J-S15041-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
AARON EVANS,
Appellant No. 2497 EDA 2012
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 27, 2012
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-51-CR-0002396-2010
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 29, 2016
Appellant, Aaron Evans, appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed after his jury conviction of one count each of rape, attempted rape,
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, terroristic threats, and two counts
each of endangering the welfare of children, corruption of minors, and
possession of an instrument of crime.1 We affirm.
We begin by noting that this case is a procedural quagmire replete
with represented Appellant’s pro se filings, his multiple counseled requests
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(a)(6), 901(a), 3123(a)(6), 2706(a)(1), 4304(a),
6301(a)(1), and 907(a), respectively.
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for remand, counsel’s stated intent to file an Anders2 brief, and then his
later decision to complete a merits brief, and the unavailability of certain
notes of testimony. In light of this, we will present only the relevant factual
and procedural histories, which we take from the trial court’s January 29,
2015 opinion and our independent review of the record.
On March 18, 2010, the Commonwealth filed an information against
Appellant for his rape and related crimes against the victim who was the
minor granddaughter of his paramour, with whom he had lived for several
years. On January 5, 2011, the Commonwealth filed a notice of its intent to
introduce evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts pursuant to
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b).3 Specifically, the notice provided that
the Commonwealth intended to introduce
evidence that [Appellant] had sexual contact with [the victim’s
younger sister, K.B.] Specifically, when [K.B.] was 12 years old,
[Appellant] squeezed her vagina while “play fighting” and
attempted to put his hand up her shirt to touch her bare breast.
This occurred at 1316 S. Hicks St. where [Appellant] lived with
[K.B.’s] grandmother.
This evidence will be introduced for several reasons,
including but not limited to the following: to show [Appellant’s]
common plan, scheme or design; to bolster the credibility of the
victim; to show [Appellant’s] intent; to show [Appellant’s] state
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2
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
3
“In a criminal case the prosecutor must provide reasonable notice in
advance of trial . . . of the general nature of any such evidence [of a
defendant’s crime, wrong, or other act] the prosecutor intends to introduce
at trial.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(3).
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of mind; to help establish the elements of charges such as
[r]ape and related offenses.
(Notice of Intent to Introduce Other Acts Evidence, 1/05/11, at 1).
The court permitted the Commonwealth to present the other acts
evidence.4 The jury trial commenced on March 24, 2011.
The victim was seventeen years old at the time of trial. She testified
that Appellant was her grandmother’s live-in boyfriend, and that he had a
close relationship with the family. However, she stated that in 2002, when
she was nine or ten years old, Appellant forcibly raped her at her
grandmother’s house while threatening her with a knife he took out of a bed
stand. He threatened to kill her, her mother, and her baby cousin if she told
anyone about the rape. Therefore, although the victim’s vagina continued to
hurt, and her mother found blood on her panties days later, she denied to
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4
Because a relevant transcript on this issue does not exist, this Court
ordered Appellant to file a Rule 1923 statement in lieu of transcript on July
15, 2014. (See Per Curiam Order, 7/15/14); see also Pa.R.E. 404(b);
Pa.R.A.P. 1923. Appellant complied with the mandates of Rule 1923 and the
trial court approved his Rule 1923 statement, and adds that it “agrees that
the [Rule 404(b) evidentiary issue was] addressed and resolved on the
record, either in open court or in chambers, and that the record would be
contained in the missing notes.” (Trial Court Opinion, 1/29/15, at 4).
The certified record contains a March 23, 2011 order granting the
Commonwealth’s “motion” to introduce other acts evidence. (See Order,
3/23/11). However, this order does not appear on the docket, and is not
signed by the trial judge, although his name is typed under the signature
line. (See id.). Moreover, the Commonwealth filed a notice, not a motion.
However, it is undisputed that the trial court addressed Appellant’s objection
to the Rule 404(b) notice, and resolved the matter in the Commonwealth’s
favor.
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her mother that anyone had touched her. Appellant continued to harass her
anytime she went to her grandmother’s house thereafter.
In 2009, Appellant cornered the victim in a bathroom at her
grandmother’s house, with his penis exposed, and attempted again to rape
her at knife point. This time the victim was able to fight back, and in spite
of severely injuring her wrist in Appellant’s attack, she again did not tell her
parents out of fear of reprisal. Ultimately, a school nurse noticed the
victim’s wrist injury and her father took her to the hospital, where they
diagnosed her with a fracture. Later that year, due to the victim acting out,
her mother placed her in a program for troubled teens. As a result of the
program, the victim wrote a letter to her mother in which she finally told her
what Appellant had done to her in 2002 and 2009.
The Commonwealth introduced the testimony of the victim’s younger
sister, K.B., about other bad acts perpetrated by Appellant on her. K.B.
testified consistent with the Commonwealth’s January 5, 2011 other acts
notice that, in 2009, when she was twelve years old, she was at her
grandmother’s house when Appellant rubbed her stomach, tried to touch her
breasts, and squeezed her vagina.
Appellant testified on his own behalf. He described his close
relationship to his paramour’s family and denied any wrongdoing, and stated
that he neither carried a knife nor kept one in the bed stand.
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The trial court provided the jury with a limiting instruction on the
permissible uses of K.B.’s other bad acts testimony. On March 28, 2011, at
the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Appellant of the aforementioned
charges. On July 27, 2012, after granting several continuances, the trial
court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of not less than twelve-and-
one-half nor more than twenty-five years’ incarceration. Appellant timely
appealed on August 23, 2012.5
Appellant raises one issue for our review:6
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5
In response to the trial court’s order that he file a Rule 1925(b) statement,
Appellant’s counsel initially filed a notice of his intent to file an Anders brief.
See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), (c)(4). Thereafter, as stated previously, this case
became a procedural quagmire, thus causing multiple delays of its
disposition. However, pertinent to this review, Appellant’s counsel ultimately
filed a Rule 1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc on August 22, 2014. See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court filed an opinion on January 29, 2015.
See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
6
Appellant observes that our June 9, 2015 Order vacated a then-existing
briefing schedule without prejudice to this merits panel’s finding of waiver
for any issue that had not been included in Appellant’s previously filed March
19, 2014 brief. (See Per Curiam Order, 6/09/15; see also Appellant’s Brief,
at 17-19). We accept his claim that waiver is not appropriate. Our June 15,
2014 Order granted his petition for remand for the preparation of a Rule
1923 statement in lieu of transcript, and provided that, if any non-frivolous
errors were apparent from the record, he could request to file a Rule
1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc, and our Prothonotary would establish a
new briefing schedule. (See Per Curiam Order, 7/15/14). Appellant
complied with our Order by submitting a Rule 1923 statement to the trial
court for approval, and requesting the trial court that he be allowed to file a
Rule 1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc. After the court’s approval, Appellant
filed a Rule 1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc, our Prothonotary established
a new briefing schedule, and Appellant filed the brief currently under review.
Therefore, due to the procedural posture of this case, we agree with
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Did not the trial court err in admitting “other acts”
evidence at trial since the allegations presented by the
Commonwealth in its “Notice of Intent to Introduce Other Acts
Evidence” were insufficient to support the admission at trial of
evidence of other acts by [Appellant], and where the evidence
was prohibited pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404, where no proper non-
propensity purpose existed for the admission of said evidence,
and where even if such a non-propensity purpose did exist, the
probative value of the evidence did not outweigh its potential for
unfair prejudice?
(Appellant’s Brief, at 3).7
Our standard of review of this matter is well-settled:
Admission of evidence rests within the discretion of the trial
court, and we will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion.
Discretion is abused when the course pursued represents not
merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is
manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or
where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill will.
Generally speaking, evidence is admissible if it is relevant,
that is, if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the
case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable or
supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a
material fact. Pa.R.E. 402. It is settled law in this
Commonwealth that other bad acts evidence is inadmissible to
prove a defendant’s propensity to commit crime. Nonetheless,
bad acts evidence may be introduced for other limited purposes,
including, but not limited to, establishing motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of
mistake or accident, common scheme or design, modus
operandi, and the natural history of the case. Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2).
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
Appellant that he did not waive his appellate issue, and we will review its
merits.
7
The Commonwealth has not filed a brief in this matter, despite the fact that
we granted its application for an extension of time within which to do so.
(See Per Curiam Order, 10/28/15).
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This evidence is admissible only if the probative value of the
evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.
Commonwealth v. Kinard, 95 A.3d 279, 284 (Pa. Super. 2014) (case
citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, we note that “[t]he
particular prejudice that Rule 404(b)(3) seeks to prevent is the misuse of
the other-offense evidence-specifically, that jurors might convict a defendant
because they perceive the defendant has a bad character or propensity to
commit crimes.” Commonwealth v. Cascardo, 981 A.2d 245, 251 (Pa.
Super. 2009), appeal denied, 12 A.3d 750 (Pa. 2010).
Here, Appellant maintains that the trial court erred in allowing the
Commonwealth to admit prior bad acts evidence because the evidence of the
other acts was presented to the court “in a vacuum.” (Appellant’s Brief, at
23). Specifically, Appellant argues that “there was simply no showing of
relevance or of sufficiently weighty probative value of the ‘other acts’
evidence, as is required by Rule 404(b).” (Id. at 26). We disagree.8
We first observe that:
“In criminal cases, the prosecution shall provide
reasonable notice in advance of trial . . . of the general nature of
any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.” Pa.R.E.
404(b)(4). The purpose of this rule “is to prevent unfair
surprise, and to give the defendant reasonable time to prepare
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8
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in justifying a pre-trial
evidentiary decision on the basis of evidence presented at trial. (See
Appellant’s Brief, at 25). However, the court’s decision is supported by the
allegations contained in the certified record as it existed when the court
decided the issue.
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an objection to, or ready a rebuttal for, such evidence.” Pa.R.E.
404, cmt.
Commonwealth v. Lynch, 57 A.3d 120, 125-26 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal
denied, 63 A.3d 1245 (Pa. 2013).
In this case, the Commonwealth properly filed its notice of intent to
introduce other acts evidence over two months before this case went to trial.
(See Notice of Intent to Introduce Other Acts Evidence, 1/05/11). The
notice stated that the victim’s minor sister, K.B., would testify about
Appellant’s inappropriate sexual contact with her in her grandmother’s
home. (See id.). It also apprised Appellant of the reasons for which the
Commonwealth sought to introduce the evidence. (See id.). Therefore, the
notice provided Appellant with “the general nature of [the] evidence it
intend[ed] to introduce at trial” and prevented any unfair surprise, by
allowing him time to object to the proposed testimony. Lynch, supra at
126; see also Pa.R.E. 404(b)(3).
On March 23, 2011, when the court considered Appellant’s objection to
the proposed evidence, it was aware of the factual background of this case
and the allegations against Appellant based on the documents contained in
the record. For instance, the affidavit of probable cause recited that the
minor victim reported that, seven years prior, when she was nine or ten
years old, she had been raped and sexually assaulted by Appellant, i.e., her
grandmother’s boyfriend, in her grandmother’s home; that Appellant had
threatened her with a knife if she resisted; and that she was afraid to say
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anything sooner because he stated he would harm her family if she told
anyone. (See Affidavit of Probable Cause, 12/15/09, at 2). The victim’s
mother stated that she remembered the victim complaining of a stomach
ache around that time, and that the victim had blood on her underwear, but
that she denied that anyone had touched her. (See id.). The criminal
complaint, in addition to the foregoing, included the fact that, in the summer
of 2009, the victim stated that Appellant again attempted to rape her at her
grandmother’s home while brandishing a knife. (See Criminal Complaint,
2/22/10, at unnumbered page 2).
In explaining its decision to allow the Commonwealth to introduce the
proposed evidence, the trial court stated:
Due to the lapse of time, the fact that the victim’s testimony was
to a large extent uncorroborated, and [Appellant’s] denials of the
events, the evidence of the other acts was needed by the
Commonwealth for all the permitted purposes set forth in the
Rule and delineated in its notice. The probative similarities in all
of the details of the incidents allowed a reasonable fact finder to
conclude that there were logical connections between them, and
the court’s instructions safeguarded him against any potential
undue prejudice. . . .
(Trial Ct. Op., at 11).
We agree and conclude Appellant’s argument, that the court could not
decide the relevancy of the proposed bad acts evidence, to be unpersuasive.
The notice stated that the victim’s sister would testify that, when twelve
years’ old, Appellant, who was her grandmother’s live-in boyfriend, sexually
assaulted her at her grandmother’s house. (See Notice of Intent to
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Introduce Other Acts Evidence, 1/05/11). Similarly, Appellant was charged
with raping the victim, the witness’s sister, at the grandmother’s house
when the victim was approximately ten years’ old, and attempting to do so
again when she was sixteen. (See Affidavit of Probable Cause, 12/15/09, at
2; Criminal Complaint, 2/22/10, at unnumbered page 2).
The similarities between Appellant’s actions against the victim in this
case, and his alleged behavior with the victim’s sister, rendered the sister’s
proposed testimony not only relevant, but necessary to enable the
Commonwealth to establish Appellant’s common plan, scheme, or design,
and his modus operandi. See Kinard, supra at 284; see also
Commonwealth v. Aikens, 990 A.2d 1181, 1185-86 (Pa. Super. 2010),
appeal denied, 4 A.3d 157 (Pa. 2010) (concluding court properly allowed
other acts evidence where victim and witness were of similar ages, both had
same familial relationship with defendant, and he initiated sexual contact
under very similar circumstances). Therefore, Appellant’s claim lacks merit.
See Cascardo, supra at 251.
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not palpably abuse its
discretion when it allowed the Commonwealth to introduce other bad acts
evidence. See Kinard, supra at 284; Aikens, supra at 1185-86.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/29/2016
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