IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-2052
Filed March 9, 2016
IN THE INTEREST OF A.L.,
Minor Child,
K.L., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Joseph W. Seidlin,
District Associate Judge.
The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child, A.L.
AFFIRMED.
Britt Gagne of Gagne Law Office, Des Moines, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Michelle R. Becker of Youth Law Center, Des Moines, attorney and
guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vogel and Potterfield, JJ.
2
VOGEL, Judge.
The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her daughter,
A.L. She asserts the court improperly concluded the State established grounds
to terminate her rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d) and (h)
(2015) and that she should be granted additional time to work towards
reunification. We conclude that, because of A.L.’s special needs and the
mother’s inability to care for her properly, termination is appropriate under
paragraph (h); furthermore, termination is in A.L.’s best interests, particularly
given the parent-child bond is not strong. Consequently, we affirm the order of
the juvenile court.
A.L., born January 2014, came to the attention of the Iowa Department of
Human Services (DHS) after testing positive for morphine at the time of her birth.
Though it was later determined the amount was consistent with the mother being
given morphine during childbirth, no morphine was listed on the mother’s medical
chart. A.L. is a child with special needs, suffering from multiple birth defects and
chromosomal abnormalities, including heart, respiratory, auditory, and orthopedic
difficulties that result in her needing constant and long-term medical care. She
requires a feeding tube, frequent trips to the doctor, as well as specialized
equipment, such as a seating chair, a car chair, and a bath chair.
After her birth, A.L. remained in the hospital for three months until she was
released to her mother. For the next several months of A.L.’s life, DHS provided
the mother with services so A.L. could remain in her care, such as in-home
nursing and help with attending to A.L.’s developmental needs. However, the
mother could not care for A.L. properly, as she not only missed medical
3
appointments, but she stopped complying with in-home nursing services.
Concern grew, and at a medical checkup in February 2015, it was apparent A.L.
was not getting adequate nutrition. Over the mother’s initial objection, A.L. was
hospitalized and diagnosed with failure to thrive. When released from the
hospital on February 27, 2015, A.L. was removed from the mother’s care and
placed in foster care, where she remained at the time of the termination hearing.
The mother was offered supervised visitation as often as she liked but was
sporadic in taking advantage of the visitation opportunities. When the
permanency order was entered on September 1, 2015, she became more
consistent and saw A.L. more frequently, but that was only for a short time.
Thus, a strong bond between the mother and A.L. was not evidenced. The
mother was also offered services through ChildServe and Early Access, as well
as mental health services, but she failed to take full advantage of them.
The mother currently lives with her mother, A.L.’s maternal grandmother.
The mother informed the court that if A.L. were to be returned to her care they
would live at her current residence. As of the time of the termination hearing, the
mother was not employed.
Due to the mother’s lack of consistent engagement with services, as well
as her inability to understand the severity of A.L.’s condition, the State filed a
petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights on September 22, 2015, and a
hearing was held on November 4, 2015. The district court ordered that the
mother’s rights be terminated on November 19, 2015. The mother appeals.1
1
The father’s rights were also terminated; however, he is not a party to this appeal.
4
We review termination proceedings de novo. In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63,
64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). The grounds for termination must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence. Id. Our primary concern is the child’s best interest. Id.
When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory
ground, we only need to find grounds to terminate under one of the sections cited
by the juvenile court to affirm. Id. To terminate the mother’s rights under Iowa
Code section 232.116(1)(h), the State must establish the child (1) is three years
old or younger, (2) has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance, (3) has
been removed from the home for six of the last twelve months, and (4) cannot be
returned home at the present time. Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(1)–(4). The
mother only maintains the State did not prove the fourth element by clear and
convincing evidence.
The record indicates the mother is not able to care for A.L. such that A.L.
cannot be returned to her care at the present time. As the district court noted:
[The mother] testified at the TPR hearing that she feels
overwhelmed at times. She felt that she and [A.L.] were “thrown to
the wolves” with having to “meet with all these people.” She
blames her reluctance to work with [A.L.]’s medical providers on
wanting to protect her from having to go back to the hospital,
having seen what the child went through when she was
hospitalized after birth. She stated that “it’s hard to deal with” the
child’s needs, and that “it sucks.”
Nonetheless, the mother refused to attend mental health appointments or take
advantage of services, and did not understand the amount of care required to
keep A.L. healthy. The fact the mother has shown only minimal improvement
since A.L.’s removal—which occurred due to A.L.’s hospitalization because of the
5
mother’s neglect—indicates the mother cannot presently care for A.L. See id.
§ 232.116(1)(h)(4).
Additionally, once the mother was referred to Early Access service
providers, the district court observed that it “then embarked on a six-month
Odyssey of trying to get [the mother] to consent to and engage in their services.”
It took the mother from April 9 until September 8, 2015, to cooperate with an
evaluation so that services could be initiated on October 12, after the petition to
terminate her parental rights had been filed. Thus, despite the intervention of
DHS and the multiple attempts by the providers to coax the mother to cooperate
with the case plan, the mother showed little to no effort with regard to making
progress so she could safely resume care of A.L.
Though she made some progress shortly before the termination hearing,
in determining the future actions of the parent, her past conduct is instructive.
See In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006). The mother’s actions prior to
the September permanency order demonstrate she neither possesses the skills
nor the determination to acquire the skills necessary to care for A.L., and that she
will not do so in the future. Thus, an extension of time—particularly given the
vast amount of services the mother has already received—would not likely result
in reunification. “We have repeatedly followed the principle that the statutory
time line must be followed and children should not be forced to wait for their
parent to grow up.” In re N.F., 579 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998); see
also Iowa Code § 232.116(2). Moreover, the lack of engagement the mother has
shown with A.L. has had a detrimental effect on the parent-child bond. It is also
encouraging that A.L. is thriving in the care of her foster parents, who have
6
indicated a willingness to adopt her. Therefore, we conclude it is in A.L.’s best
interests that the mother’s parental rights be terminated, and the parent-child
bond does not prevent termination. Consequently, we affirm the order of the
district court.
AFFIRMED.