J-S15039-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
FRANCISCO SOSA,
Appellant No. 2082 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 13, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-51-CR-0007184-2007
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED MARCH 02, 2016
Appellant, Francisco Sosa, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered following the revocation of his probation. For the reasons discussed
below, we quash.
We take the underlying facts and procedural history in this matter
from the trial court’s July 16, 2015 opinion and our independent review of
the certified record. On September 26, 2007, Appellant pleaded guilty to
corruption of minors and a related charge. On January 9, 2008, the trial
court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of incarceration of not less
than eleven and one-half nor more than twenty-three months to be followed
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S15039-16
by a consecutive, aggregate term of twelve years’ probation. Appellant did
not file a direct appeal.
While on probation, in 2011, Appellant was arrested for a violation of
probation, namely, failing to attend a mandatory sexual offender treatment
program. The trial court held a violation hearing on January 25, 2011, and
continued the hearing to see if the out-patient treatment program would be
willing to re-admit Appellant. A second hearing took place on March 1,
2011; defense counsel informed the trial court that the original program
would not re-admit Appellant but that there was a possibility that a different
out-patient treatment program would admit him. After appointing new
counsel for Appellant, the trial court again continued the matter. A third
hearing took place on April 15, 2011; new counsel informed the court that
the second program was unwilling to admit Appellant. Accordingly, the trial
court found that Appellant had violated probation and sentenced Appellant to
a term of incarceration of not less than two nor more than four years.
On April 25, 2011, counsel filed a motion for reconsideration of
sentence, which the trial court denied on May 3, 2011. Appellant did not file
a direct appeal.
On September 27, 2011, Appellant, acting pro se, filed a petition
under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
The PCRA court subsequently appointed counsel, who filed an amended
-2-
J-S15039-16
PCRA petition on August 20, 2012, seeking a new violation hearing and a
new sentencing hearing.
On March 13, 2014, the trial court held a new sentencing hearing, and
after extensive argument, resentenced Appellant to a term of incarceration
of not less than two nor more than four years. That same day, counsel filed
a motion for reconsideration of sentence. The trial court denied that motion
by operation of law on July 15, 2014.
On July 17, 2014, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. On January 26,
2015, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant filed a timely
Rule 1925(b) statement on January 31, 2015. On July 16, 2015, the trial
court issued an opinion.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following questions for our review:
1. Did the resentencing [c]ourt abuse its discretion and
make an error of law which prejudiced Appellant by failing to
request a [p]re-[s]entence [i]nvestigation report which would
have allowed the [c]ourt to familiarize itself with Appellant’s
background and thereby would have allowed the [c]ourt to
fashion an appropriate sentence?
2. Did the resentencing [c]ourt abuse its discretion and
make an error of law which prejudiced Appellant by failing to
provide Appellant with written [n]otice of his violation offense
and by basing Appellant’s violation determination on
impermissible hearsay alone?
3. Did the resentencing [c]ourt abuse its discretion and
make an error of law which prejudiced Appellant by failing to
consider the evidence presented by Appellant at his resentencing
hearing (and accepted by the Commonwealth) that Appellant
had not missed several sex counseling sessions when Appellant
-3-
J-S15039-16
provided documentation that he attended some of the classes
that he was alleged to have missed and did the resentencing
[c]ourt abuse its discretion by mandating that Appellant
attended such classes when Appellant had no financial resources
to pay for such classes?
(Appellant’s Brief, at 4).
Prior to addressing the merits of these claims, we must decide if they
are properly before us. Although neither party raises the issue, “the
[t]imeliness of an appeal is a jurisdictional question.” Commonwealth v.
Pena, 31 A.3d 704, 706 (Pa. Super. 2011). Therefore, it may be raised sua
sponte. See Commonwealth v. Coolbaugh, 770 A.2d 788, 791 (Pa.
Super. 2001). Further, “[w]hen a statute fixes the time within which an
appeal may be taken, the time may not be extended as a matter of
indulgence or grace.” See Pena, supra at 706. Our Rules of Appellate
Procedure mandate that the notice of appeal “shall be filed within 30 days
after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken.” Pa.R.A.P.
903(a). Further, our Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that the filing of a
motion to modify sentence following a revocation hearing does not toll the
thirty-day appeal period. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 708(E); Commonwealth v.
Coleman, 721 A.2d 798, 799 (Pa. Super. 1998). Time limitations on filing
appeals are strictly construed. See Commonwealth v. Perez, 799 A.2d
848, 851 (Pa. Super. 2002).
Here, the record reflects that, at resentencing, Appellant was
accurately informed of the correct appeal period. (See N.T. Resentencing,
-4-
J-S15039-16
3/13/14, at 14). Despite this, Appellant did not file an appeal within thirty
days of the March 13, 2014 resentencing hearing. Rather, he filed his notice
of appeal on July 17, 2014, two days after the denial of his post-sentence
motion.1 Thus, the present appeal is untimely. As such, we lack jurisdiction
over this appeal and must, therefore, quash. See Coleman, supra at 799;
but cf. Coolbaugh, supra at 791 (declining to quash appeal as untimely
where trial court misstated appeal filing deadline following revocation
hearing).
Appeal quashed.
Judge Olson joins the Memorandum.
President Judge Emeritus Bender notes his dissent.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/2/2016
____________________________________________
1
We note that the order denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion
incorrectly stated that Appellant could appeal within thirty days of the denial
of the motion. (See Order, 7/15/14, at unnumbered page 1). However, as
the trial court issued that order well after the expiration of the appeal period,
it is of no matter.
-5-
J-S15039-16
-6-
Com. v. Sosa, F.
Combined Opinion