IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 73295-1-
Respondent, DIVISION ONE
v.
LAURA MARIE REED, UNPUBLISHED
Appellant. FILED: March 7, 2016 ^ 35r
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Cox, J. - Laura Reed appeals her conviction for second degree assault. ^
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Here, the trial court properly instructed the jury on reasonable doubt using WPIg Gr$A
4.01. But the trial court imposed discretionary legal financial obligations on Reed
under the mistaken belief that the obligations were mandatory. Thus, we affirm
Reed's conviction, but remand for resentencing so that the court may
appropriately exercise its discretion on these legal financial obligations.
The State charged Reed with second degree assault, domestic violence.
After a trial, a jury found her guilty as charged.
The court sentenced Reed. This sentence included several legal financial
obligations. At the sentencing hearing, Reed objected to these financial
obligations. The court responded by stating that these obligations were
mandatory.
Reed appeals.
No. 73295-1-1/2
REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION
Reed argues that the reasonable doubt instruction given in this case,
WPIC 4.01, is unconstitutional. Because controlling precedent directs trial courts
to use this standard instruction, we reject this argument.
Here, the trial court instructed the jury on reasonable doubt, using WPIC
4.01—the standard reasonable doubt instruction. In relevant part, that instruction
states "A reasonable doubt is one for which a reason exists and may arise from
the evidence or lack of evidence."1
Reed claims this standard instruction is unconstitutional. In substance,
she argues the instruction mandates that a juror must be able to articulate a
reason in order to have reasonable doubt. She also argues this alleged
articulation requirement undermines the presumption of innocence.
The supreme court has ordered trial courts to use WPIC 4.01 in all
criminal cases.2 This court recently noted that directive in rejecting the same
argument that Reed makes here.3 We reject this argument on the same basis.
LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS
Reed argues that the court abused its discretion when it imposed
discretionary legal financial obligations under the belief that they were
mandatory. We accept the State's concession of error and remand for
resentencing.
1 WPIC 4.01.
2 State v. Bennett. 161 Wn.2d 303, 318, 165 P.3d 1241 (2007).
3 State v. Lizarraqa Wn. App. , 364 P.3d 810, 830 (2015).
No. 73295-1-1/3
A sentencing court's failure to exercise its discretion is reversible error.4 If
the court fails to exercise its discretion based on its erroneous belief about the
law, we remand for resentencing.5
Here, the court imposed several legal financial obligations, including fees
for a domestic violence assessment, a jury demand, and court appointed
counsel. These three fees are discretionary.6
The State properly concedes that the court imposed these fees under the
mistaken belief that they were mandatory. We accept this concession and
remand so that the court may exercise its discretion on these fees.
We affirm Reed's conviction. We remand for resentencing only on the
discretionary legal financial obligations imposed by the court.
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WE CONCUR:
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4 State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 342, 111 P.3d 1183 (2005).
5 State v. McGill. 112 Wn. App. 95, 100, 47 P.3d 173(2002).
6 RCW 10.99.080; RCW 10.01.160.