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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
PATRICK HAVRILESKO, :
:
Appellant :
: No. 1528 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 15, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division
at No(s): CP-26-CR-0001930-2014
BEFORE: LAZARUS, STABILE, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 26, 2016
Appellant, Patrick Havrilesko, appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed in the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas after he pleaded
guilty to one count of indecent assault—person less than sixteen years of
age.1 Appellant claims the twenty-five year sexual offender registration
requirement is unconstitutional. We affirm.
The Commonwealth alleged that on June 26, 2014, Appellant had
sexual relations with the fourteen-year-old complainant, when he was
twenty years old. Numerous sexual offenses were filed against him on July
8, 2014. On December 18, 2014, Appellant completed a written colloquy for
a guilty plea to one count of indecent assault based on a plea bargain for
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(8).
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“probation.” Guilty/Nolo Contendere Plea Colloquy Form, 12/18/14, at 7.
The trial court accepted Appellant’s guilty plea to indecent assault on June 1,
2015,2 and the following day ordered an assessment of Appellant by the
Sexual Offender Assessment Board. Order, 6/2/15. On September 15,
2015, following a continuance requested by Appellant, the trial court
sentenced Appellant to serve two years’ probation. The court’s sentencing
order indicated Appellant was found not to be a sexually violent predator,
but that he was subject to a twenty-five year registration period under
SORNA. Sentencing Order, 9/15/15, at 2; see also 42 Pa.C.S. §§
9799.14(c)(1.3) (as renumbered eff. Sept. 2, 2014); 9799.15(a)(2).
Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion on September 18, 2015,
challenging the twenty-five year registration period, which the trial court
denied on September 23rd.
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) statement.3 The trial court filed a responsive Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
opinion observing that “[t]he issues raised in [Commonwealth v.
McDonough, 96 A.3d 1067 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 108 A.3d 34
2
The record transmitted by Appellant does not explain the delay between
the completion of the written guilty plea colloquy form and the court’s
acceptance of the plea. Moreover, the record does not contain transcripts
from the guilty plea hearing and the sentencing hearing.
3
The trial court prematurely ordered compliance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
after Appellant filed motion to proceed in forma pauperis. However,
Appellant filed his notice of appeal and his Rule 1925(b) statement on
October 1, 2015.
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(Pa. 2015)] were the same as those [Appellant] now pursues, to wit: the
unconstitutionality of the registration requirements . . . .” Trial Ct. Op.
10/19/15, at 3. The court noted McDonough “determined that the
registration requirements are not punitive, and therefore do not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment[,] and the same rationale is applicable here.”
Id.
Appellant presents three questions on appeal, all of which relate to his
claim that he is entitled to relief from the twenty-five year registration
requirement. See Appellant’s Brief at 7. He asserts, “It defies logic to
argue that the registration requirements are only civil in nature,” noting the
burden to register on a quarterly basis and the severe penalties for failing to
comply with registration. Id. at 10. He cites Commonwealth v. Williams,
832 A.2d 962 (Pa. 2003), to support his contention that relief is due because
“the requirement of a twenty five [year] registration requirement for a crime
that carries a maximum of [two years, see 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 1104(2);
3126(a)(8), (b)(1)] is . . . in excess of what is needed to ensure
compliance.” Id. at 11. Similarly, he asserts the registration period “is
totally beyond the statutory maximum sentence for the crimes [and]
constitutes an unusual punishment as barred by the Pennsylvania and U.S.
Constitutions . . . .” Id. at 12. Notably, Appellant does not reference the
trial court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion or attempt to distinguish
McDonough.
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Following our review, we agree with the trial court that the rationale
set forth in McDonough disposes of the argument raised in this appeal,
even though that case addressed a fifteen year registration requirement and
the instant case involves a twenty-five year registration period. As the
McDonough Court discussed:
On December 20, 2011, the legislature replaced Megan’s
Law with SORNA, effective December 20, 2012, to
strengthen registration requirements for sex offenders and
to bring Pennsylvania into compliance with the Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act. Section 9799.14 of
SORNA establishes a three-tiered system of specifically
enumerated offenses requiring registration for sexual
offenders for differing lengths of time. Pursuant to Section
9799.15(a)(1), a person convicted of a Tier I offense . . .
must register for 15 years. A Tier II offender must
register for 25 years, while a Tier III offender must
register for the remainder of his or her life. 42 Pa.C.S. §
9799.15(a)(2), (a)(3).
[The defendant] relies upon Commonwealth v.
Williams, 574 Pa. 487, 832 A.2d 962 (2003), to support
his argument that requiring an individual to register for
many years longer than the maximum penalty of the crime
itself is excessive and the registration provisions should be
struck down as unconstitutional punishment under the
state and federal constitutions. In Williams, our Supreme
Court was asked to decide whether certain provisions of
Megan’s Law II were constitutional as it applied to sexually
violent predators (SVP’s). The Williams Court specifically
held that the registration, notification, and counseling
provisions of Megan’s Law II, to offenders deemed to be
SVP’s, were non-punitive, regulatory measures supporting
a legitimate governmental purpose. However, the Court
did find that the prescribed penalties that attach to SVP’s
for failure to register and verify their residence were
unconstitutionally punitive and, therefore, invalidated
those provisions.
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[The defendant], while not classified as an SVP, uses
Williams to argue by analogy that the provisions imposing
penalties for failure to comply with the registration
requirements of the Law are similarly unconstitutional as
applied to him. However, even assuming that his 15–year
registration requirement is excessive in comparison to his
actual sentence of one to two years’ imprisonment, we
cannot ignore our Supreme Court's pronouncement that:
Because we do not view the registration
requirements as punitive but, rather, remedial, we
do not perceive mandating compliance by
offenders who have served their maximum
term to be improper. Furthermore, the fact that
an offender may be held until such information is
furnished is no different from confining someone in a
civil contempt proceeding. While any imprisonment,
of course, has punitive and deterrent effects, it must
be viewed as remedial if release is conditioned upon
one's willingness to comply with a particular
mandate.
Similarly, . . . this Court also recognized that:
The registration provisions of Megan’s Law do not
constitute criminal punishment. The registration
requirement is properly characterized as a collateral
consequence of the defendant’s plea, as it cannot be
considered to have a definite, immediate and largely
automatic effect on a defendant's punishment.
* * *
Because the registration requirements under Megan’s
Law impose only collateral consequences of the
actual sentence, their application is not limited by
the factors that control the imposition of sentence.
Thus, while a defendant may be subject to conviction
only under statutes in effect on the date of his acts,
and sentence configuration under the guidelines in
effect on that same date, the application of the
registration requirements under Megan’s Law is not
so limited. This is so due to the collateral nature of
the registration requirement.
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[T]he same principles behind the registration requirements
for sexual offenders under Megan’s Law apply to those
subject to SORNA. Namely, to effectuate, through
remedial legislation, the non-punitive goal of public safety.
In fact, one of the main purposes behind SORNA is to
fortify the registration provisions applicable to such
offenders. With this purpose in mind, we cannot find that
the law is unconstitutional as it applies to [the defendant].
He has offered neither competent nor credible evidence to
undermine the legislative findings behind SORNA’s
registration provisions. Accordingly, we find no error.
McDonough, 96 A.3d at 1070-71 (citations omitted).
Thus, we agree with the trial court that Appellant failed to establish a
right to relief in this appeal.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/26/2016
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