CLD-150 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 15-3252
___________
HOWARD O. KIEFFER,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN ALLENWOOD USP
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 1-14-cv-01547)
District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones, III
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
February 19, 2016
Before: FISHER, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 25, 2016)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Howard O. Kieffer, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the District
Court’s order denying his motion for relief from the dismissal of his habeas petition. We
will affirm.
Kieffer was convicted in federal courts in North Dakota and Colorado of charges
arising from his unlicensed operation of a criminal law practice. He was sentenced to 51
months in prison by the North Dakota District Court, and this sentence was affirmed.
United States v. Kieffer, 621 F.3d 825, 827 (8th Cir. 2010). He was subsequently
sentenced by the Colorado District Court to 57 months in prison, to run consecutive to his
North Dakota sentence. The case was remanded for resentencing because the court erred
in making the sentence consecutive. See United States v. Kieffer, 681 F.3d 1143, 1167-
68, 1172 (10th Cir. 2012). On remand, the court orally resentenced Kieffer to 99 months
in prison to run concurrent with the North Dakota sentence, stating that its intent was to
have Kieffer serve an additional 48 months in prison. See United States v. Kieffer, 596
F. App’x 653, 657 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2825 (2015). The court
memorialized the oral sentence in a First Amended Judgment, stating “the Court adjusted
the ninety-nine (99) months by subtracting the fifty-one (51) months already served in
[North Dakota], for a remaining sentence of forty-eight (48) months.” Id. (alteration in
original). The Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) interpreted this judgment as imposing only a
48-month sentence and began processing Kieffer for release. See id.
The Colorado District Court then issued a series of further amended judgments in
an attempt to clarify its intent that Kieffer serve 48 months in addition to his North
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Dakota sentence, for a total Colorado sentence of 99 months. Id. at 657-59. Kieffer
challenged the amended judgments in the Tenth Circuit and also filed a habeas petition
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Middle District of Pennsylvania,1 arguing that the
oral sentence imposed a term of 48 months (that had already expired) and that the BOP
erred by recalculating his sentence pursuant to the further amended judgments. See
Kieffer v. Warden, 616 F. App’x 464, 466 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
561 (2015).
While Kieffer’s § 2241 petition was pending, the Tenth Circuit vacated the
amended judgments and remanded for the Colorado District Court to issue a new
judgment consistent with its oral sentence, i.e., a sentence of 99 months less 11 months
served on the North Dakota sentence, for a resultant sentence of 88 months. See United
States v. Kieffer, 596 F. App’x at 661-62. The court issued a judgment in accordance
with that mandate, and Kieffer’s subsequent appeal was unsuccessful. See United States
Kieffer, No. 15-1078, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 1652, at *9, *12 (10th Cir. Feb. 1, 2016).
After the Tenth Circuit vacated the amended judgments and remanded for a new
judgment consistent with the oral sentence, the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissed
Kieffer’s § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that it was an attack on the
validity of the Colorado District Court’s amended judgments. We affirmed to the extent
Kieffer’s petition was construed as a challenge to the amended judgments. See Kieffer v.
Warden, 616 F. App’x at 466. We also acknowledged that Kieffer’s petition could be
1
At the time he filed his § 2241 petition,3Kieffer was confined in Pennsylvania.
construed as challenging the execution of his sentence because he argued that his oral
sentence was for a term of 48 months that had already expired. Id. at 466-67. However,
we deemed that argument to lack merit, given that the Tenth Circuit had already rejected
it. Id. at 467.
Several months after our decision, Kieffer filed a “Motion for Reconsideration
and/or Relief from Final Judgment of Dismissal (Fed R. Civ. P. 60(B)),” in the District
Court, purporting to have new evidence for the court’s consideration: the BOP’s
recalculation of his sentence pursuant to the Colorado District Court’s new judgment on
remand. However, the essence of Kieffer’s motion was, once again, his argument that he
had received an oral sentence of 48 months that is superior to any written judgment. The
District Court summarily denied the motion, noting that we had already affirmed its
dismissal of Kieffer’s § 2241 petition. This appeal followed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. If no substantial question is
presented, we may affirm on any ground supported by the record. See 3d Cir. L.A.R.
27.4; I.O.P. 10.6; Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).
We construe Kieffer’s motion as seeking relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(2), which allows a litigant to obtain relief from a final judgment based
on “newly discovered evidence.”2 A movant “bears a heavy burden” under this rule,
2
Although Kieffer sought reconsideration, he cited Rule 60(b) and expressly relied
on newly discovered evidence as the basis for his motion. Furthermore, he filed his
motion after the 28-day deadline in Rule 59(e) for motions for reconsideration.
4
Plisco v. Union R.R. Co., 379 F.2d 15, 17 (3d Cir. 1967), and must show that the new
evidence is material, could not have been discovered earlier, and “would probably have
changed the outcome” of the proceedings, Bohus v. Beloff, 950 F.2d 919, 930 (3d Cir.
1991). In general, we review orders denying Rule 60(b) motions for an abuse of
discretion. See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008).
As noted above, Kieffer relies on the BOP’s recalculation of his sentence as newly
discovered evidence warranting relief because it states a term never used by the
sentencing court, i.e., 88 months. This is an utterly meritless contention. The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the Colorado District Court to issue a judgment
reflecting a sentence of 88 months, see 596 F. App’x at 661-62, and it recently rejected
Kieffer’s argument that the 88-month sentence is invalid. See 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS
1652 at *6-9. Furthermore, Kieffer’s motion is essentially an attempt to relitigate his
contention that he received an oral sentence of 48 months. This position has been
rejected by this Court and the Tenth Circuit. See id. at *8-9; Kieffer v. Warden, 616 F.
App’x at 467; United States v. Kieffer, 596 F. App’x at 661. A Rule 60(b) motion may
not be used as a means of seeking review of our prior decisions. See Reform Party v.
Allegheny Cty. Dep’t of Elections, 174 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc).
In sum, it is apparent that Kieffer has failed to offer anything that would have
changed the outcome of his § 2241 proceedings. Rule 60(b)(2) relief was therefore not
5
warranted, and the District court acted within its discretion when it denied Kieffer’s
motion.3 Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.
3
To the extent that Kieffer also sought relief under Rule 60(b)(1) and (6), he failed to
show any mistake that called the validity of the prior judgment into doubt or any
“extraordinary circumstances where, without [Rule 60(b)] relief, an extreme and
unexpected hardship would occur.” Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 140 (3d Cir.
1993).
6