In the Int. of: S.T., a Minor Appeal of: L.T.

J-S05017-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.T., A MINOR, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: L.T., MOTHER,

No. 1375 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Decree July 10, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2014-1806

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, and PLATT,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 26, 2016

L.T. (“Mother”) appeals from the decree granting the petition filed by

the Lancaster County Children and Youth Social Service Agency (the

“Agency”) to involuntarily terminate her parental rights to her daughter, S.T.

or S.A.T. (“Child”), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and

(b).1 Mother’s counsel, Attorney Catharine I. Roland (“counsel”), has filed a

petition for leave to withdraw as counsel and a brief pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We grant counsel’s petition to

withdraw and affirm.
____________________________________________

*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
Although the July 10, 2015 decree states that the orphans’ court
terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(6), it is
clearly a typographical error. See Orphans’ Court Memorandum Opinion,
7/10/15, at 1, 5, 7.
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The orphans’ court has set forth the relevant factual and procedural

history of this case as follows:

SAT is a minor child, born [in 2006], in Lancaster County,
PA. She currently resides in the Kinship Resource Home of her
maternal great-uncle and great-aunt, [D.P and L.P] (hereinafter
“Resource Family”).

The birth mother of SAT, [L.T.] (hereinafter “Mother”), was
born June 9, 1983. She currently resides at New Life for Girls
(hereinafter “NLFG”), a faith-based drug and alcohol
rehabilitation facility in Dover, PA. Mother was present at the
hearings and represented by counsel. She is contesting
termination of her parental rights and testified at the hearing on
March 24, 2015.

* * *

The Agency’s long history with the family began in 2008,
after the Agency received reports concerning Mother’s substance
abuse, inappropriate housing, and emotional maltreatment of
SAT. Referrals were also received in January 2009 and
November 2010. The 2009 case was screened out. After
conducting a home visit in 2010, the Agency discovered the
home had no heat or electricity, there was no food in the home
and the refrigerator contained mold. The bathtub was filled with
dirty dishes. A voluntary Safety Plan was put into place in
November 2010 and was revised in December 2010. The
maternal grandparents were involved in the Safety Plan to
assure SAT’s safety and welfare. Mother’s initial level of
cooperation with the Agency waned and a Petition for Legal
Custody was filed January 21, 2011. After numerous
continuances, a Shelter Care hearing was held on April 5, 2011.
SAT was placed in the temporary legal custody of the Agency,
and the temporary physical custody of the maternal
grandparents. The Adjudication hearing was scheduled for
May 3, 2011. However, on April 25, 2011, Mother violated the
Safety Plan and the Agency filed a Petition for Temporary
Custody and requested immediate placement of the child to
insure her safety. A second Shelter Care hearing was held on
May 31, 2011[,] continuing SAT in the temporary custody of the
Agency. SAT was adjudicated dependent at the
Adjudication/Disposition hearing on July 26, 2011. The Child

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was placed in Kinship Care with maternal great aunt and uncle,
[L.P. and D.P.] A Child Permanency Plan was approved with
reunification as its primary goal. Mother successfully completed
her plan and SAT was released into Mother’s physical custody.
On January 31, 2012, legal custody was returned to Mother and
the Court terminated supervision.

Unfortunately, following the release of custody, Mother’s
behavior again deteriorated. The reunification lasted
approximately 16 months. The Agency received reports of
Mother’s excessive drinking, Mother’s visits to her paramour in
prison while SAT was home alone, and Mother’s inappropriate
parenting. Following these reports, the Agency attempted to
contact Mother. In response to the Agency’s messages, Mother
stated she did not have a caseworker and did not want one.
Mother refused to meet with caseworkers, allow caseworkers
into the home, or talk to caseworkers without being able to
record the conversations. Consequently, the caseworker visited
SAT at school. SAT was approximately seven years of age at the
time. When the caseworker attempted to speak with her, SAT
stated, “I have the right to refuse to speak with you without a
lawyer, a parent, and a recording device present.” SAT then
stated she did not want to be taken away, immediately left the
room, and ran down the hallway.

Based on these reports and events, the Agency filed a
Petition for Emergency Protective Custody of SAT on May 31,
2013. A hearing was set for June 25, 2013. On June 3, 2013,
the Agency was alerted that Mother reportedly planned to leave
the state to flee from Court jurisdiction and the Agency before
the hearing. As a result, the Agency filed a second Petition
requesting immediate temporary placement. The Court granted
the temporary relief and SAT was placed into the temporary
custody of the Agency. The Shelter Care hearing was held on
June 11, 2013. SAT was found to be a dependent child on
July 9, 2013, and a Child Permanency Plan was approved. The
components of Mother’s plan included mental health, drug and
alcohol, to remain crime free, parenting, income, housing, and
commitment. SAT was again placed in kinship care with the
Resource Family with whom she resided during her first
placement.

Upon SAT’s second placement, Mother’s behavior
continued to decline. She lacked sufficient income, lost her

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housing, continued her substance abuse, and was incarcerated
several times. N.T. 3/24/15, 164. She continued to manipulate
the system and abuse drugs and alcohol. Although she
participated in therapy sessions, she was not invested in the
process and made little progress. Mother admitted she really
never changed her behavior over the last few years, but
manipulated how the Agency viewed her in order to complete
her plan. N.T. 3/24/15, 163-166. As her paranoia increased,
she remained uncooperative with the Agency. In August of
2014, Mother was charged with receiving stolen property and
incarcerated for three weeks. After her release, Mother entered
NLFG to address her substance abuse issues.

The Agency caseworker testified that upon SAT’s second
placement, SAT became more and more upset with Mother and
during visits went in to a “coping mode.” Visits were suspended
from August 5, 2014, through September 2, 2014, due to
Mother’s incarceration and NLFG’s subsequent initial “black out”
period. Since Mother’s treatment began at NLFG, the
caseworker started to note a change in Mother’s behavior. She
testified that Mother is now attempting to make a true
connection with SAT. SAT has thrived in her current placement.
She maintains a structured daily routine, is gradually improving
in school, and participates in several extracurricular activities.
Her Resource Family makes sure she gets any additional help
with school work and is active in her therapy.

Orphans’ Court Memorandum Opinion, 7/10/15, at 1–5 (footnotes omitted).

On July 10, 2015, the orphans’ court entered a decree terminating

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), [(5)],

and 8.2 Mother timely filed a notice of appeal on August 10, 2015, along

with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to

____________________________________________

2
On July 10, 2015, the orphans’ court also terminated the parental rights of
Child’s father, W.D.M., III (“Father”), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1)
and (2). Father has not filed an appeal, nor is he a party to the present
appeal.

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Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).3 On September 10, 2015, counsel filed a

petition to withdraw and Anders brief. Mother did not file a pro se brief or

retain alternate counsel for this appeal.

Pursuant to Anders, when counsel believes an appeal is frivolous and

wishes to withdraw representation, he or she must do the following:

(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that after
making a conscientious examination of the record . . ., counsel
has determined the appeal would be frivolous;

(2) file a brief referring to anything that might arguably support
the appeal, but which does not resemble a “no-merit” letter or
amicus curiae brief; and

(3) furnish a copy of the brief to defendant and advise him of his
right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se or raise any
additional points he deems worthy of the court’s attention.

In re: S.M.B., 856 A.2d 1235, 1237 (Pa. Super. 2004) (emphasis in

original) (citation omitted). In In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267, 1275 (Pa. Super.

1992), this Court extended the Anders principles to appeals involving the

termination of parental rights.

“When considering an Anders brief, this Court may not review the

merits of the underlying issues until we address counsel’s request to
____________________________________________

3
Mother originally filed a notice of appeal and a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement on July 22, 2015, in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas
Juvenile Division and docketed in this Court at 1251 MDA 2015. This filing
was in error, however, because the proper division to appeal an orphans’
court matter in Lancaster County is the Office of the Register of Wills. On
August 10, 2015, Mother timely filed an appeal and Rule 1925(b) statement
with the appropriate division. The action at 1251 MDA 2015 was
discontinued on October 13, 2015.

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withdraw.” S.M.B., 856 A.2d at 1237. In Commonwealth v. Santiago,

978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009), our Supreme Court addressed the second

requirement of Anders, i.e., the contents of an Anders brief, and instructed

that the brief must:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts,
with citations to the record;

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes
arguably supports the appeal;

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous;
and

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of
record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that
have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. “After an appellate court receives an Anders

brief and is satisfied that counsel has complied with the aforementioned

requirements, the Court then must undertake an independent examination

of the record to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous.” S.M.B.,

856 A.2d at 1237 (citation omitted). With respect to the third requirement

of Anders, that counsel inform the defendant of his or her rights in light of

counsel’s withdrawal, this Court has held that counsel must “attach to [his]

petition to withdraw a copy of the letter sent to [his] client advising

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him . . . of [his] rights.” Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752

(Pa. Super. 2005).4

Here, counsel has complied with each requirement of Anders.

Counsel indicates that she conscientiously examined the record and

determined that an appeal would be frivolous. Further, counsel’s Anders

brief comports with the requirements set forth by the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania in Santiago. Finally, the record contains a copy of the letter

that counsel sent to Mother, advising her of her right to proceed pro se or

retain alternate counsel and file additional claims, and stating counsel’s

intention to seek permission to withdraw. Accordingly, counsel has fulfilled

the procedural requirements for withdrawing from representation. Thus, we

will now review Mother’s claim on appeal regarding the termination of her

parental rights.

In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we

adhere to the following standard:

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard
when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for
termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our
standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if
they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9
____________________________________________

4
On September 14, 2015, counsel filed a copy of her letter to Mother,
dated July 22, 2015, in compliance with Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873
A.2d 748 (Pa. Super. 2005). In response to this Court’s September 18,
2015 order, on September 24, 2015, counsel filed a certificate of service for
the Anders brief and petition to withdraw as counsel.

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A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court
made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 36
A.3d [567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion)]. As has been
often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely
because the reviewing court might have reached a different
conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors
America, Inc., ---Pa. ---, 34 A.3d 1, 51 (2011); Christianson
v. Ely, 575 Pa. 647, 654, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (2003). Instead, a
decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon
demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,
prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–827 (Pa. 2012).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental

rights are valid. In re: R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).

Moreover, we have explained:

The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as
testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to
enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”

Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).

The termination of parental rights involves a bifurcated analysis,

governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act.

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if
the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
standard of best interests of the child.

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In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

In the matter sub judice, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s

parental rights under sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), which

provide as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at
least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition
either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental
claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental
duties.

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his
physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of
the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.

* * *

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an
agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions which
led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist,
the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a
reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably
available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions
which led to the removal or placement of the child within a
reasonable period of time and termination of the parental rights
would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an
agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of
removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal

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or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of
parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the
child.
* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).

This Court may affirm the orphans’ court’s decision regarding the

termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section

2511(a). In re M.T., 101 A.3d 1163, 1179 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc).

Because the orphans’ court addressed the evidence supporting termination

under only section 2511(a)(8), and because we agree with the orphans’

court decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to that

subsection, we need not address the remaining subsections of the Adoption

Act. See In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 100 (Pa. Super. 2011) (observing that

if we agree with the trial court’s decision as to termination of parental rights

under any subsection of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a), we need not address the

remaining subsections).

With regard to termination under subsection (a)(8), the orphans’ court

first referenced the uncontested fact that “[Child] was removed from

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Mother’s care by the Court for the second time in her young life in June

2013, and that more than 12 months have passed since placement.”

Orphans’ Court Memorandum Opinion, 7/10/15, at 7. The court next

assessed whether the conditions leading to Child’s placement with the

Agency have persisted and considered the following evidence:

Mother was unable to parent SAT when the termination
proceedings began. Despite her current progress, Mother is still
learning how to maintain boundaries and develop tools for
raising a daughter and managing her addiction issues. She has
yet to remedy the reasons SAT was placed in care 24 months
ago. Mother waited too long to start any significant or
meaningful attempts to complete her plan.16 SAT is really no
closer to returning home than she was when she was originally
placed. Termination does not require evaluating Mother’s
willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that initially
caused the placement. It was her continued inability to
complete her plan and cooperate with the Agency which allowed
SAT to remain in care for a period of 24 months. The possibility
that Mother might now be on track to complete her plan in a few
years cannot cause SAT to remain in care indefinitely. SAT’s life
“simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [Mother] will
summon the ability to handle the responsibility of parenting.” In
re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1125 (Pa. Super. 2010). Consequently,
the [orphans’ court] finds that clear and convincing evidence has
been established that Mother’s deficiencies and the reasons for
SAT’s placement continue to exist.
16
Mother has failed to demonstrate significant
progress toward her plan. Mother’s [Permanency
Plan] goals for reunification call on her to improve
mental health functioning to the extent that she can
care for her child; to remain free from drugs and
misuse of alcohol; to remain crime free; to learn and
use good parenting skills; to be financially stable in
order to provide for herself and her child; to obtain
and maintain a home free and clear of hazards for
herself and her child; [and] to maintain an ongoing
commitment to her child. See Petitioner’s Exhibit #1
7/9/13.

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Orphans’ Court Memorandum Opinion, 7/10/15, at 12–13.

The orphans’ court then addressed “the statutory consideration under

(a)(8) requir[ing] the Court to find that termination would best serve the

needs and welfare of this Child.” Orphans’ Court Memorandum Opinion,

7/10/15, at 13. As noted,

[W]hile both Section 2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b) direct us
to evaluate the “needs and welfare of the child,” we are required
to resolve the analysis relative to Section 2511(a)(8), prior to
addressing the “needs and welfare” of [the child], as proscribed
by Section 2511(b); as such, they are distinct in that we must
address Section 2511(a) before reaching Section 2511(b).

In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc).

The orphans’ court made the following observation as to its needs-

and-welfare-of-the-child analysis under subsection (a)(8): “The [c]ourt has

briefly touched upon the best interest standard in its above analysis.

However, since the [c]ourt must also consider what is in the best interest of

the child under Section 2511(b), the remainder of this Opinion will continue

with that analysis.” Orphans’ Court Memorandum Opinion, 7/10/15, at 13.

While this language could indicate that the orphans’ court improperly

conflated its section 2511(a)(8) needs-and-welfare discussion with its

section 2511(b) analysis, a careful reading of the court’s memorandum

opinion demonstrates that it adequately conducted a discrete section (a)(8)

needs-and-welfare review. Notably, the orphans’ court’s section 2511(a)(8)

examination included findings that: (1) “Child has been involved with the

Agency and [the c]ourt for more than half of her life;” (2) although Mother

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had made significant personal progress “her recovery is separate from

[Child’s] need to recover from the harm she has suffered throughout her life

as a result of Mother’s issues; (3) Mother does not recognize the “need to

place [Child’s] interests above her own;” and (4) Mother does not appreciate

the damage to Child. Id. at 10–11.

The orphans’ court also detailed the impact on Child if she was

reunited with Mother:

SAT needs a loving and stable home. Mother’s solution is
to have SAT join her at her rehabilitation facility. This would
mean SAT would move to the NLFG facility to share a room with
not just Mother but also with other women in the program. It
would require a change of school, change of therapist, change of
home. In the best case scenario, SAT and Mother would be in
the treatment facility for no less than a year, but would then
have to transition into living outside the facility, guaranteeing all
those changes would again occur just a year later. During that
two year interval, SAT would experience a lot of transition, a lot
of waiting just to have the type of stable environment she has
now. Even then, there is still the possibility of another failed
attempt at reunification.

* * *

Because of her substance abuse issues, Mother’s priority
has been, will be, and should be on her recovery. Her
conversation is centered on her goals, her program
requirements, and her hopes for the future, with little awareness
or understanding of SAT’s goals, hopes, and needs. SAT needs
to deal with her own issues, and that begins with insuring
permanency and stability in her life. While Mother’s attitude and
participation in visits has greatly improved, Mother structures
the activities and the focus remains on her. She does not ask
about SAT’s homework or things she is engaged with at school.
It is difficult to believe SAT’s needs will be able to take priority at
this early stage of Mother’s recovery. To require SAT to move to
NLFG would, once again, displace SAT’s needs and interests in
favor of Mother’s.

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Orphans’ Court Memorandum Opinion, 7/10/15, at 11–12 (record reference

and footnotes omitted).

Our review reveals that the orphans’ court’s factual findings that

twelve months or more have elapsed from the date of Child’s removal, that

the conditions leading to Child’s removal continue to exist, and that

termination of Mother’s parental rights would best serve the needs and

welfare of Child are supported by the record. Moreover, the court’s section

2511(a)(8) analysis comports with the law. We therefore turn to the

orphans’ court needs-and-welfare evaluation under section 2511(b).

Our Supreme Court recently stated as follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a
court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child
have been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as
love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781,
791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa.
1993)], this Court held that the determination of the child’s
“needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional
bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost attention”
should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of
permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at
791.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

The orphans’ court set forth its section 2511(b) needs-and-welfare

scrutiny as follows:

In analyzing the best interest of the child, the Court relied
on Dr. Suzanne Ail’s testimony and bonding assessment and the
recommendations of the Guardian Ad Litem and the child’s
therapist in favor of termination. There is no question, based

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upon the record, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in
the best interest of SAT and that the effect of that termination
will not be harmful to SAT.

The Agency presented the testimony of Dr. Ail who
testified that the status of the bond between Mother and SAT is
attenuated. Mother’s failure to do what was necessary to reunite
with SAT over the past two years, followed years of instability
which has had a devastating impact on SAT’s relationship with
Mother. While Mother is making some progress, her focus is still
on what she needs to do in her recovery. There has not been a
lot of focus on the needs of SAT or that SAT’s recovery is going
to require as much depth and time as Mother’s.

Dr. Ail’s report states, “[t]he chronicity and severity of
[Mother’s] substance abuse and mental illness has badly
compromised SAT’s attachment to her mother. She has
repeatedly witnessed firsthand her mother’s reactivity, emotional
manipulativeness, and physical violence.” SAT has had to live
with uncertainty and had to endure the effects of Mother’s
relapses. The result of which has manifested in SAT’s actions
toward Mother: “I was expecting there to be anger, but what I
saw was very intense and unrelenting, and that . . . concerned
me about how deep that injury went.”

While Dr. Ail concluded that Mother and SAT do have a
bond, her report noted that the bond between SAT and the
Resource Family is more significant. She testified that the
Resource Family is more effective in providing limits and
structure. She did not see the same anger and ambivalence
with them that she saw with Mother, which would lead to
challenging behavior. When SAT became disgruntled, the
Resource Parents remained calm and firm and she was able to
regroup. Dr. Ail testified that SAT has a veneer of resiliency,
which only predictability and consistency can help strengthen.

The effects of Mother’s actions have traumatized SAT and
that damage manifests in her behavior. She is still so unsure of
the permanence of her current circumstances that she will not go
to bed unless the Resource Mother lays down with her until she
falls asleep. SAT becomes fearful if her Resource Family leaves
her for an overnight or weekend. SAT’s teachers have reported
that she has lacked confidence, has cried in school, and has
indicated she did not think she could do anything. She needs

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the stability of a family and a home, without the continuing
threat or chance of being removed. There will not be any
comfort and stability in SAT’s life until she knows that she is in a
safe and permanent home.

SAT’s therapist, Kellie Jacobs, testified that SAT has made
significant progress in therapy with the help of her Resource
Family, who have taken an active role in SAT’s treatment. While
acknowledging SAT is flourishing in their care, Ms. Jacobs stated
[she] does not believe SAT can survive another failed attempt at
reunification. Her hard won resiliency is still fragile and
dependent on the stability of her current placement. Ms. Jacobs
believes that Mother’s “manipulativeness, lack of accountability,
failure to support her daughter’s treatment, paranoia, and
inability to make choices congruent with her daughter’s best
interest” have left a residual negative impact on SAT that
manifests in an ambivalent attachment to Mother.

Both Karen Kelly, Assistant Director of NLFG, and Rebecca
Kern, Mother’s mentor at NLFG, testified to Mother’s substantial
progress and rehabilitation. The testimony was probative as to
the progress Mother has made and the potential for her to
continue that progress. However, the Court does not find their
testimony compelling or instructional in its decision on whether
to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Their testimony centered
on [the] NLGF (sic) program, Mother’s drug and alcohol
rehabilitation, and Mother’s desire to have SAT at the rehab
facility. Neither witness has met SAT nor has any knowledge of
her needs outside of what Mother reports to them.

Conversely, the Court found the testimony of Dr. Ail and
Ms. Jacobs credible and persuasive. This child needs
permanency and stability. SAT’s development has been
consistently disrupted in one way or another by Mother. While
SAT does have a bond with Mother, it is not particularly
meaningful or beneficial to SAT. It is clear from the evidence
and testimony presented that this child has been adversely
affected by Mother’s substance abuse and mental illness. It is
equally clear that she appears to have found stability in her
current kinship resource home. The Resource Family has been a
longstanding and consistent stabilizing factor in SAT’s life. Their
commitment has been unwavering, unlike Mother’s. SAT
flourishes in their care and demonstrates a strong attachment to
them, which is both meaningful and beneficial to her welfare.

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This bond should not be disrupted. She is in a pre-adoptive
home that offers her the love, stability, and permanence which
Mother has not been able to consistently provide to her.

The Resource Family remain[s] supportive of Mother,
affirming her potential. They are committed to maintaining
SAT’s relationship with Mother and open to future possibilities
should Mother maintain her current progress of stability and
sobriety. They have indicated their willingness to allow Mother
and SAT to continue to have contact, subject to the
recommendation of SAT’s therapist. Dr. Ail and Ms. Jacobs
testified they would recommend contact in the future if Mother
continues her current progress.

SAT has been in the custody of the Agency for over two
years. Her life has finally begun to stabilize. She needs to
remain in the home of her Resource Family. This child deserves
the peace, comfort, and safety of knowing her current home is
more than a temporary one. Termination of parental rights in
furtherance of adoption by her great aunt and uncle is in her
best interest. To deny or further delay the stability and
permanence that adoption would provide would be detrimental
to SAT’s physical and emotional wellbeing. It is important that
her current home is not a place of transition, but a forever
home, where all of her needs will be met, and where she can
flourish under the love, supervision and guidance of her great
aunt and uncle.

Orphans’ Court Memorandum Opinion, 7/10/15, at 14–18 (record references

and footnotes omitted).

Again, the orphans’ court’s factual findings are supported by the

record, and its legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an

abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we concur with the orphans’ court’s

analysis with regard to section 2511(b).

Finally, we are mindful that once satisfied that counsel has complied

with the Anders requirements, this Court undertakes an independent

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examination of the record to determine whether the appeal is wholly

frivolous. S.M.B., 856 A.2d at 1237. Thus, it is incumbent upon us to

discuss the issue raised in Mother’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement that the

orphans’ court erred in terminating her parental rights “when expert

testimony was clear that Mother and child should remain in contact with

each other, thus termination of parental rights was not in the best interests

of the child under 25 Pa.C.S. 2511(b).” Mother’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

statement, 8/10/15, at unnumbered 1.

We previously recounted the orphans’ court’s thorough discussion of

the expert testimony in this matter recommending that Mother’s parental

rights to Child be terminated and concluded that the court’s termination

decision under section 2511(b) was factually supported and legally sound.

Regarding Mother’s specific claim that the expert testimony regarding the

possibility of future contact between Mother and Child contraindicates a

conclusion that termination was in Child’s best interest under section

2511(b), the orphans’ court concluded:

The expert testimony does not state that Mother and child must
or should remain in contact. The testimony is quite clear that the
experts are in agreement that parental rights should be
terminated and that any future contact is contingent upon Mother
maintaining her sobriety, SAT’s therapist recommendation, and
the continued approval of SAT’s Resource Family. Whether or not
there will be future contact and what that contact will be is
unknown at this time. That decision will be based upon what is in
SAT’s best interest. In fact, the expert testimony of both . . .
Dr. Suzanne Ail and Ms. Kellie Jacobs revealed that Mother and
Child need some time apart to deal with their issues and that

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maybe they can renew a relationship in the future. Dr. Ail
testified:

I believe that if [Mother] is able to run the course
well and do what she needs to do and [SAT] is given
the space and place that she needs, I really believe
there is a strong likelihood that they will move
toward a better place of reconciliation, and I think it
is quite possible that, as an adult or even as a late
adolescent, [SAT] would be seeking out more time
with [Mother] and an even closer relationship with
[Mother] . . . I don’t think [SAT] and [Mother] can do
that work in conjunction at this particular point with
the two of them together.

* * *

The expert testimony and the gracious decision of the
Resource Family to remain open to the idea of conditional
contact between SAT and Mother certainly cannot to be
construed as clear evidence that termination of parental rights is
not in SAT’s best interest.

Orphans’ Court Opinion Sur Appeal, 8/5/15, at unnumbered 2. The orphans’

court’s assessment of the expert testimony is supported by the record and is

free from legal error. Accordingly, Mother’s argument that the expert

testimony can be construed favorably as to retention of her parental rights is

without merit.

Therefore, after a careful and independent review of the record, and

identifying no other non-frivolous issues, we conclude that the orphans’

court’s findings are supported by clear and convincing, competent evidence,

and that it reasonably concluded that the elements of section 2511(a)(8)

and (b) were met by the facts before it. We discern no abuse of discretion

or error of law in this decision. Accordingly, we affirm the orphans’ court’s

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decree terminating Mother’s parental rights, and we grant the petition to

withdraw as counsel.

Decree affirmed. Petition to withdraw as counsel granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/26/2016

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