UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4375
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMAR LAMONT HUNTER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. John A. Gibney, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:11-cr-00076-JAG-1)
Submitted: January 26, 2016 Decided: March 3, 2016
Before WYNN, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Geremy C. Kamens, Acting Federal Public Defender, Frances H.
Pratt, Elizabeth W. Hanes, Assistant Federal Public Defenders,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United
States Attorney, Erik S. Siebert, Assistant United States
Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jamar Lamont Hunter appeals the district court’s order
revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to twenty-
four months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Hunter contends that his
sentence is substantively unreasonable because he committed only
one Grade C violation and the district court erred in its
consideration of the relevant statutory factors. Upon review of
the record, we affirm.
In reviewing a sentence imposed upon revocation of
supervised release, this Court takes a “deferential appellate
posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of
discretion.” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439 (4th
Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). We will affirm a
sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release if it is
not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d
544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010). The first step in this review
requires us to determine whether the sentence is unreasonable.
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438. Only if the sentence is procedurally
or substantively unreasonable does our inquiry proceed to the
second step of the analysis to determine whether the sentence is
plainly unreasonable. Id. at 438–39.
Hunter does not challenge the procedural reasonableness of
his sentence. Instead, he argues it is substantively
unreasonable. A sentence is substantively reasonable if the
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district court stated a proper basis for concluding the
defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up to the
statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. “A court need not
be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence
as it must be when imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it
still must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence
imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
In this case, the district court appropriately considered
the Chapter Seven policy statement range and applicable
statutory factors. In announcing its sentence, the district
court reasonably found that Hunter’s failure to adhere to his
supervised release terms and breach of the court’s trust after
receiving relatively lenient sentences on two prior occasions
supported the twenty-four-month maximum. The court also acted
within its discretion in sentencing him to the maximum term.
Because Hunter’s sentence is procedurally and substantively
reasonable, it is not plainly unreasonable.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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