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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CV-15-854
OPINION DELIVERED MARCH 9, 2016
RAYMOND VAIL and SAMANTHIA
SEE
APPELLANTS APPEAL FROM THE RANDOLPH
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
V. [NO. JV-2014-37]
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HONORABLE KEVIN N. KING,
HUMAN SERVICES and S.S., MINOR JUDGE
CHILD
APPELLEES AFFIRMED
ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Chief Judge
In this termination-of-parental-rights case, both parents, in separate briefs, appeal the
Randolph County Circuit Court’s order of August 11, 2015, terminating their parental
rights and granting to appellee Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) the power
to consent to adoption. Appellants Raymond Vail and Samanthia See both argue that
termination of their parental rights was not in the child’s best interest. Raymond also
contends that the trial court erred in determining that DHS proved a statutory ground for
terminating his parental rights. We affirm.
I. Statement of Facts and Procedural History
A petition for emergency custody and dependency-neglect was filed by DHS on
April 7, 2014, alleging that Samanthia and Raymond were the parents of S.S., born April 7,
2013; Samanthia had custody; and Raymond was the legal/putative father. The attached
affidavit of the DHS caseworker stated that a protective-services case had been opened on
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June 26, 2013, when Samanthia left S.S. alone for three hours and failed a drug screen for
THC by diluting the specimen with hot water. The case was closed on November 7, 2013,
after services, including parenting classes, had been provided. An emergency occurred on
April 3, 2014, when Samanthia admitted to not feeding S.S. until after 2:00 p.m., S.S. had
a severe diaper rash that had gone untreated, and Samanthia had her roommate, Daniel
Honeycutt, caring for S.S. Honeycutt had threatened suicide days prior, and Samanthia had
refused to take a drug screen for DHS. A seventy-two-hour hold was taken on S.S. due
to the maltreatment and risk of serious harm.
A probable-cause order was filed on April 8, 2014, finding probable cause that the
emergency conditions that necessitated removal of custody from Samanthia continued and
that S.S. should remain in DHS custody. DHS was to develop an appropriate case plan and
provide services. The parents were ordered to view “The Clock is Ticking” video; attend
and complete parenting classes; submit to random drug screens, a drug-and-alcohol
assessment, and a psychological evaluation; obtain and maintain sufficient income to support
the family and safe, clean, and stable housing; permit DHS access to their home; regularly
attend visits; notify DHS if transportation was needed; and keep DHS informed of correct
telephone numbers and addresses. The order also stated that Raymond should establish
paternity.
An adjudication order was filed on May 20, 2014, and the circuit court found that
DHS had been involved with the family since May 28, 2013, and services, including
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parenting classes, home visits, and random drug screens had been provided. These services
did not prevent removal because an emergency developed on April 3, 2014, as outlined
above. The circuit court found by a preponderance of the evidence that S.S. was
dependent-neglected due to Samanthia’s environmental and medical neglect. DHS
remained the custodian, and the goal of the case was reunification with a parent. The
concurrent plan was adoption/guardianship/permanent custody. All prior orders remained
in place.
A review order was filed on September 30, 2014, and custody remained with DHS.
Raymond was adjudicated to be the father of S.S., and the goal of reunification remained.
The circuit court found that Samanthia had been compliant in completing parenting classes,
viewing the video, and completing the psychological and drug-and-alcohol assessments and
outpatient substance-abuse counseling. She had attended counseling at Mid South,
submitted to random drug screens, attended weekly supervised visitations, and maintained
a home. However, Samanthia was not compliant in that she tested positive for THC when
she performed the drug-and-alcohol assessment; she missed a visit on August 21, 2014; and
she did not have sufficient income. The circuit court noted that DHS reported that
Samanthia was inconsistent during visits in her concern for S.S., her interaction with S.S.,
and her affection for S.S.
The circuit court found that Raymond was compliant in completing parenting
classes, viewing the video, submitting to drug-and-alcohol and psychological assessments,
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attending visitation, maintaining income and a home, and submitting to random drug
screens. However, Raymond tested positive for THC and opiates on August 12, 2014, and
on September 11, 2014, and he had not returned his home-study packet. He was often late
for visits, and he had trouble keeping track of visitation days and times. Neither parent was
ordered to pay child support.
A permanency-planning order was filed on March 31, 2015, and the circuit court
found that return of custody to the parents was contrary to the welfare of S.S, and
continuation of custody in DHS was in the child’s best interest. The circuit court authorized
a plan for adoption with DHS filing a petition for termination of parental rights because (1)
S.S. was not being cared for by a relative, and termination was in her best interest; (2) DHS
had provided appropriate services; and (3) the permanent goal should be a plan for adoption.
Accordingly, the circuit court appointed counsel for Raymond. A home study and drug-
and-alcohol assessment on Raymond were admitted in evidence. The circuit court found
that, while Samanthia had been partially compliant with the case plan and was continuing
to seek disability income after being denied twice, she had not been compliant in that she
tested positive for THC at the drug-and-alcohol assessment and for opiates on January 7,
2015. She had missed one visit on August 21, 2014, and she did not have sufficient income.
The circuit court specifically noted concerns about Samanthia’s credibility. Regarding
Raymond, the circuit court found compliance and noncompliance as set forth above and
further found that the home-study packet, which was finally submitted in January 2015 due
to his not being able to provide a current address, was denied.
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DHS filed a petition for termination of parental rights on April 17, 2015, and alleged
that (1) S.S. had been out of the custody of the parents for twelve months, and despite
meaningful effort by DHS to rehabilitate the parents and correct the conditions which
caused removal, those conditions had not been remedied, citing Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-
341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a) (Repl. 2015); (2) subsequent to the filing of the original petition for
dependency-neglect, other factors or issues arose which demonstrated that placement of S.S.
in the parents’ custody would be contrary to her health, safety, or welfare and that despite
the offer of appropriate family services, the parents had manifested the incapacity or
indifference to remedy the subsequent issues, citing Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-
341(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a); and (3) the parents had subjected S.S. to aggravated circumstances,
citing Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a). DHS alleged that, due to her tender age,
S.S. was adoptable and that there was potential harm due to the parents’ lack of sufficient
income and their instability with respect to relationships and employment.
At the termination hearing held on June 23, 2015, Raymond testified that he and
Samanthia had never been married to each other and had not lived together. He claimed
that S.S. had been in his home almost every weekend and every day he had off work until
she was removed by DHS and placed in foster care. He claimed that S.S. was placed in
foster care because he stopped going to Samanthia’s house and keeping it clean. He admitted
to having contact with Samanthia, as he had been to her house on the day prior to the
hearing. He explained that he had a prescription for opiates when he tested positive for
that, but admitted that he had failed the drug screen for THC, which was his fault. He said
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that he did not know where he got the marijuana. He said that he had three jobs and had
trouble getting his home-study packet returned to DHS. He denied being late for visits and
denied having trouble remembering what day his visits were scheduled. He admitted that
he did not keep a calendar even though he was shown how to keep one. Since the case
began, he had moved three times and had two girlfriends. He said he was currently dating
Anna, his fiancée. He admitted that he also had sex with Samanthia twice since the case
began. His jobs were at a sawmill and Larry’s Pizza, and he had a weekend job cutting
timber. He admitted that his income was not sufficient to cover his bills on a monthly basis.
He claimed that the only thing he had failed to do was the home study. He further claimed
that he did not know of Samanthia’s drug problem before DHS became involved.
Samanthia testified that she is S.S.’s mother and that S.S. was almost a year old when
she was placed in foster care by DHS. She said,
[T]hey took her because my house is trash. They said she was drinking on a spoiled
bottle, and I didn’t feed her until two o’clock that afternoon, she had a severe diaper
rash, which it actually was a yeast infection. And it wasn’t that bad because I was
treating it.
She claimed that she only had problems with keeping a job. She claimed that S.S. had a
yeast infection from antibiotics she had been taking for an ear infection. Samanthia said S.S.
was dirty that day because she had been teaching S.S. to walk outside in the dirt. She did
not bathe S.S. before her nap because she planned on taking S.S. back outside. She admitted
having used marijuana around the time S.S. was removed from her care, but denied having
used opiates in January 2014. She surmised that someone may have slipped her some pills,
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as she had been hanging around some bad people, including Raymond. She claimed that
Raymond had two fiancées during the case. She admitted having had several different
boyfriends since the case started and explained that it was because she was looking for
something “long term.” She said that she had visited S.S. on Thursdays and that DHS had
talked to her about how she needed to focus on S.S. during her visits. She wanted DHS to
help her find a job so she could be reunited with S.S. Her plan was to leave S.S. with a
friend while she worked. She also thought that if she could get her driver’s license, a car,
and a job in Jonesboro, she could take S.S. to her aunt’s daycare there. She said that she
was applying for disability based on her borderline-personality disorder, which developed
over many years of being abused. She said that she sometimes took her medication as she
was supposed to, but most of the time she did not.
Allison Starr testified that she was the family-service worker for DHS and was
assigned to S.S.’s case from April 2014 until January 2015. She helped develop both of the
case plans. She said that Raymond and Samanthia had done everything in the case plans.
However, she testified that DHS’s recommendation was to terminate the parental rights of
both parents and change S.S.’s goal to adoption.
She said that Raymond had not been able to do an unsupervised visit or extend his
visits throughout the entire case. She admitted that DHS and the ad litem determined by
agreement whether to extend visitation. She said, “He’s been unable to get a hold of most
of the time. There’s been times that we’ve tried to extend the visits and we have not been
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able to get a hold of him.” She said that even after repeated suggestions that he keep his
telephone with him so that he could be reached, most of the time Raymond would not
answer his telephone. She said that if S.S. were to go back home and an emergency occurred
while she was with a caretaker and Raymond was at work, there would be a concern that
Raymond would not be reachable. She also said that Raymond did not have a plan for
how he would care for S.S. if she were in his home. She claimed that Raymond told her
that he worked from “sunup to sundown,” that he would never cut Samanthia out of his
daughter’s life, and that Samanthia could care for her. She said that Raymond had not
always been on time for his visits with S.S. and that she helped him develop a calendar for
visitation. She said that when she stopped making a calendar for him, he showed up on the
wrong days. She said that he would have to know the child’s schedule for school, doctor
appointments, and different things. She also said that Raymond had requested a home study,
but DHS was not able to give him one until paternity had been established. That was done
in June, but the study was not done until January because Raymond had different addresses.
He had lived in five different places since the case had begun.
She said that Raymond had failed drug tests for THC and opiates, but later provided
verification of a prescription for the opiates. She admitted that she was not concerned about
the opiates, but she was concerned about the marijuana. She said that marijuana can stay in
your system from thirty to forty-five days, and the tests were administered to Raymond
thirty days apart. She said that it was a positive sign that Raymond had not failed a drug
screen for the last nine months. She stated that Raymond stayed fairly consistent with his
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visitation, that he had missed four out of forty-eight visits, and he was late a total of five
times. She said that she had observed him being appropriate on visits with S.S. She also
said he had one fiancée at the beginning of the case, he then went “back and forth” with
Samanthia, and he now had a current fiancée. Therefore, he had been involved with three
women over the last fourteen months. She said that Raymond’s income was not sufficient
and that Samanthia did not have a job. She said that she found it interesting that both
Samanthia and Raymond tested positive for the same illegal drugs.
Ms. Starr also testified that she was not aware of any factors that would prolong or
prohibit an adoption in this case. She said that both parents had insufficient income to
support S.S. and that both had instabilities in their lives. She said one family member
interested in adopting S.S. had requested a home study.
Ava Lou Holt testified that she was Samanthia’s landlord, had been for ten months,
and that Samanthia’s home was clean. She said that Samanthia was gullible and
impressionable, but she had a good heart. She had witnessed Samanthia maintain a normal
household, clean, and cook. She said that she had taken Samanthia to apply for jobs and
that Samanthia was trying hard to get one.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court granted DHS’s petition to
terminate parental rights of both parents. The circuit court’s order was filed on August 11,
2015. Appellants filed separate notices of appeal in a timely manner, and this appeal followed.
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II. Standard of Review
We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. Mitchell v. Ark. Dep’t of
Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 715, 430 S.W.3d 851. At least one statutory ground must
exist, in addition to a finding that it is in the child’s best interest to terminate parental rights;
these must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341; Dunn
v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 34, ___ S.W.3d ___. Clear and convincing
evidence is that degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a firm conviction as to
the allegation sought to be established. Anderson v. Douglas, 310 Ark. 633, 839 S.W.2d 196
(1992). The appellate inquiry is whether the trial court’s finding that the disputed fact was
proved by clear and convincing evidence is clearly erroneous. J.T. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 329 Ark. 243, 947 S.W.2d 761 (1997). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Yarborough v. Ark. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 96 Ark. App. 247, 240 S.W.3d 626 (2006).
III. Termination of Samanthia’s Parental Rights
Samanthia argues that termination of her parental rights was not in S.S.’s best interest.
She specifically targets the circuit court’s finding that S.S. would be subject to potential
harm if returned to her custody. She does not challenge the circuit court’s finding that there
was at least one ground supported by sufficient evidence or that S.S. was adoptable.
However, she contends that reversal is still proper on the potential-harm factor as it is a
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component of the best-interest finding and must be proved separate and apart from any
statutory ground or adoptability. She maintains that there was insufficient evidence to
support the circuit court’s finding of potential harm. She cites Conn v. Arkansas Department
of Human Services, 79 Ark. App. 195, 85 S.W.3d 558 (2002), where this court reversed the
termination of the father’s parental rights because there was no clear and convincing
evidence that termination was in the child’s best interest. We noted that no evidence was
presented at the termination hearing at all, and the termination was based solely on a
stipulation concerning the earlier termination of parental rights to the juvenile’s sibling. Id.
at 198, 85 S.W.3d at 560. Because only one of the two requirements of the statute was
proved, the circuit court’s decision to terminate parental rights was deemed clearly
erroneous. Id.
Samanthia also cites Strickland v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 103 Ark. App.
193, 287 S.W.3d 633 (2008), where this court reversed the termination of the mother’s
parental rights, which was predicated on the mother’s numerous moves during the pendency
of the case. The Strickland court held as follows:
Appellant always maintained some type of housing, and DHS presented no clear and
convincing evidence that any of her residences were unsafe or inappropriate. DHS
cites the moves as evidence of an unusually peripatetic or unstable personality, but
there are logical explanations for many of the moves. Moreover, they equally
connote a continual striving by appellant to maintain suitable housing despite her
circumstances. We believe the termination decision is too important to rest on this
factor, given the entirety of the evidence in this case. As late as August 2007, the
court lauded appellant’s progress and predicted imminent reunification. Appellant is
unquestionably devoted to her children and visited them faithfully throughout the
case. Her completion of three sets of parenting classes is a testament to her
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determination to abide by the case plan and court orders. And, while it appears she
may have missed some of JS’s doctor’s appointments during this two-year case, the
record reveals some confusion as to whether she received notification of all
appointments.
Further, there was no clear and convincing evidence that appellant’s limited cognitive
abilities or her possible depression, which was not shown to be anything other than
situational, adversely affected her ability to parent JS and CS. Nor was there clear
and convincing evidence that appellant’s meager income rendered her unfit.
Appellant testified that her disability payments and food stamps covered what few
expenses she had, with money left over. DHS witness Jennifer Harper testified that
appellant could possibly support herself and the children on that income. It is also
noteworthy that, when appellant lost her vehicle after separating from Mr. Garcia–
Lopez, she was able to establish a transportation support system that no DHS witness
could seriously fault. Jennifer Harper testified that appellant’s obligation to acquire
stable transportation did not necessarily require ownership of a car.
Strickland, 103 Ark. App. at 200, 287 S.W.3d at 639.
Samanthia argues that her primary issues, as articulated by DHS’s caseworker, were
related to income, unstable relationships, and visitation concerns that boiled down to her
utilizing her telephone at times during visits. She contends that the evidence demonstrated
that she had successfully maintained a stable and clean home for ten months prior to the
termination hearing, had faithfully visited S.S., had completed the case plan, and had not
engaged in any relationship for several months prior to the hearing. She argues that none
of that evidence was challenged, and all of it belies the circuit court’s finding that S.S. would
be subject to potential harm if returned to her custody. She cites Benedict v. Arkansas
Department of Human Services, 96 Ark. App. 395, 398, 242 S.W.3d 305, 308 (2006), for the
proposition that, while there is still reason to believe there can be a positive, nurturing
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parent-child relationship, the law favors preservation, not severance, of natural familial
bonds.
The State contends that a de novo review supports the circuit court’s decision to
terminate Samanthia’s parental rights. We agree. Appellate review here is limited to
whether the circuit court’s best-interest finding was clearly erroneous. The best-interest
finding must be based on a consideration of two factors—the likelihood that, if parental
rights are terminated, the juvenile will be adopted, and the potential harm caused by
continuing contact with the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A). The court was
not required to find that actual harm would result or to affirmatively identify a potential
harm. McFarland v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 91 Ark. App. 323, 210 S.W.3d 143 (2005).
Furthermore, the Arkansas Supreme Court has directed that the potential-harm analysis be
conducted in broad terms. Bearden v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 344 Ark. 317, 42 S.W.3d
397 (2001).
DHS opened a protective-services case in June 2013 because Samanthia had left S.S.
unsupervised for three hours. Samanthia also tested positive for THC after she had tried to
dilute the test specimen with hot water. She was provided with services, including parenting
classes, referral for counseling through a contract provider, home visits, and random drug
screens. The case remained open for five months, then it was closed. Five months later,
there was a report to DHS that Samanthia was providing S.S. inadequate food and
supervision. S.S. was reportedly in a dark bedroom with the door shut, crying and drinking
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from an old bottle. S.S. had a full diaper and a severe diaper rash. Samanthia admitted that
S.S. had not eaten that day, and it was 2:00 p.m. When the caseworker contacted
Samanthia, she became irrational and erratic, screaming at the caseworker and threatening a
lawsuit. DHS assumed immediate emergency custody and the current case began, resulting
in an adjudication of dependency-neglect and an ultimate termination of parental rights.
Even though Samanthia was mostly case-plan compliant, her completion of the case
plan is not determinative. Whether her completion achieved the intended result of making
her capable of caring for S.S. is what mattered. Wright v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 83
Ark. App. 1, 115 S.W.3d 332 (2003). Here, even after nearly two years of DHS services,
she was not employed and was not ready to care for S.S. She had not obtained disability
benefits, and she had no stable means of supporting herself and S.S. The caseworker testified
that Samanthia had learned little in spite of the services. She discussed Samanthia’s visits
with S.S. and her need to be redirected to focus on S.S. Further, it was necessary to
implement a plan for Samanthia to obtain approval to bring extra people to visits with S.S.,
and Samanthia needed a plan that forbade telephone calls and texts during her visits with
S.S. Accordingly, the circuit court’s best-interest finding was not clearly erroneous.
IV. Termination of Raymond’s Parental Rights
Raymond contends that the circuit court committed reversible error by terminating
his parental rights. He argues that none of the four statutory grounds alleged by DHS were
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proved by clear and convincing evidence. He also contends that the circuit court erred in
finding that it was in S.S.’s best interest to terminate his parental rights.
The third ground for terminating Raymond’s parental rights relied on Ark. Code
Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a), in finding that, subsequent to the filing of the original
petition, other factors or issues arose which demonstrate that placement of S.S. in the
parent’s custody would be contrary to S.S.’s health, safety, or welfare and that despite the
offer of appropriate family services, the parent has manifested the incapacity or indifference
to remedy the subsequent issues or factors. The circuit court found that the parents had
failed to comply with their case plans, both failing drug screens, and both having issues
keeping up with their visitation times and places. However, Raymond contends that a
review of the record shows that the circuit court found him to be compliant with the case
plan. The record also shows that drugs were not a concern with Raymond, according to
the caseworker’s testimony. Finally, Raymond contends that his visitation record was
positive. Thus, he argues that DHS did not produce clear and convincing evidence as to
this ground.
Raymond maintains that the circuit court seemed to articulate a burden of proof that
is not supported by Arkansas law. He refers to the remarks made during the circuit court’s
ruling from the bench and contends that juvenile courts are supposed to protect the best
interest of the child. He asks if average people could not successfully traverse dependency-
neglect court, what hope do those who are below average have?
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Raymond also contends that the circuit court erred in finding that it was in S.S.’s
best interest to terminate his parental rights. The circuit court’s best-interest finding was
premised on the likelihood that S.S. would be adopted and the potential harm to her health
and safety caused by returning S.S. to her parents’ custody. The circuit court relied on the
caseworker’s testimony, which the court found to be credible, and the parents’ failure to
complete their case plans, engaging in multiple relationships during the course of the case,
and failure to show they can adequately provide for S.S. Raymond claims that the
caseworker’s testimony was that he was compliant with the case plan, had demonstrated
appropriate parenting skills during visitations, was consistently employed, and had been drug
free for nine months. He claims that he could find no case law to support the circuit court’s
decision that three girlfriends over the course of a year equates to instability or potential
harm, and he argues that there was scant evidence that he lacked the financial means to care
for his child. Assuming there was evidence that he was too poor to provide for his child,
that, by itself, should not be a potential harm that would substantiate a best-interest finding
in a termination-of-parental-rights proceeding. Davis v. Smith, 266 Ark. 112, 583 S.W.2d
37 (1979).
Termination of parental rights requires clear and convincing evidence that two
elements exist. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3). First, termination must be in the child’s
best interest; second, at least one of nine statutory grounds must exist. Here, the circuit
court found that both conditions existed. Among other things, the circuit court terminated
Raymond’s parental rights under section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a), which provides that
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rights can be terminated if, subsequent to the filing of the original petition for dependency-
neglect, other factors or issues had arisen demonstrating that placement of the child with the
parents was contrary to the child’s health, safety or welfare, and that despite the offer of
appropriate family services, the parent had manifested the incapacity or indifference to
remedying those issues.
After the case had begun, Raymond twice tested positive for illegal drugs. This in
itself was a subsequent factor. Dodd v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 64, ___
S.W.3d ___. Raymond was also difficult to keep track of throughout the case, was difficult
to contact via telephone or otherwise, and moved so often that a home study could not be
done until January 2015, which was then denied. Even though Raymond worked several
jobs, his expenses were more than his income, and his daughter was not living with him at
that point. Raymond’s financial instability was something learned subsequent to the filing
of the petition for dependency-neglect. The circuit court was also rightfully concerned
with Raymond’s demonstrated instability in relationships with the opposite sex, maintaining
some sort of on-again off-again relationship with Samanthia and entering two marriage
engagements with other women over the course of one year. The State contends that he
was somewhat compliant with visitation, as he had issues with tardiness and inaccessibility,
which led to DHS never extending him more visits or unsupervised visitation.
As is the case with Samanthia, Raymond’s compliance with the case plan did not
achieve the result of making him capable of caring for S.S. Wright, supra. After a year of
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DHS-provided services, the circuit court still was not confident that Raymond had
demonstrated the capacity to remedy these factors that arose subsequent to the child’s
removal. As only one ground is necessary to terminate parental rights, and clear and
convincing evidence supports the “subsequent factors ground,” we affirm the circuit court’s
termination of Raymond’s parental rights and do not discuss the other statutory grounds
raised by Raymond.
Regarding clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the child’s best
interest, taking into consideration the likelihood that the child will be adopted and the
potential harm that may occur from returning the child to the custody of the parents, the
evidence must be viewed in a forward-looking manner and considered in broad terms.
Dowdy v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 180, 314 S.W.3d 722. Raymond
argues that there was insufficient evidence of potential harm and no evidence that he posed
a danger to his child. However, the financial, relationship, and housing instability and
uncertainty discussed above support the circuit court’s finding of potential harm. See
Singleton v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 455, 468 S.W.3d 809. Continuing
use of illegal drugs, as shown by Raymond’s positive drug tests, also by itself shows potential
harm. Allen v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 288, 384 S.W.3d 7. Moreover,
after a year into the case, Raymond still had not demonstrated that he was capable of
providing S.S. with a safe and appropriate family home. In light of this factor and the circuit
court’s voiced concern over Raymond’s inability to articulate a clear plan for S.S.’s care or
his own income and housing situation, no clear error has been committed.
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Affirmed.
VIRDEN and GRUBER, JJ., agree.
Bristow & Richardson, P.L.L.C., by: Benjamin W. Bristow, for appellee Raymond Vail.
Leah Lanford, Arkansas Public Defender Commission, for appellant Samanthia See.
Jerald A. Sharum, County Legal Operations, for appellee.
Chrestman Group, PLLC, by: Keith L. Chrestman, attorney ad litem for minor child.
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