J-S04013-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.K.V. II, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
A MINOR, PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: J.K.V. I, FATHER,
No. 414 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Order February 25, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County
Civil Division at No(s): 20037-2014 D.C.A.
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.K.V. II, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
A MINOR, PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: J.K.V. I, FATHER,
No. 415 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered February 25, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County
Civil Division at No(s): CP-37-DP-0000030-2013
NO. 30 OF 2013 D.C.A.
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.K.V. II, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
A MINOR, PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: J.K.V. I, FATHER
No. 416 WDA 2015
J-S04013-16
Appeal from the Order February 25, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County
Civil Division at No(s): CP-37-DP-0000035-2013
BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MARCH 04, 2016
J.K.V. (“Father”) appeals from the order entered on February 25,
2015, wherein the orphans’ court terminated his parental rights to his son,
J.K.V. II.1 We affirm.
At the outset, we observe that Father’s appeals filed at Court of
Common Pleas of Lawrence County action numbers 30-2013 and and 35-
2013 stem from dependency proceedings that are not at issue in this case
regarding the termination of parental rights. The proceedings at action
number 30-2013 related to a prior application for shelter care that the
Lawrence County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) filed and
subsequently withdrew on on April 12, 2013. Hence, that case is closed and
there is no order from that proceeding that is currently before us.
Accordingly, we quash the appeal filed at 415 WDA 2015 regarding action
number 30-2013.
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
The orphans’ court order also terminated the parental rights of D.B., J.K.V.
II’s birth mother. We do not address that aspect of the order.
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Similarly, the appeal filed at action number 35-2013 relates solely to
the underlying juvenile court proceedings and apparently challenges the
juvenile court’s adjudication of dependency pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S §
6341(c).2 Any appeal from the juvenile court’s order adjudicating J.K.V. II
dependent had to be filed within thirty days of the date the order was filed.
See Pa.R.A.P. 903. Herein, the juvenile court adjudicated J.K.V. II
dependent on November 20, 2013, and Father failed to appeal that order or
any ensuing order from the juvenile court. Hence, that appeal is also
____________________________________________
2
It is not entirely clear why Father purported to appeal from multiple action
numbers when the only appealable order was entered at 20037-2014,
relating to the termination of parental rights. We observe that CYS filed a
motion in the dependency proceedings to change J.K.V. II’s permanency
goal to adoption and the juvenile court scheduled argument concurrent with
the evidentiary hearing on the agency’s petition for involuntary termination.
CYS reasserted its motion at the outset of the involuntary termination
hearing, but the trial court, sitting as the orphans’ court in that proceeding,
did not dispose of the dependency-related motion on the record or in the
resulting order terminating parental rights. Moreover, the copy of the
docket for the juvenile court proceedings that is included in the certified
record confirms that the juvenile court never entered an order granting the
motion for a goal change. Hence, nothing exists to form the basis of the
instant appeal filed at 35-2013. In addition, in light of the facts that (1)
Father does not purport to challenge the goal change and (2) it is beyond
peradventure that the orphans’ court may terminate parental rights
regardless of whether the juvenile court has formally changed a dependent
child’s goal to adoption, we decline to address that juvenile court matter sua
sponte. See In re Adoption of S.E.G., 901 A.2d 1017, 1026 (Pa.
2006)(“an agency may file a termination petition even where reunification
remains the permanency goal for the child.”); In re M.T., 101 A.3d 1163,
1166 (Pa.Super. 2014) (en banc) (juvenile court’s goal change is not
prerequisite to involuntary termination of parental rights in orphans’ court).
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improper. Therefore, we quash the appeal at 416 WDA 2015 concerning
action number 35-2013.
J.K.V. II was born during June 2013. CYS was familiar with the family
because it had an open case involving an older half-sibling. When CYS
discovered that Mother had given birth to J.K.V. II, it inquired as to who
would care for the newborn. Mother advised the agency that she had placed
J.K.V. II in Father’s care. As CYS was not familiar with Father, it filed an
application for shelter care pending its review. That application was
withdrawn after CYS’s investigation confirmed that Father had provided
appropriate accommodations for his son at a relative’s home in New
Brighton, Pennsylvania.
CYS revived its concern approximately two weeks later after a
caseworker observed Father wandering around downtown New Castle,
Pennsylvania with J.K.V. II, the child’s belongings, and a formula canister
that was filled with flour instead of baby formula. The flour mixture was also
discovered in the newborn’s bottle. Father appeared to be homeless, which
he denied, but he failed to provide the agency with a home address. CYS
took emergency custody of J.K.V. II. On November 19, 2014, the juvenile
court adjudicated J.K.V. II dependent, and placed him in kinship care with
his paternal aunt and uncle, a pre-adoptive resource, where he has
remained.
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The original permanency goal was reunification. In order to achieve
that goal, CYS crafted a child permanency plan (“the plan”) that directed
Father to, inter alia, secure and maintain housing, improve his parenting
skills, address emotional instability, complete drug and alcohol counseling
and treatment, participate in anger management, and refrain from criminal
activity. Each of these components subsumed related goals and objectives
that CYS used to measure Father’s progress toward reunification.
Father’s compliance with the plan was minimal. From the outset,
Father was adversarial. He refused to even sign the plan, and he informed
CYS that he would not participate in any of the programs absent a court
order. He was so recalcitrant that he refused to execute a release to allow
CYS to contact service providers in order to confirm the progress he made
toward his goals and objectives. Father participated in thirteen of
approximately thirty-eight bi-weekly supervised visitations with J.K.V. II,
acknowledged his substance abuse by completing an inpatient treatment
program, and passed the only drug screen that he volunteered to take. On
the other hand, he failed to obtain housing, address his parenting
deficiencies, confront his emotional instability, participate in anger
management counseling, or refrain from criminal activity.
On September 17, 2015, CYS filed a petition to terminate Father’s
parental rights to J.K.V. II pursuant to the statutory grounds outlined in 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5) and (8). Father was represented by the attorney who
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had been appointed in the course of the dependency proceedings. During
the ensuing hearing, CYS presented the testimony of Stephanie Kelley, the
caseworker currently assigned to the family and the custodian of the
agency’s case file. Father testified on his own behalf. On February 25,
2015, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to
§ 2511(a)(8) and (b). This timely appeal followed.3
Father raises one issue. “The trial court abused its discretion [in]
terminating [F]ather’s rights without full consideration that the child had
been detained for [an] unsubstantiated allegation and that [F]ather had
substantially complied with what was required of him to reunify him with the
child.”4 Father’s brief at xxi.
Our standard of review is well settled.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
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3
Although represented at that juncture, Father filed a pro se notice of
appeal. The orphans’ court subsequently granted trial counsel’s petition to
withdraw and eventually appointed current counsel, who filed Father’s
appellate brief with this Court.
4
We interpret Father’s curious reference to J.K.V. II’s “detention for [an]
unsubstantiated allegation” as a challenge to the juvenile court’s finding that
J.K.V. II was a dependent child as the term is defined in 42 Pa.C.S § 6302.
While the propriety of the adjudication of dependency is not properly before
this Court, we understand the gist of Father’s argument, i.e., since the
agency’s concern over Father’s homelessness was misplaced, the goals and
objectives that CYS established for Father lacked any rational relationship to
the facts of this case.
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by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often
have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple
hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938. As the party petitioning for
termination of parental rights, CYS “must prove the statutory criteria for that
termination by at least clear and convincing evidence.” In re T.R., 465 A.2d
642, 644 (Pa. 1983). Clear and convincing evidence is defined as
“testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the
trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of
the precise facts in issue.” Matter of Sylvester, 555 A.2d 1202, 1203–04
(Pa. 1989).
As noted, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights
pursuant to § 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provide as follows.
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
....
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(8) The child had been removed from the care of the parent
by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an
agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of
removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
removal or placement continue to exist and termination of
parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of
the child.
....
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) and (b).
In order to satisfy the requirements of § 2511(a)(8) in the case at bar,
CYS was required to produce clear and convincing evidence that: (1)
J.K.V. II has been removed from Father for at least twelve months; (2) the
conditions which led to the child’s removal continue to exist; and (3)
involuntary termination of parental rights would best serve J.K.V. II’s needs
and welfare. See In Re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-1276
(Pa.Super. 2003). “Notably, termination under Section 2511(a)(8), does
not require an evaluation of [Father's] willingness or ability to remedy the
conditions that led to placement of her children.” In re Adoption of R.J.S.,
901 A.2d 502, 511 (Pa.Super. 2006) (emphasis in original).
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First, we observe that J.K.V. II has been in CYS’s care since April of
2013, due to concerns that Father was homeless and lacked a minimal
degree of parenting skills. As CYS did not file its petition to terminate
Father’s parental rights until September 17, 2014, approximately seventeen
months later, CYS satisfied the threshold requirement of § 2511(a)(8),
which mandates that the child be removed from Father for at least twelve
months. Next, the certified record reveals that the condition that led to
J.K.V. II’s removal in April 2013, i.e., Father’s inability to provide his son a
safe and secure environment continued to exist, and that terminating
Father’s parental rights would best serve J.K.V. II’s needs and welfare.
During the evidentiary hearing, Ms. Kelley testified that she had been
assigned to the family since May 2014. N.T., 12/11/14, at 5. She was the
current custodian of the family’s file. Ms. Kelley outlined Father’s lack of
cooperation and refusal to sign the plan or comply with it absent a court
order. Id. at 14-15. She highlighted Father’s goals, justified their inclusion
into the plan, and gave a brief explanation of what was expected of him. For
example, under the goal of maintaining secure housing, which addressed the
agency’s primary concern of homelessness, Father was required to lease an
appropriate residence for six months in order to demonstrate stability. Id.
at 25. He was not compliant with this component.
Ms. Kelley testified that Father failed to provide CYS with any address
between the date of his son’s placement during April 2013 and July of 2014,
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when he provided an address to a home that was vacant. Id. at 25, 27.
When the agency confronted him with the fact that he provided an address
to an unoccupied home, Father claimed that he lived on the second floor of
the home and that his belongings could not have been viewed from the
outside. Id. at 25-26. He continued that it would not be necessary for CYS
to return to the home for an inspection of the upper level because he
intended to move to a better neighborhood and would forward the agency
his new address. Id. at 26. Father failed to provide that information. Id.
Three months later, Ms. Kelley serendipitously discovered that Father was
living with Mother, after he used a house key to enter Mother’s residence
through a locked door and unknowingly interrupted a discussion that Mother
was having with Ms. Kelley in the home. Id. at 27. Father denied that he
lived with Mother, but Mother subsequently admitted that he resided in her
home and a check of the public welfare records confirmed that Father listed
that address as his residence. Id.
In order to improve his parenting skills, Father was expected to attend
supervised visitation, cooperate with the agency, complete a parenting class,
and demonstrate the appropriate parenting skills. Father did not attend a
parenting program and he only participated in thirteen of thirty-eight bi-
weekly supervised visitations scheduled since April 2014. Id. at 29-30, N.T.,
2/12/15, at 47. At least once, Father called after the missed visitation in
order to proffer an excuse. N.T., 12/11/14, at 30. On other occasions,
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however, he simply failed to attend the visitations without notice or excuse.
N.T., 2/12/15, at 34, 37. The tone of the visitations was neither positive nor
negative. Id. at 47.
Ms. Kelley also testified about Father’s failure to address his emotional
instability and drug and alcohol treatment. She indicated that the agency
included these components in the plan due to his criminal history and
potential substance abuse. N.T., 12/11/14, at 32, 34. She explained that
“the number of past convictions often relates to a [parent’s] stability.
Depending on [the nature of the charges and prior behaviors] . . . we’ve
seen in the past[,] maybe we still see [them].” N.T., 2/12/15, at 51. The
agency attempts to determine whether the criminal activity is connected to
drug or alcohol abuse or whether a pattern exists that will forecast future
issues. Id. at 51-52. Ms. Kelley surmised, “We would like to see stability
before we release a child to [a parent], because . . . we don’t want to
traumatize the child by bringing them back into the system.” Id. at 52.
As it relates to mental health, Father was required to have a
psychological evaluation, comply with treatment recommendations, and
execute releases in order to permit CYS to confirm his compliance. N.T.,
12/11/14, at 32. In relation to the substance abuse component, Father had
to participate in a drug and alcohol assessment, comply with treatment
recommendations, submit random drug screens, and attend three Narcotics
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Anonymous (“NA”) or Alcoholics Anonymous (AA”) meetings per month. Id.
at 34. His compliance with these goals was half-hearted.
Father apparently scheduled a mental health assessment and attended
that intake appointment. However, he failed to share the results of the
assessment or confirm whether he completed the program or followed the
treatment protocol. Id. at 33-35; N.T., 2/12/15, at 41-42. Indeed, without
releases permitting CYS to substantiate Father’s self-reporting, there was no
documentation that he completed any of the necessary tasks. N.T.,
12/11/14, at 33-34.
CYS encountered similar impediments in determining whether Father
addressed his substance abuse. Ms. Kelley testified that Father was
uncooperative with prior caseworkers’ attempts to administer drug screens,
but she indicated that Father passed the one drug screen that he permitted
her to administer. N.T., 2/12/15, at 41. Similarly, he completed inpatient
treatment administered by the Addiction Recovery Center (“ARC”), however,
it remained unclear whether he engaged in the required clean-and-sober
aftercare program at another facility. Id. at 40; N.T., 12/11/14, at 35-37.
Again, without the appropriate releases, the agency could not confirm that
Father initiated after-care. N.T., 12/11/14, at 36. Likewise, Father
neglected to attend the required number of AA and NA meetings per week.
Id.
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Finally, as it relates to domestic violence and anger management, Ms.
Kelley testified that those features of the plan were necessary to address
reported concerns of domestic violence between Father and Mother. Id. 37.
In addition, based upon the nature of Father’s prior criminal activity, CYS
believed that anger management would be beneficial. Id. at 38. Father
neglected to address either component. Id. At the time of the February
2015 evidentiary hearing, Father was incarcerated for a probation violation,
and he was subject to a temporary protection from abuse (“PFA”) order that
had been entered for Mother’s protection. N.T., 2/12/15, at 53-54.
Ms. Kelley concluded that J.K.V. II was thriving in the pre-adoptive
foster home with his paternal aunt and uncle and that she did not have any
concerns about his health and welfare. Id. at 52-53. She opined that it was
in J.K.V. II’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights. She
concluded, “The child is comfortable with [paternal aunt and uncle.] They
have expressed their willingness and eagerness to keep him if the
termination does go through. He interacts with [them] as though they’re
[his] parents.” N.T., 12/11/14, at 42.
The foregoing evidence sustains the trial court’s determination that
CYS proved by clear and convincing evidence the statutory grounds to
terminate Father’s parental rights to J.K.V. II pursuant to § 2511(a)(8).
J.K.V. II has been removed from Father’s care for approximately two years
as of the date of the termination hearings; the conditions that led to the
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child’s removal continue to exist; and, as discussed infra, involuntary
termination of parental rights would best serve J.K.V. II’s needs and welfare.
Stated plainly, Father’s failure to address his mental health issues, rectify his
parenting deficiencies, and secure stable housing, illustrates that he is
unable to care for his son. Accordingly, we find that the record supports the
orphans’ court’s conclusion that CYS satisfied the statutory requirements to
terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8). See
In re Adoption of R.J.S., supra.
We reject Father’s assertion that CYS should not have interfered with
the family in the first place because the agency’s claim of his homelessness
was unfounded. Equally unpersuasive is Father’s protestation that the
services that CYS required him to complete were unconnected to the reason
for its involvement. First, to the extent Father intended to challenge the
juvenile court’s decision to adjudicate J.K.V. II dependent, Father failed to
appeal that decision, which is entirely independent of the orphans’ court’s
current decision to terminate parental rights. Hence, Father’s stale
complaint regarding the sufficiency of the evidence that CYS adduced before
the juvenile court during 2013 to demonstrate his homelessness is not
properly before this Court. What is highly relevant, however, is the fact that
two years after the initial determination of homelessness, Father remains
unable to secure safe and stable housing as required by the plan, and he
attempted to mislead the agency about living with Mother. As it relates to
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Father’ secondary complaint, we underscore that Ms. Kelley explained during
the evidentiary hearings the various reasons that the agency selected the
precise objectives for Father in the child permanency plan. Stated simply,
CYS perceived risks related to, inter alia, Father’s homelessness, parenting
deficiencies, emotional instability, substance abuse, and criminal activity,
and it crafted goals that would permit Father to remedy those inadequacies.
In obdurate defiance of CYS, Father intentionally squandered the agency’s
efforts by either failing to comply with the plan or neglecting to execute a
release of information that would permit CYS to confirm his
accomplishments. No relief is due.
Next, we address whether the trial court abused its discretion in
finding that CYS presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that terminating Father’s parental rights and
permanently severing the existing bond between him and J.K.V. II would
best serve the child’s needs and welfare pursuant to § 2511(b). While the
Adoption Act does not mandate that the trial court consider the effect of
permanently severing parental bonds, our case law requires it where a bond
exists to some extent. See In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993).
The extent of the trial court’s bond-effect analysis depends upon the
circumstances of a particular case. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 763
(Pa.Super. 2008). We have emphasized that, while a parent’s emotional
bond with his child is a major aspect of the § 2511(b) best-interest analysis,
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it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the trial court
when determining what is in the best interest of the child. In re K.K.R.-S.,
958 A.2d 529, 535-536 (Pa.Super. 2008). Indeed, the mere existence of an
emotional bond does not preclude the termination of parental rights. See In
re T.D., 949 A.2d 910 (Pa.Super. 2008) (trial court’s decision to terminate
parental rights was affirmed where court balanced strong emotional bond
against parents’ inability to serve needs of child).
As we explained in In re K.Z.S., supra at 763 (emphasis omitted),
In addition to a bond examination, the court may equally
emphasize the safety needs of the child under subsection (b),
particularly in cases involving physical or sexual abuse, severe
child neglect or abandonment, or children with special needs.
The trial court should also examine the intangibles such as the
love, comfort, security and stability the child might have with the
foster parent. Another consideration is the importance of
continuity of relationships to the child and whether the parent
child bond, if it exists, can be severed without detrimental
effects on the child. All of these factors can contribute to the
inquiry about the needs and welfare of the child.
See also In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa.Super. 2010) (orphans’ court
can emphasize safety needs, consider intangibles, such as love, comfort,
security, and stability child might have with the foster parent, and
importance of continuity of existing relationships).
Herein, the orphans’ court concluded that severing the parental bond
and freeing J.K.V. II for adoption was in the child’s best interest. The court
implied that the parental bond that nurtures safety, security, and
permanency exists between J.K.V. II. and his foster parents rather than
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between him and Father. The court reasoned,
Although . . . Father did care for J.V. in the months immediately
following his birth, the evidence is void of any facts to support a
finding that [he] developed a strong and proverbial bond with
J.V. or that J.V. has any bond with either parent. Furthermore,
. . . Father offered [no] evidence that [he is] prepared to care
for J.V. in the immediate future if the underlying petition was
denied. Accordingly, the Court determines that termination of
parental rights would best serve the minor child’s best interests.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/25/15, at 12.
Our review of the certified record confirms the orphans’ court’s
conclusion. Ms. Kelley stated that the tone of Father’s visitations with
J.K.V. II was neither positive nor negative. N.T., 2/12/15, at 47. There was
little bonding during those sessions. N.T., 12/11/14, 29. She indicated,
“[T]he child would be more preoccupied with playing with the toys than
engaging with Father.” Id. Similarly, he did not cry or act out when he was
separated from Father following the visitations. Id. at 39. Indeed, Ms.
Kelley opined, “the child reacts . . . to . . . [F]ather [in] the same way [he]
reacts to [her, as his caseworker].” Id.
In contrast to the disinterest that he demonstrated toward Father,
J.K.V. II sought out his paternal aunt for comfort on the few occasions that
he needed consolation during the visitations. Id. at 38. Furthermore, Ms.
Kelley made the following observations regarding the child’s interactions
with paternal aunt and uncle at the pre-adoptive foster home. Id. at 40.
There is a discernible bond between J.K.V. II and his paternal aunt, whom
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he refers to as “Mimi.” Id. at 41. He is comfortable in the foster home and
displays affection for both foster parents. Id. 40-41. She described how
J.K.V. II “climbs all over them. [H]e’s really clingy to [his uncle] and still
really possessive with [his aunt].” Id. at 41. In addition, he enjoys the love
of his paternal family members who live nearby. Id. at 42. He is
particularly close with his grandmother, and two cousins with whom he
spends a lot of his time. Id. In sum, Ms. Kelley opined that J.K.V. II shares
a bond with his pre-adoptive parents, and, if he has any connection with
Father, it is weak. Id. at 42. As noted, supra, she believes that it was in
J.K.V. II’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights so that the child
can be adopted by his kinship foster parents.
As highlighted by the foregoing evidence, the certified record supports
the trial court’s needs and welfare analysis pursuant to § 2511(b). No
meaningful bond exists between J.K.V. II and Father that would be
detrimental to sever. The evidence confirms that J.K.V. II’s primary
attachment is to his pre-adoptive foster parents. That relationship reveals
the hallmarks of a healthy parent-child relationship. In contrast, Father has
not cultivated any bond with his son beyond visitation. The fact that J.K.V.
II’s primary attachment is with his pre-adoptive foster parents rather than
Father is a significant factor in evaluating his developmental and emotional
needs and welfare. See In re K.Z.S., supra (“the bond between [the child]
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and [foster mother] is the primary bond to protect, given [the child’s] young
age and his very limited contact with Mother”).
Thus, mindful of the additional factors that should be emphasized
during the needs-and-welfare analysis in In re K.Z.S., supra at 763, such
as “the love, comfort, security and stability the child might have with the
foster parent” and the importance of continuing that beneficial relationship,
we find that the record confirms that terminating Father’s parental rights
best satisfies J.K.V. II’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
welfare.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the orphans’ court order
terminating Father’s parental rights to J.K.V. II pursuant to § 2511(a)(8)
and (b).
Order affirmed. Appeals filed at 415 WDA 2015 and 416 WDA 2015
quashed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/4/2016
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