proceedings.
11
However, because I agree with the majority that the
statements in the press, made in response to the Massachusetts
Nurses' Association's comments on the terminations, were
protected by the mirror image doctrine, I also must agree, based
on our existing precedent, that the statements to the Globe
acquired the status of protected petitioning activity. See
Wynne v. Creigle, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 246 (2005). Contrast Cadle,
448 Mass. at 251 ("Here, nothing in the record would support a
finding that the challenged statements made by Schlichtmann were
either a response to statements that Cadle had made to the press
or repetitions of statements initially made in a governmental
proceeding"). Other than the brief reference in Cadle, the
mirror image doctrine has not been considered in any depth by
the Supreme Judicial Court, and its parameters have not been
much explored by this court. Whatever those parameters may be,
I concur with the majority that the fact that the hospital was
responding to (not initiating) a press inquiry, and that the
response essentially mirrored the statements in the report
prepared by Attorney Scott Harshbarger, compels the conclusion
that this much of the claim is petitioning activity under
existing precedent.
Which leads to the final conundrum -- the ultimate
disposition of the defamation claim. In Wenger, 451 Mass. at 9,
the Supreme Judicial Court, without discussion, parsed a
12
complaint, count by count, dismissing some counts under the
anti-SLAPP statute and preserving others. This approach has
borne some criticism, on the theory that parsing claims
undermines the "sole purpose" doctrine and results in expensive
and complicated litigation contrary to the purpose of the anti-
SLAPP statute. See One Claim at a Time: The Inherent Problems
with Piecemeal Application of the anti-SLAPP Statute, Vol. 11-n1
Mass. Bar Assn. Section Rev. (2009). Wenger remains good law,
however, and we follow it.11
This case is different in that it involves a single count
alleging two separate acts of defamation. One of our cases
since Wenger has explicitly stated that "the anti-SLAPP inquiry
produces an all or nothing result as to each count the complaint
contains. Either the count survives the inquiry or it does not,
and the statute does not create a process of parsing counts to
segregate components from those that cannot." Ehrlich, 74 Mass.
App. Ct. at 536, and cases cited. Accord Burley, 75 Mass. App.
Ct. at 821. The majority holds that the statements to the Globe
could have as easily been pleaded as two counts rather than one,
and that it would elevate form over substance to permit the
count based on the statements to the Globe to go forward, thus
distinguishing Ehrlich. Whether Wenger governs in this
11
Indeed, the defamation count here is but one of many
counts, and has been considered separately at all stages of the
litigation in accordance with Wenger.
13
circumstance as well, or whether Ehrlich is the correct
statement of the law turns, as does much of this case, on
further clarification of the reach of the "sole purpose"
doctrine first articulated in Duracraft.
Accordingly, I concur in the result solely because I agree
with those portions of the majority opinion that hold that the
e-mail was not petitioning activity and the statements to the
Boston Globe were protected by the mirror image doctrine under
existing precedent.