In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Nos. 15‐1354 & 15‐1582
STAFFING NETWORK HOLDINGS, LLC,
Petitioner/Cross‐Respondent,
v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
Respondent/Cross‐Petitioner.
On Petition for Review and Cross‐Application
for Enforcement of an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.
No. 13‐CA‐105031
ARGUED NOVEMBER 5, 2015 — DECIDED MARCH 2, 2016
Before FLAUM, MANION, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.
ROVNER, Circuit Judge. The National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB” or “Board”) concluded that Staffing Network
Holdings, LLC (“Staffing Network”) violated the National
Labor Relations Act by twice threatening employees with
discharge for engaging in protected, concerted activity, and for
actually discharging employee Griselda Barrera for engaging
in protected, concerted activity. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.
2 Nos. 15‐1354 & 15‐1582
(hereafter “the Act”). The NLRB ordered Staffing Network to
offer Barrera reinstatement and to make her whole for lost
wages. Staffing Network petitions this court for review of that
decision and asks that we reverse the Board’s decision in its
entirety. The NLRB cross‐petitions for enforcement of its
Order. We deny Staffing Network’s petition for review and
grant the NLRB’s petition for enforcement.
I.
Staffing Network is a staffing agency, providing temporary
and long‐term employees to a variety of employers. The
company operates at free‐standing locations and on‐site at its
clients’ premises. ReaderLink, an Illinois company, is an on‐site
client that fills book orders for other businesses. At the time of
the incident leading to this action, Staffing Network provided
approximately eighty full‐time employees for ReaderLink,
including an on‐site manager, a staffing assistant, pickers and
stockers. Pickers at ReaderLink work side‐by‐side on a
production line, selecting books to fill orders, placing the books
in boxes and sending them down the line. Stockers ensure that
pickers have an adequate supply of books to fill the orders.
Barrera began working for Staffing Network in 2004, and was
placed at ReaderLink as a picker. Except for once punching the
clock too early for her shift, Barrera worked at ReaderLink for
eight years without incident. Staffing Network’s on‐site
manager at ReaderLink was Andy Vega, who had been
working for the company for only a few months at the time of
these events. Monica Amaya worked as Vega’s staffing
assistant. ReaderLink also had its own in‐house supervisors,
including Mari Perez.
Nos. 15‐1354 & 15‐1582 3
On November 15, 2012, ReaderLink was working to fill an
especially large book order. At some point in the day, Perez
told Vega that two of the stockers were not working quickly
enough. Vega asked both stockers to work more quickly, but
one of the workers, a man named Juan, said that he would
work no faster for $8.25 an hour. Perez told Vega to send Juan
home and Vega complied. Juan’s dismissal caused an immedi‐
ate reaction among the pickers, including Barrera, Olga
Gutierrez and other women. They asked why Juan had been
sent home, and they told Vega that Juan could not keep up
with the line because he was new at the job. Vega replied that
Juan was sent home because of his attitude as well as his
inability to keep up with the work. Barrera, Gutierrez and
others told Vega that this was not fair. Vega replied that it was
not the pickers’ matter to deal with and that they should get
back to work. Vega also said that he could send them home as
well for their attitude. He then left the area.
Vega returned a short time later. He angrily and repeatedly
asked Barrera if everything was fine and told her again that he
could send her home if she had an issue. Barrera asked Vega if
he was threatening her and said that she could send a letter to
the Department of Human Rights. Vega then told Barrera to
collect her things and go home. Barrera refused, insisting that
she had done nothing wrong. Vega became angrier, pointed at
Barrera and said in a raised voice, “Let’s see if you’re not
leaving.” Gutierrez and others came to Barrera’s defense,
saying she had done nothing wrong. Vega again left the area
and returned to his office.
Vega then directed Amaya to tell Barrera to go home.
Amaya went to the production line and told Barrera to take her
4 Nos. 15‐1354 & 15‐1582
personal items and leave. She told Barrera that if she did not
leave, Vega intended to have security guards escort her out.
Again, the other women came to Barrera’s defense, telling
Amaya that Barrera had done nothing wrong and that Vega
had been rude. Amaya said there had been a lot of complaints
about Vega but that there was nothing she could do. Barrera
then left the work area with Amaya, turned in her radio
headset that pickers used to communicate, and waited in the
cafeteria for a ride to pick her up.
Amaya initially told Barrera to leave for the day. However,
later in the day, Barrera sent Amaya a text message asking if
she could return to work the next day. Amaya asked Vega how
she should reply to the message. Amaya then sent Barrera a
text message stating that Barrera needed to speak to Vega
about what had happened that day, and that she should not
return to work.
Having been told to leave and not come back, Barrera
reasonably surmised that she had been terminated and she
applied for unemployment benefits. The Illinois Department of
Employment Security (“IDES”) sent a request for information
about Barrera’s claim to Staffing Network. Vega and Amaya
composed and sent Staffing Network’s reply to the State. The
IDES form requested that the employer provide the claimant’s
“current status with your company, including details.” The
form presented four possible statuses: (1) Lack of Work (with
sub‐categories of Permanent or Temporary); (2) Voluntary
Separation; (3) Involuntary Separation; and (4) Still Working.
Vega and Amaya checked the box for “Involuntary Separa‐
tion.” For Involuntary Separation, the form requested that the
employer “[p]rovide reason, policy violation (include policy
Nos. 15‐1354 & 15‐1582 5
section), dates and details of prior warnings, and written
documentation of the final incident details. Include the name
& title of the individual who terminated the claimant.” Vega
and Amaya replied:
On 11‐15‐2012 the client (Mari Perez) informed
me that a stacker [sic] was not working at the
level he should be. When told to speed it up a
bit Griselda Barrera took it upon herself to tell
the onsite manager that he doesn’t know what
he’s talking about and that he should do his
homework. After this Griselda Barrera went to
the rest room for about 10 min [and] when she
returned she was talking to some of the ladies in
the line disrupting the production. Mari Perez
told the on site manager to tell Griselda Barrera
if she does not want to work to punch out and
go home. To which her reply to Andy Vega (on
site) was “do not threaten me with nonsense, I
have been here for many years and I know my
rights! And you are nobody to tell me what to
do,” [sic] After this she was told to punch out
and go home for the day but she ignored the
request and continued to get the ladies in the
line worked up saying this was going against
the law and that they have to stand up against
all the injustice we are committing.
Due to this Griselda Barrera cannot return to
ReaderLink.
Ex. R‐8.
6 Nos. 15‐1354 & 15‐1582
In response to questions specific to the staffing industry,
Vega and Amaya also indicated on the form that Barrera
would “be considered for future assignments with your
agency,” stating, “Yes, with any account other than
ReaderLink. She may call other branches for work.” In re‐
sponse to a question regarding whether there had been any
“job refusals since the last assignment ended that have not
been reported,” Vega and Amaya replied, “No she has not
been called due to her being placed on DNR from this ac‐
count.” In this context, “DNR” means “Do Not Return,” a
status given to a Staffing Network employee when a particular
client requests that the employee not return to the client’s work
site. The State ultimately approved Barrera’s unemployment
benefits. Staffing Network never told Barrera that she had not
been terminated. Nor did the company tell her that she could
return to work at ReaderLink or that she could work at an
alternate location. After the termination, Barrera tried to meet
with a representative of ReaderLink’s human resources
department directly. But when Barrera visited ReaderLink and
asked to speak to a ReaderLink employee, Vega and Amaya
met her instead and told her the ReaderLink employee was
unavailable.
Barrera filed an unfair labor practice charge, and the
Board’s General Counsel issued a complaint alleging that
Staffing Network violated section 158(a)(1) of the Act by twice
threatening to discharge employees for engaging in protected,
concerted activity, and by actually discharging Barrera because
of her protected, concerted activity. An Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing at which both the General
Counsel and Staffing Network presented witnesses and
Nos. 15‐1354 & 15‐1582 7
entered documentary evidence. The ALJ determined the facts
as we have recited them above, generally crediting the General
Counsel’s witnesses and finding that Staffing Network’s
witnesses were either partly or entirely not credible. The ALJ
agreed that Staffing Network violated section 158(a)(1) as
alleged by the Board. The ALJ rejected the company’s claims
that Barrera was not terminated, or that if she was terminated,
the discharge was justified by Barrera’s insubordinate behav‐
ior. The ALJ further found that Barrera did not lose the
protection of the Act under the factors delineated in Atlantic
Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814 (1979). Finally, the ALJ determined
that a burden‐shifting analysis under Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B.
1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), was not necessary
but that a violation would be found under Wright Line if the
case applied.
As a remedy, the ALJ ordered that Staffing Network offer
reinstatement to Barrera and make her whole for lost earnings
and benefits. The ALJ further ordered that Staffing Network
cease and desist from threatening to discharge or discharging
employees for engaging in protected, concerted activity. The
ALJ also directed the company to post a notice in both English
and Spanish informing workers of their rights and summariz‐
ing the outcome of the proceedings. On appeal, the Board
affirmed the ALJ’s rulings, findings, and conclusions and
adopted the ALJ’s Order with slight modifications that are not
relevant to this appeal. Staffing Network then petitioned this
court for review of the Board’s decision, and the Board cross‐
petitioned for enforcement of its Order.
8 Nos. 15‐1354 & 15‐1582
II.
In its petition for review, Staffing Network asserts that
(1) the Board erred in finding that the company terminated
Barrera; (2) in the alternative, if the Board was correct that
Barrera was terminated, the Board erred in concluding that
Staffing Network was prohibited by the Act from terminating
Barrera; (3) the Board erred in concluding that the company
unlawfully threatened employees twice on November 15, 2012;
and (4) the Board erred in crediting the testimony of all of the
General Counsel’s witnesses and discrediting all of Staffing
Network’s witnesses. Our review of the Board’s findings is
deferential, assessing only whether they are supported by
substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.
N.L.R.B. v. Enterprise Ass’n of Pipefitters Local 638, 429 U.S. 507,
531 (1977); AutoNation, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 801 F.3d 767, 771 (7th
Cir. 2015); 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (“the findings of the Board with
respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evi‐
dence on the record considered as a whole shall … be conclu‐
sive.”). See also Big Ridge, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 808 F.3d 705, 713 (7th
Cir. 2015) (we will affirm and enforce the Board’s findings if
they are supported by substantial evidence and if the Board’s
conclusions have a reasonable basis in law). “Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc.
v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). See also AutoNation,
801 F.3d at 771.
Nos. 15‐1354 & 15‐1582 9
A.
We begin with Staffing Network’s claim that the company
never terminated Barrera. According to the company, no
Staffing Network employee ever told Barrera that her employ‐
ment was terminated and Barrera, at the time of briefing,
remained an active employee in the company’s database.
Staffing Network also asserts that the Board misunderstood the
nature of the company’s business as a staffing agency, and that
an inability to be placed at a particular client such as
ReaderLink was not an indication that Barrera was terminated
from Staffing Network. Rather, she could be placed at other
employers. The company also faults the Board for relying on
a “phantom” text message from Amaya to Barrera, purporting
to tell Barrera not to return to work. Staffing Network contends
that the Board ignored undisputed evidence that Barrera has
never been terminated.
None of these assertions has any merit and we easily
conclude that the Board’s determination that Barrera was
terminated was supported by substantial evidence. Indeed, in
light of the smoking‐gun admission that the company made in
response to the State of Illinois’ unemployment inquiries,
Staffing Network’s claim that it did not terminate Barrera is
frivolous. As we noted above, in its response to the State, the
company indicated that Barrera’s status with Staffing Network
(as opposed to ReaderLink) was an “involuntary separation.”
Staffing Network did not check the box on the form indicating
that Barrera was “still working,” or even the box for “volun‐
tary separation,” even though it now claims both that Barrera
is still employed and also that Barrera simply abandoned her
job. In fact, Staffing Network did not attempt to explain this
10 Nos. 15‐1354 & 15‐1582
conclusive admission at the hearing before the ALJ or in its
briefing in this court, even though the ALJ relied on it and the
Board also cited it. Asked at oral argument about this singu‐
larly damning piece of evidence, Staffing Network’s counsel
responded:
The person who filled out the IDES form, ac‐
cording to the testimony, was not a lawyer. He
filled it out as best he could. He put information
in there that conveyed that the person could not
return to ReaderLink but also was eligible for
assignments. Someone who is eligible for assign‐
ments is not separated from Staffing Network.
They are active in the system and able to go on
other assignments.
R. 31, at 2:47. A manager need not be a lawyer to know
whether an employee has been terminated or simply sent
home for the day.
Moreover, this interpretation of the document is unsup‐
ported by the facts as determined by the ALJ and affirmed by
the Board. As we noted, Vega did not check boxes indicating
that Barrera was “still working” or that her separation was
“voluntary.” He checked the box for “involuntary separation”
from Staffing Network. That Vega is not a lawyer (a fact also
not contained in the record but we see no reason to doubt
counsel on this point) does not explain why he indicated an
involuntary separation when the company really meant there
had been no separation at all. Having made this conclusive
admission in a document filed with the State, Staffing Network
could have asked Vega to explain his answer, and Vega was
Nos. 15‐1354 & 15‐1582 11
free to clarify that he meant only that Barrera could not return
to ReaderLink, not that she had been involuntarily terminated
from Staffing Network. But Vega never clarified why he
checked the “involuntary separation” box in response to the
State’s inquiry. There is no evidence in the record supporting
counsel’s claim on appeal that checking the box for “involun‐
tary separation” meant something other than involuntary
separation from Staffing Network.1 The ALJ was justified in
relying on this admission in concluding that Barrera had been
terminated from the company, and this document alone
provides substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that
Barrera was terminated by Staffing Network.
But in addition to the company’s response to the State
indicating involuntary separation, other evidence supported
the Board’s determination that Barrera had been terminated.
Barrera testified that Amaya told her, at first, to go home for
the day (under threat of a security escort). After Barrera heard
from a co‐worker that Vega told another co‐worker that
1
Staffing Network relies on other parts of the company’s IDES response to
contend that Barrera was not terminated from Staffing Network but simply
could not return to ReaderLink. For example, on the IDES form, Vega
indicated that Barrera could not return to ReaderLink, and in the section
devoted to “questions [that] are specific to your industry,” Vega stated that
Barrera would “be considered for future assignments” “with any other
account than Readerlink [sic].” The ALJ found that this statement indicated
that Barrera was eligible for rehire. Nothing in the company’s IDES
response undermines the ALJ’s conclusion that Barrera was terminated
from Staffing Network and also was eligible for rehire.
12 Nos. 15‐1354 & 15‐1582
Barrera no longer worked at Staffing Network,2 Barrera sent a
text message to Amaya asking if she could return to work the
next day. Amaya indicated in her reply to Barrera that Vega
wanted to talk to Barrera the next day “but it wasn’t for me to
go back to work.” Tr. at 26. Having been told to go home and
to not come back, Barrera did not return to work, and instead
applied for unemployment benefits. See AutoNation, 801 F.3d
at 776‐77 (finding employer’s claim that it fired employee due
to job abandonment to be a pretext because employer knew
that employee had filed for unemployment benefits and was
under the impression that he had already been terminated and
yet the company did nothing to correct the employee’s alleged
misimpression). On the question of termination, the ALJ
credited Barrera’s version of events.3 That version of events
2
The ALJ allowed Barrera to testify to this double‐hearsay not for the truth
of the matter asserted but simply to show why Barrera sent a text message
to Amaya inquiring about her status. Like the ALJ, we do not credit the
truth of the co‐worker’s assertion that Vega told another worker that
Barrera no longer worked at Staffing Network. The evidence is relevant
only to demonstrate why Barrera sought clarification of her status.
3
The ALJ discredited Vega’s testimony about his response to Barrera’s text
message to Amaya because Vega’s testimony conflicted with Amaya’s
version of events and was also contradicted by Vega’s own testimony
regarding whether Barrera could return to ReaderLink the next day. In
particular, the ALJ rejected Vega’s claim that Barrera was directed to return
to ReaderLink the next day because Vega also testified that Barrera could
not return to ReaderLink because she was on “DNR” status, a fact he
confirmed with the State as well. To the extent that Staffing Network asserts
that a DNR with a particular client was not a separation from Staffing
Network, that claim is belied by the company’s admissions to the State of
(continued...)
Nos. 15‐1354 & 15‐1582 13
provides substantial evidence to support the conclusion that
Staffing Network terminated Barrera.
B.
Staffing Network’s remaining arguments are all founded on
a version of the facts that was thoroughly rejected by the ALJ.
Under the company’s version of events, Vega did not fire
Barrera; he simply sent her home for the day after she had been
insubordinate and abusive towards him. When Vega sent Juan
home at the request of ReaderLink’s management, Barrera
refused to go back to work, called Vega “a nobody,” threat‐
ened to report him to immigration authorities, and told him he
was just Amaya’s “secretary,” according to Staffing Network.
Vega denied yelling at Barrera or pointing at her, and claimed
that he sent her home not because she was complaining about
“injustice” but because she had been abusive and insubordi‐
nate, causing him embarrassment in front of other employees.
Under Staffing Network’s version, no one ever told Barrera she
could not return to work, and in fact Amaya told her to return
the next day. The company also asserted that Barrera’s adult
son repeatedly called Vega’s cell phone and left threatening
and harassing voice mails. Staffing Network asserts that it
repeatedly attempted to meet with Barrera but that she
rebuffed all attempts to communicate. Staffing Network also
claims that ReaderLink alone made the decision to place
Barrera on “do not return” status.
3
(...continued)
Illinois that Barrera was involuntarily separated from Staffing Network.
14 Nos. 15‐1354 & 15‐1582
But this version of events was almost completely rejected
by the ALJ. Based on this discredited version of events, Staffing
Network asserts (1) that the Board erred in finding that the
termination violated the Act; (2) that the Board was mistaken
in concluding that the company unlawfully threatened
employees twice on November 15, 2012; and (3) that the Board
wrongly credited the testimony of all of the General Counsel’s
witnesses while discrediting all of Staffing Network’s wit‐
nesses. Because the ALJ’s findings were based in large part on
concluding that Barrera and the General Counsel’s other
witnesses were credible, and that Vega and Staffing Network’s
witnesses were not, we begin with the company’s complaint
that the Board erred in reaching its credibility findings.
We must defer to the Board’s credibility determinations
and will disturb them only in extraordinary circumstances. Big
Ridge, 808 F.3d at 715; Jet Star, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 209 F.3d 671, 676
(7th Cir. 2000). The category of “extraordinary circumstances”
includes a clear showing of bias by the ALJ, an utter disregard
for uncontroverted sworn testimony, and the acceptance of
testimony to a fact that would be physically impossible. Jet
Star, 209 F.3d at 676; J.C. Penney Co. v. N.L.R.B., 123 F.3d 988,
995 (7th Cir. 1997); Carry Companies of Ill., Inc. v. N.L.R.B.,
30 F.3d 922, 928 (7th Cir. 1994). “The judge on the front line is
in the best position to determine which of two stories told by
competing witnesses should be credited.” N.L.R.B. v. Joy
Recovery Tech. Corp., 134 F.3d 1307, 1313 (7th Cir. 1998). That is
so because credibility is “a function not only of what a witness
says but of how a witness says it.” N.L.R.B. v. Overnite Transp.
Co., 938 F.2d 815, 819 (7th Cir. 1991). Moreover, an ALJ does
not necessarily exhibit bias when crediting all of the witnesses
Nos. 15‐1354 & 15‐1582 15
on one side of a dispute and none of the witnesses on the other.
N.L.R.B. v. Q‐1 Motor Express, Inc., 25 F.3d 473, 479 (7th Cir.
1994). See also N.L.R.B. v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 337 U.S. 656, 659
(1949) (“total rejection of an opposed view cannot of itself
impugn the integrity of competence of a trier of fact”).
Staffing Network points to nothing in the record that would
demonstrate the extraordinary circumstances necessary to set
aside the credibility determinations here. The ALJ carefully
considered the testimony of all of the witnesses and assessed
the demeanor and credibility of each witness. The ALJ discred‐
ited Vega’s testimony based on his demeanor when testifying,
the “self‐serving,” “illogical,” “rambling and narrative” nature
of his testimony, and the contradictory testimony of other
witnesses, including witnesses also employed by Staffing
Network. For example, the ALJ discredited Vega’s testimony
in part because it conflicted with the testimony of Amaya, his
assistant and a Staffing Network employee. Vega’s testimony
was also contradicted by the written record including Vega’s
own written statements to the State of Illinois. At times, Vega’s
testimony was also internally inconsistent. For example, Vega
testified both that he told Barrera to come back to work at
ReaderLink the next day and that ReaderLink had placed her
on “do not return” status. These are valid reasons to reject
Vega’s testimony and to find that he was not credible.
In contrast, the ALJ found the testimony of Barrera to be
“both believable and reliable,” noting that she had testified “in
a steady and forthright manner,” and that her testimony was
corroborated by other witnesses. The ALJ also found her
testimony to be “logical and consistent” for the most part. On
a few minor points, the ALJ did not credit Barrera’s testimony
16 Nos. 15‐1354 & 15‐1582
to the extent that it contradicted an earlier affidavit. Again,
these are valid reasons to find a witness credible and there is
no hint of bias in the ALJ’s decision and order much less
“extraordinary circumstances” that would cause us to disturb
credibility findings.
Accepting the ALJ’s factual findings (which were in turn
affirmed by the Board), the only remaining question is whether
those facts lend substantial evidence to the Board’s finding that
the company wrongfully terminated Barrera, and the Board’s
conclusion that the company twice threatened employees with
discharge for engaging in protected, concerted activity. The Act
provides, in relevant part, that employees have the right “to
self‐organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection[.]“ 29 U.S.C. § 157. Employers may not “interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157ʺ of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). An
employer violates section 158(a)(1) when it threatens employ‐
ees with discipline or discharge for engaging in concerted
activity that is protected under section 157. Fleming Companies,
Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 349 F.3d 968, 973 (7th Cir. 2003). Threats of
discharge, discipline, other reprisals against employees for
engaging in union activity violate the Act because “these acts
reasonably tend to coerce employees in the exercise of their
rights, regardless of whether they do, in fact, coerce.” Fleming
Companies, 349 F.3d at 973. The tendency to coerce is judged
from the viewpoint of the employee. N.L.R.B. v. Champion Labs.,
Inc., 99 F.3d 223, 228 (7th Cir. 1996); N.L.R.B. v. Gold Standard
Nos. 15‐1354 & 15‐1582 17
Enters., Inc., 679 F.2d 673, 676 (7th Cir. 1982). We easily
conclude that the Board’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence.
As was the case with the question of termination, the
company’s response to the State’s unemployment inquiry
provides a veritable smoking gun on the issue of the reason for
Barrera’s termination. Asked to provide the reason for
Barrera’s involuntary separation, Staffing Network explained
that after a stocker was told to speed up his work, Barrera
objected and then began “talking to some of the ladies in the
line disrupting the production.” According to Vega’s own
description of events, after he told Barrera to punch out and go
home “if she does not want to work,” Barrera “ignored the
request and continued to get the ladies in the line worked up
saying this was going against the law and that they have to
stand up against all the injustice we are committing. Due to
this, Griselda Barrera cannot return to ReaderLink.” With this
response to the State, the company essentially admitted the
relevant facts supporting the ALJ’s conclusion. It is well settled
that a brief, on‐the‐job work‐stoppage is a form of economic
pressure entitled to protection under the Act. Molon Motor &
Coil Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 965 F.2d 523, 525 (7th Cir. 1992). That is
the type of action that Vega described in his response to the
State in justifying Barrera’s discharge. Witness testimony also
supported the finding that Staffing Network terminated
Barrera because of her concerted, protected activity in protest‐
ing Vega’s treatment of Juan in relation to the terms and
conditions of his employment and that of the pickers. Namely,
Barrera and Gutierrez both testified that Vega told Barrera to
leave because she and the other pickers protested Vega’s unfair
18 Nos. 15‐1354 & 15‐1582
treatment of Juan. Therefore, substantial evidence supports the
Board’s finding that the company violated the Act when it
discharged Barrera for engaging in protected, concerted
activity.
Substantial evidence also supports the Board’s finding that
Vega twice threatened workers with discharge for engaging in
protected, concerted activity. As we have noted, the pickers’
temporary work stoppage and complaints to Vega regarding
his treatment of Juan constituted protected, concerted activity.
According to the testimony of both Barrera and Gutierrez,
Vega told the workers to get back to work, said that what
happened to Juan was not the pickers’ matter to deal with, and
threatened that he would send the workers home for their
attitude if they did not comply. And both Barrera and
Gutierrez testified that Vega made a second threat to Barrera,
telling her he would send her home after repeatedly and
angrily asking her if she was fine. Of course, Vega then carried
through on that threat when he terminated Barrera moments
after delivering the threat. The ALJ determined that Vega’s
statements had a tendency to coerce workers who were
engaged in protected, concerted activity. The testimony of
Barrera and Gutierrez supplied substantial evidence to support
that finding.
III.
Staffing Network’s remaining arguments are unavailing. In
light of the deference we owe to the fact‐findings of the Board,
we conclude that the Board’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence. We therefore deny Staffing Network’s
petition for review and we ENFORCE the decision of the Board.