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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JULIUS DODSON
Appellant No. 2338 EDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order July 1, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0002640-1993
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
JUDGMENT ORDER BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED MARCH 03, 2016
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Montgomery County, dismissing Julius Dodson’s petition
for writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum as an untimely petition filed under
the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546 (“PCRA”).
Dodson filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum on
May 22, 2015, claiming that he was convicted under a subsection of the
aggravated assault statute that had been repealed eight years prior to his
conviction.1 Such a claim constitutes a challenge to the legality of his
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
In his statement of questions presented, Dodson also raises a claim that
the PCRA judge erred in failing to recuse himself because he had
represented the Commonwealth as a district attorney at Dodson’s
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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sentence and is cognizable under the PCRA. Commonwealth v.
Concordia, 97 A.3d 366, 372 (Pa. Super. 2014). Because claims that are
cognizable under the PCRA are to be pursued within the parameters of that
statute, id., the trial court properly treated Dodson’s filing as a PCRA
petition.
A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition, must be
filed within one year of the date the underlying judgment of sentence
becomes final. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); see also Commonwealth
v. Bretz, 830 A.2d 1273, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2003). A judgment is deemed
final “at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the
Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
or at the expiration of time for seeking review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3);
see also Commonwealth v. Pollard, 911 A.2d 1005, 1007 (Pa. Super.
2006). Here, Dodson’s judgment of sentence became final no later than
February 13, 1997, upon the expiration of the ninety-day period for filing a
writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(3); U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13. Thus, he had one year from that date, or
until February 13, 1998, to file a timely PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b). Dodson did not file the instant petition until May 22, 2015, more
than 18 years after his judgment of sentence became final. Accordingly, the
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(Footnote Continued)
preliminary hearing. However, Dodson does not address this claim in the
argument portion of his brief and it is, accordingly, waived.
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PCRA court had no jurisdiction to entertain Dodson’s petition unless he
pleaded and offered to prove one of the three statutory exceptions 2 to the
time bar. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). Dodson failed to do so. Accordingly,
the PCRA court properly dismissed his petition.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/3/2016
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2
The statutory exceptions are as follows:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
this section and has been held by that court to apply
retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).
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