MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Feb 25 2016, 5:57 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael J. Kyle Gregory F. Zoeller
Baldwin Kyle & Kamish Attorney General of Indiana
Franklin, Indiana Ian McLean
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Derrick Michael Means, February 25, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
41A04-1502-CR-68
v. Appeal from the Johnson Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable K. Mark Loyd,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
41C01-1312-FC-113
Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Derrick M. Means (Means), appeals his sentence after
pleading guilty to two Counts of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated
causing serious bodily injury, Class C felonies, Ind. Code § 9-30-5-4(a)(3)
(2013).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUES
[3] Means raises three issues on appeal, which we restate as follows:
(1) Whether Means waived his right to challenge his convictions on double
jeopardy grounds following a guilty plea;
(2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion during sentencing by relying
on the fact Means fled from the police; and
(3) Whether Means’ sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of his
offenses and his character.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] On November 27, 2013, while fleeing from the police in Johnson County, a
heavily intoxicated Means rammed his SUV into a vehicle occupied by two
adults and their six-year-old son. The driver of the vehicle sustained a
traumatic brain injury. He fractured his skull, part of which had to be removed
due to brain swelling, and he remained in a coma for two to three weeks
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following the accident. The front passenger suffered a double concussion, a
fractured knee cap, multiple lacerations, and internal bleeding. The child, who
was in the back seat, sustained only bumps and bruises; however, immediately
after the crash, he experienced immense shock because he believed his parents
were dead. At the time of the accident, Means was on probation for an
unrelated conviction of public intoxication. He also had one prior 2009
conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated in Indiana and one
prior 2009 conviction for driving under influence in California.
[5] On December 16, 2013, the State filed an Information charging Means with:
Counts I and II, causing serious bodily injury when operating a motor vehicle
while intoxicated with a previous conviction of operating a motor vehicle while
intoxicated within the past five years, both Class C felonies; Counts III and IV,
resisting law enforcement, both Class C felonies; and Count V, operating a
motor vehicle while intoxicated with a previous conviction of operating a motor
vehicle while intoxicated within the past five year, a Class D felony.
[6] On November 13, 2014, Means pled guilty to Counts I and II in exchange for a
maximum executed sentence cap of six years on each Count, merger of Count
V with Counts I and II, and dismissal of Counts III and IV. On January 26,
2015, the trial court held a sentencing hearing and, on January 28, 2015,
sentenced Means to an aggregate term of sixteen years, with twelve years
executed at the Department of Correction and four years suspended to
probation.
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[7] Means now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
[8] Means first argues that his convictions for operating a vehicle while intoxicated
causing serious bodily injury violate Indiana’s double jeopardy laws. The State
contends that Means waived his right to challenge his convictions on double
jeopardy grounds because he entered into a plea agreement. We agree with the
State. Our review of the record reveals that Means was represented by counsel,
who discussed the plea agreement with Means several times and explained all
pertinent consequences. He understood the terms and then freely and
voluntarily signed the plea agreement. Moreover, Means received substantial
benefits from the deal—dismissal of several charges and a cap on his executed
sentence. As such, Means waived his right to challenge his convictions on
double jeopardy grounds. See Mapp v. State, 770 N.E.2d 332, 334 (Ind. 2002).
[9] Notwithstanding the waiver, Means fails to persuade us on the merits of his
double jeopardy claim as well. Means pled guilty to two offenses under Indiana
Code Section 9-30-5-4. The offenses at the time of the accident were defined as:
(a) A person who causes serious bodily injury to another person
when operating a vehicle:
(1) with an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least
eight-hundredths (0.08) gram of alcohol per:
(A) one hundred (100) milliliters of the person’s
blood; or
(B) two hundred ten (210) liters of the person’s
breath;
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(2) with a controlled substance listed in schedule I or II of
[I.C. §] 35-48-2 or its metabolite in the person’s body;
or
(3) while intoxicated;
commits a Class D felony. However, the offense is a Class C
felony if the person has a previous conviction of operating
while intoxicated within the five (5) years preceding the
commission of the offense.
(b) A person who violates subsection (a) commits a separate
offense for each person whose serious bodily injury is caused
by the violation of subsection (a).
I.C. § 9-30-5-4.
[10] The statute’s language is unambiguous. The offense is elevated from a Class D
to a Class C felony, if the offender has a prior similar conviction. Further, the
offender is charged for each victim separately.
[11] Means acknowledges the statute’s specific requirement to charge separate
offenses for each victim. Instead, he claims he was subject to double jeopardy
because each of his convictions was elevated from a Class D to a Class C felony
based on his 2009 conviction of operating a vehicle while intoxicated and one
conviction “cannot be the basis of multiple enhancements . . . even when there
are multiple victims.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 6).
[12] However, at the time of the accident, Means had two prior convictions of
operating a vehicle while intoxicated within the previous five years—one in
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Indiana and one in California. 1 Therefore, Means’ argument is misplaced.
Because there were two prior similar convictions, the elevation of both offenses
from Class D felonies to Class C felonies does not raise double jeopardy
concerns.
[13] Means further contends that the trial court abused its discretion when, during
sentencing, it relied on Means’ flight from the police because it was not
supported by evidence. We disagree. Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified
on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). A trial court abuses its discretion in
sentencing when it fails to issue an adequate sentencing statement, finds
aggravating or mitigating factors not supported by the record, omits factors that
are clearly supported by the record, or finds factors that are improper as a
matter of law. Id. at 490-91. An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the
court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn
therefrom. Id. at 490.
[14] Here, the trial court’s decision is adequately supported by the record and the
video recording of the crash. Means admitted in open court that he was
stopped by a police officer, fled the scene, and then, while being chased by the
1
Means admitted that he had a DUI in California at his sentencing hearing. A log showing an entry of
conviction for DUI and hit and run on August 3, 2009 in California was admitted into evidence without
objection as State’s Exhibit 6.
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police, hit the vehicle occupied by adults and their child. As such, we hold that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion under the circumstances.
[15] Means finally claims that his aggregate executed sentence of twelve years is
inappropriate in light of the offense and his character. It is long settled “that
sentencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court’s
judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d
1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). Despite the fact that the trial court imposed a sentence
that is authorized by statute, our court may revise the sentence if, after due
consideration of the trial court’s decision, we find that the sentence is
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender. Appellate Rule 7(B).
[16] With respect to Appellate Rule 7(B), “[t]he principal role of appellate review
should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, and identify some guiding principles
for trial courts and those charged with improvement of the sentencing statutes,
but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell, 895
N.E.2d at 1225. Ultimately, “whether we regard a sentence as appropriate at
the end of the day turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the
severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that
come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224. In making this determination, we
focus on the length of the aggregate sentence and the manner in which it is to be
served. Id. The defendant bears the burden of proving that his sentence is
inappropriate. Reid v. State, 876 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (Ind. 2007).
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[17] As to the nature of the offenses, we note that Means drove his SUV with a
blood alcohol content of 0.24. Means was stopped by the police, but fled. He
was so intoxicated that he lacks any recollection of crashing into another
vehicle and causing severe injuries to the victims. The harm that Means caused
is incalculable; it completely changed the course of the victims’ lives. The
driver’s injuries were so severe that his heart stopped twice. His doctors
believed he was going to die and had begun preparing his family for his death.
The driver lost all sight in his right eye. He had to have part of his skull
removed because of swelling in his brain and now has a plate and screws
holding his skull together. The passenger endured a double concussion, a
fractured knee, internal bleeding, and lacerations. She floated in and out of
consciousness for seventy-two hours following the accident and remained in the
hospital for approximately a week. Furthermore, their six-year-old son not only
experienced the accident, but witnessed his parents in such a severe condition
that he believed them to be dead, and as a result, undergoes counseling
approximately twice a month. Means’ bad judgment on the evening of the
crash caused devastating and lasting consequences to this family on many
levels: physically, emotionally, and financially.
[18] Turning to Means’ character, we note that Means had multiple prior
convictions for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, public intoxication, and
resisting law enforcement, as well as probation violations. This certainly
demonstrates Means’ disregard for the law and willingness to risk his own
safety and the safety of others to avoid the consequences of his own decisions.
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He was provided with opportunities for treatment and rehabilitation, but failed
to take advantage of them. Means was well aware of his severe drinking
problem and yet he continued driving his vehicle; he was uninsured at the time
of the accident and for more than a year before that. Means’ unchanged
behavior and the serious nature of the present offenses justify the trial court’s
sentencing decision. As such, we conclude that the trial court’s sentence was
not inappropriate.
CONCLUSION
[19] Based on the foregoing, we hold that Means waived his right to appeal his
convictions on double jeopardy grounds, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion during sentencing by relying on the fact Means fled from the police,
and his sentence was not inappropriate.
[20] Affirmed.
[21] Najam, J. and May, J. concur
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Derrick Michael Means v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Combined Opinion