In the Matter of the Term. of the Parent-Child Relationship of: M.S., A.S., El.S., & Ev.S. and S.S. (Mother) and R.S. (Father) v. Ind. Dept. of Child Services (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Mar 09 2016, 8:49 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Leanna Weissmann Gregory F. Zoeller
Lawrenceburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Jeffrey E. Stratman Robert J. Henke
Aurora, Indiana Abigail R. Recker
Deputy Attorney Generals
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Termination March 9, 2016
of the Parent-Child Relationship Court of Appeals Case No.
of: 21A01-1505-JT-337
M.S., A.S., C.S., El.S., & Ev.S Appeal from the Fayette Circuit
(Minor Children) Court
The Honorable Beth A. Butsch,
And Judge
S.S. (Mother) and R.S. (Father), Trial Court Cause No.
Appellants-Respondents, 21C01-1408-JT-207, 21C01-1408-
JT-208, 21C01-1408-JT-209,
v. 21C01-1408-JT-210 & 21C01-1408-
JT-211
The Indiana Department of
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioners.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A01-1505-JT-337 | March 9, 2016 Page 1 of 20
 Riley, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellants-Respondents, S.S. (Mother) and R.S. (Father) (collectively,

Parents), appeal the trial court’s Order terminating their parental rights to their

five minor children, M.S., C.S., Ev.S., El.S., and A.S. (collectively, Children).1

[2] We affirm.

ISSUE

[3] Parents raise one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows: Whether the

trial court’s decision to terminate Parents’ parental rights to Children was

supported by clear and convincing evidence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] Mother and Father are the biological parents of M.S., born August 2, 2007;

C.S., born April 10, 2009; Ev.S., born June 10, 2010; El.S., born April 10, 2012;

and A.S., born May 24, 2013. On June 9, 2009, M.S. and C.S. were removed

from Parents’ care after the Department of Child Services (DCS) received a

report that Parents refused to allow medical professionals to evaluate C.S. for

her sleep apnea and feeding dysfunction. DCS filed its child in need of services

(CHINS) petitions. After a DCS investigation, DCS concluded the allegations

1
We note that Parents each filed a separate Notice of Appeal under the same appellate cause number 21A01-
1505-JT-337 and filed separate appellate briefs.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A01-1505-JT-337 | March 9, 2016 Page 2 of 20
 against Parents regarding medical neglect and environment life/health

endangerment were true. However, M.S. and C.S. were never adjudicated as

CHINS and, on September 9, 2009, DCS filed a motion to dismiss. The case

was then closed.

[5] On May 19, 2011, Officer Brian Evans (Officer Evans) of the Connersville

Police Department received a report that two minors, M.S. and C.S., were

found playing “in the middle of an intersection without anyone around.”

(Father’s App. p. 59). When Officer Evans arrived at the scene, a bystander

suggested that the minors might live in a two-story white house on Grand

Avenue in Connersville, Indiana. The house was a few blocks away from the

intersection. Officer Evans located the house and delivered M.S. and C.S. to

Parents. Neither Mother nor Father had searched for M.S. and C.S. On June

4, 2011, M.S. was found unsupervised and naked “in the bushes” by funeral

home personnel. (Father’s App. p. 56). The police officer delivered M.S. back

to Parents’ residence. Neither Father nor Mother had searched for him.

[6] On August 5, 2012, at approximately 7:14 p.m., Officer Evans received a report

that three unsupervised minors, M.S., C.S., and Ev.S., were observed running

on the rooftop of their residence. When he arrived at the scene, the officer

located the minors on the roof and tried to alert someone inside, but no one

answered. Officer Evans “immediately ran to the edge of the roof and

attempted to get [the three minors] to [sit down] so they would not fall [off] the

roof.” (Father’s App. p. 61). He also radioed for assistance. At this point,

Mother stuck her head out of the window, and the officer ordered her to get the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A01-1505-JT-337 | March 9, 2016 Page 3 of 20
 minors inside the residence. Mother explained that she had just woken up, and

she believed Father had taken the three minors to the grocery store. When

Father returned home, he informed the officer that he had placed the minors in

the upstairs room and had taken the door knob off the door to prevent them

from leaving. Father added that he was unsure how they had gotten the

window open. Mother was arrested that same day on neglect of dependent

charges.2 The police officers contacted DCS, and DCS initiated a safety plan

which allowed a family friend to take all four minors to her home where they

stayed until August 9, 2012.

[7] On August 6, 2012, DCS Family Case Manager Kathy Hobson (FCM Hobson)

met with Father at the family’s residence. Inside the house, FCM Hobson

noticed that several doors were missing door knobs and that there was a

padlock on the front door, which took Father several minutes to open. FCM

Hobson expressed her concern about having the door padlocked in case of an

emergency. Father explained it was suggested by the Riley Autism Treatment

Center (Riley Center) to prevent M.S. from leaving. FCM Hobson later verified

that the Riley Center never advised Parents to padlock their door. When FCM

Hobson visited Mother in jail, Mother’s speech was very rapid and hard to

follow. Mother would occasionally start speaking in the third person as if she

2
Both Parents were later charged with neglect of dependents, Class D felonies, and both pled guilty to the
charges as Class A misdemeanors on November 30, 2012. Father was sentenced to one year which was
suspended to probation on June 14, 2013, and Mother was sentenced to the same term on August 9, 2013.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A01-1505-JT-337 | March 9, 2016 Page 4 of 20
 was not present in the room and then switch between talking without an accent

to suddenly having a “very southern” accent. (Transcript p. 503).

[8] FCM Hobson tried to convince Parents to agree to an informal adjustment.

Father agreed, but Mother resisted and again spoke at length with FCM

Hobson in a confusing way that involved describing the minors in medical

terms. Because of Mother’s strong resistance, prior multiple incidents of

neglect, and the threat of their recurrence, DCS removed all four minors from

Parents’ care on August 9, 2012.3

[9] On August 13, 2012, DCS filed its CHINS petitions for M.S., C.S., Ev.S., and

El.S. based on Parents’ lack of proper supervision and their criminal neglect

charges. DCS found it concerning that Mother spoke about her kids in terms of

medical diagnoses and that she exaggerated and fabricated their medical

symptoms. As a result of Mother’s behavior, M.S. and C.S. underwent

numerous medical examinations and tests. Later, at the termination hearing,

Mother admitted that she had exaggerated Children’s symptoms “to get

attention for [herself] to get any kind of attention that [she] could get…” (Id. p.

885).

[10] Without any medical evidence, Mother reported that M.S. was autistic, that he

needed to be videotaped to determine if he had a seizure disorder, and that he

needed a service dog because he was “a flight risk [due to] his behavior.” (Id. p.

3
A.S. was not yet born at this time.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A01-1505-JT-337 | March 9, 2016 Page 5 of 20
 472). Mother caused M.S. to be treated with Topamax for possible seizures

when there was no record of him having seizures. Even after being told that

M.S. did not have a seizure disorder, Mother continued to insist otherwise.

Further, M.S. was never diagnosed with autism, instead he was diagnosed with

Isodicentric Y Chromosome. Children’s maternal grandmother (Maternal

Grandmother) later testified that Mother was “always wanting to find out

more, see what else could be wrong with [M.S.]” (Tr. p. 704). Due to M.S.’s Y

chromosome diagnosis, Mother also asserted that her son had “girl parts”

internally. (Tr. pp. 621-22).

[11] As to C.S., Mother claimed that she had feeding problems. According to

Maternal Grandmother’s testimony, Mother would place a nasogastric tube in

C.S.’s nose to feed her because Mother stated C.S. was not eating enough.

However, Maternal Grandmother had never experienced any eating problems

with any of the kids. Later, one of the caseworkers observed C.S. eating dry

cereal and drinking milk out of a sippy cup without any problems.

[12] After A.S.’s birth in 2013, Mother attempted to feed A.S. breast milk with a

syringe and a plastic tube when she was one month old. Mother told Maternal

Grandmother she took the syringe and the tube from the hospital without

authorization. After A.S. was placed with Maternal Grandmother, Mother

gave Maternal Grandmother some of A.S.’s things, including a vial of medicine

which she referred to as “Sweeties.” (Tr. p. 699). Mother stated that Sweeties

would calm A.S. down if she got upset. Later, Maternal Grandmother learned

that the medicine was used to calm infant boys after their circumcision

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A01-1505-JT-337 | March 9, 2016 Page 6 of 20
 procedure. Mother told Maternal Grandmother that she took the medicine

from the hospital without permission. Finally, Mother was observed wearing

scrubs and a stethoscope during one of her hospital visits without any

authorization.

[13] In August and September 2012, Parents were referred for behavioral

evaluations. After the initial evaluations, the doctor recommended a full

psychological and parenting evaluation for Mother because she was suspected

to have factitious disorder by proxy.

[14] After a two-day fact-finding hearing, on November 20, 2012, the trial court

adjudicated all four minors to be CHINS. On January 11, 2013, the trial court

entered its dispositional decree ordering Parents, inter alia, to participate in

services offered by DCS, to submit to random drug screenings,4 attend all

scheduled visitations, and comply with all visitation rules. The trial court

specifically ordered Mother to complete a psychiatric exam to “rule out

[factitious disorder by proxy].” (DCS Ex. 37).

[15] On March 26, 2013, Mother completed a psychiatric evaluation with Dr.

Susanne Blix (Dr. Blix), an associate professor of clinical psychiatry at Indiana

University Medical Center and a qualified expert in the area of factitious

disorders. Dr. Blix evaluated Mother and reviewed the records of the four

minors. Dr. Blix found that Mother exaggerated or fabricated physical

4
On February 13, 2013, Father failed a drug test and entered treatment for substance abuse.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A01-1505-JT-337 | March 9, 2016 Page 7 of 20
 symptoms for both M.S. and C.S. Mother continued to assert that M.S. had

seizures and C.S. had feeding difficulties despite medical evidence otherwise.

[16] Dr. Blix diagnosed Mother with factitious disorder by proxy, also known as

Munchausen’s syndrome by proxy. Dr. Blix concluded that Mother did not

purposefully want to harm her kids, but her longstanding personality traits were

unlikely to change. For a change to take place, Dr. Blix explained, a person

would need to undergo an intensive therapy to “cognitively” restructure the

way the person thinks. (Tr. p. 589). Dr. Blix expressed concern that Mother

would again begin to exaggerate and misinterpret symptoms and give her kids

medication they do not need for conditions they do not have. As such, Dr. Blix

opined that the minors are at “extreme risk for neglect.” (DCS Ex. 25).

[17] After A.S.’s birth in May 2013, DCS additionally filed a CHINS petition for

A.S. based on Mother’s diagnosis of factitious disorder by proxy imposed on

another and the other minors’ CHINS adjudications. On August 7, 2013, the

trial court adjudicated A.S. to be a CHINS, and, on August 23, 2013, the trial

court entered its dispositional decree ordering Parents to participate in

reunification services.

[18] Since their removal, M.S., C.S., Ev.S., and El.S., have been placed in foster

care. All four minors are doing well and are thriving in foster care. At the time

of their removal, M.S. and C.S. were both wearing diapers, and C.S. was taking

a prescription medicine for incontinence. However, within a month of

placement, M.S. and C.S. were both potty trained, and C.S. was eating well.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A01-1505-JT-337 | March 9, 2016 Page 8 of 20
 A.S. was placed with her Maternal Grandmother. A.S. appeared to be well

taken care of, and was observed to be a very active and playful infant.

[19] On May 13, 2014, the trial court entered its review orders finding that Mother

failed to follow visitation guidelines to ensure Children’s safety, and Father

made only minimal progress in intervening to correct Mother’s inappropriate

behaviors. DCS requested the permanency plan changed to adoption, but the

trial court declined.

[20] As to their visitations, Parents failed to follow rules on numerous occasions.

During their visits, Mother failed to follow specific rules on feeding her

Children. Parents failed to maintain discipline and track Children’s location.

Mother used profanity to calm Children down. Mother was constantly

preoccupied with her court hearings or other distractions instead of spending

time with her Children. Father’s attendance was irregular due to his work

schedule. During one of the visits, Mother told Children that they were coming

home soon causing M.S. and C.S. to get very angry when it did not happen.

[21] On July 11, 2014, the trial court conducted a permanency hearing. At the

hearing, the trial court found that while Parents had complied with the case

plan, they had failed to “demonstrate consistent improvement in ability to keep

[Children] safe.” (DCS Ex. 45). Father had “gained some insight into

[Mother]’s factitious disorder but need[ed] to improve his ability to intervene

and keep [Children] safe.” (DCS Ex. 45). Mother was “inconsistent in

following rules regarding child safety during visits.” (DCS Ex. 45). The trial

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A01-1505-JT-337 | March 9, 2016 Page 9 of 20
 court also found that Mother had “made only partial progress in therapy to

address her factitious disorder.” (DCS Ex. 45). The trial court changed the

permanency plan from reunification to adoption and authorized DCS to file a

termination petition.

[22] On August 19, 2014, DCS filed its petitions to terminate Parents’ parental rights

to Children. On October 28-29, 2014 and February 3, 2015, the trial court held

evidentiary hearings. On April 13, 2015, the trial court entered its termination

orders as to all five minors.

[23] Parents now appeal. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Standard of Review

[24] “Decisions to terminate parental rights are among the most difficult our trial

courts are called upon to make. They are also among the most fact-sensitive—

so we review them with great deference to the trial courts, recognizing their

superior vantage point for weighing the evidence and assessing witness

credibility.” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). On appeal, our court

does not reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. at 642.

Rather, we will only consider the evidence that supports the judgment and any

reasonable inferences which may be drawn from that evidence. Id.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A01-1505-JT-337 | March 9, 2016 Page 10 of 20
 II. Termination of Parental Rights

[25] “[O]ne of the most valued relationships in our culture” is that between a parent

and his or her child. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind. 2009), reh’g denied.

In fact, “[a] parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her

children is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’” Id. (quoting

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). Accordingly, the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution safeguards “the traditional right

of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Id. Nevertheless,

parental interests are not absolute; rather, termination of parental rights is

appropriate when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental

responsibilities. In re A.B., 887 N.E.2d 158, 164 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[26] The involuntary termination of a parent’s rights is not intended to punish the

parent; ultimately, it is meant to protect the child. S.L. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child

Servs., 997 N.E.2d 1114, 1123 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Termination of parental

rights is the most extreme sanction a court can impose, and because it

permanently severs a parent’s rights to his or her children, it is “intended as last

resort, available only when all other reasonable efforts have failed.” Id. at 1123-

24. As such, in Indiana, in order to terminate a parent’s rights, DCS must

prove, in relevant part:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least
six (6) months under a dispositional decree.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A01-1505-JT-337 | March 9, 2016 Page 11 of 20
 (ii) A court has entered a finding under [Indiana Code
section] 31-34-21-5.6 that reasonable efforts for family
preservation or reunification are not required, including
a description of the court’s finding, the date of the
finding, and the manner in which the finding was made.

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has
been under the supervision of a local office or probation
department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most
recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date
the child is removed from the home as a result of the
child being alleged to be a child in need of services or a
delinquent child;

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the
well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A01-1505-JT-337 | March 9, 2016 Page 12 of 20
 Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must prove each element by clear and

convincing evidence—“a ‘heightened burden of proof’ reflecting termination’s

‘serious social consequences.’” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642 (quoting In re G.Y.,

904 N.E.2d at 1260-61 & n.1); see I.C. § 31-34-12-2.

A. Reasonable Probability of Remedying Conditions5

[27] Parents first argue that DCS did not present clear and convincing evidence to

support the trial court’s conclusion that the conditions resulting in Children’s

removal would not be remedied. Because the trial court issued special findings

of fact and conclusions thereon, our review is guided by Indiana Trial Rule

52(A). Our court “shall not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly

erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to

judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). In our review, we

first consider whether the evidence supports the factual findings. C.B. v. B.W.,

985 N.E.2d 340, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Second, we consider

whether the findings support the judgment. Id. Findings are clearly erroneous

only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by

inference. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous if it relies on an incorrect legal

5
We note that the involuntary termination statute is written in the disjunctive and requires proof of only one
of the circumstances listed in Indiana Code section 31-35–2-4(b)(2)(B). Because we find it to be dispositive
under the facts of this case, we limit our review to whether DCS established that there was a reasonable
probability that the conditions resulting in the removal or reasons for placement of Children outside the
home will not be remedied. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A01-1505-JT-337 | March 9, 2016 Page 13 of 20
 standard. Id. While we defer substantially to findings of fact, we do not do so

to conclusions of law. Id.

[28] Here, as to the first step of our analysis, Parents specifically contend that the

following findings were inaccurate:

6. Mother reported that [M.S.] was having seizures, which
caused [M.S.] to be treated with Topamax for possible seizures
for which there was no definite diagnosis. (State’s Exhibit 25).

***

9. Mother reported to [M.S.]’s foster mother that [M.S.] had “girl
parts” internally. (Testimony from Jill Isaac[]).

***

13. Mother’s diagnosis could potentially impact [Children],
making them believe they are ill when they are not.
(Testimony from Dr. Suzanne Blix).

14. [M.S.] has demonstrated behaviors of exaggerating his
medical condition. For example, [M.S.] has repeatedly
asked for cough drops while at school, despite not being ill.
[M.S.] has also stated that he needs to go to the hospital for
injuries such as a scraped knee or paper cut. (Testimony from
Jennifer Pollitt).

***

20. Father has stated to [M.S.’s] foster mother that he is not able
to parent [Children] by himself. (Testimony from Jill Isaac[]).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A01-1505-JT-337 | March 9, 2016 Page 14 of 20
 21. [Children’s court-appointed special advocate (CASA)]
expressed concerns that Father has not stepped up as the
primary caregiver for [Children], but has actually decreased
the amount of time he is in the home since the CHINS case
was initiated. (Testimony from Sheri Black).

(Mother’s Br. pp. 6-11; Father’s Br. pp. 23-26; Father’s App. pp.1422-23) (italics

in original).

[29] After careful review of the record, we find that these findings were supported by

the evidence. In fact, the trial court cited and italicized the exact source for

each of these findings in its order. Parents’ arguments basically amount to their

explanation of the circumstances surrounding each of these findings, and thus

constitute a request for us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. C.B.,

985 N.E.2d at 345.

[30] In addition to their objections to the specific findings, Parents generally

challenge Findings 2-8, 10-13, and 15-19 of the trial court’s order arguing that

the trial court improperly considered these facts because they were based on

behavior that occurred at least one year prior to the termination hearing.

Parents cite to In re E.M. to support their claim stating that our supreme court

directed the trial courts to “focus on a parent’s current behavior and fitness at

the time of the termination hearing.” (Mother’s Br. p. 10; Father’s Br. p. 26);

see In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642-43. We disagree. A reading of In re E.M.

clarifies that our supreme court did not stop there, but continued to state that

there needs to be balancing of a parent’s recent improvements against “habitual

patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A01-1505-JT-337 | March 9, 2016 Page 15 of 20
 future neglect or deprivation.” Id. at 643. Our supreme court entrusted that

delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent’s prior

history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. Id.

That is exactly what the trial court did in the present case. In its findings, the

trial court not only focused on Parents’ behavior shortly prior to the termination

hearing, but the trial court also properly took into consideration Parents’

historical pattern of conduct, which included multiple instances of neglect and

threats to Children’s safety. The trial court properly weighed more heavily on

Parents’ prior history than their recent efforts made in response to the

termination proceedings.

[31] Nonetheless, even if we assume that the above findings, given the

circumstances surrounding them, were not accurate, it would not necessarily

establish reversible error. Parents would still be required to establish that the

record contains no facts to support the challenged findings either directly or

indirectly. See C.B., 985 N.E.2d at 348 (a parent failed to show reversible error;

a finding is clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support

it directly or by inference). Parents fail to do that.

Our review of the record indicates that Parents were provided with two years of

numerous services to improve their parenting skills. However, they failed to

demonstrate any substantial and lasting improvements. At the time of the

termination hearing, Parents still needed prompting at every visit, Mother

continued to struggle with providing supervision and discipline to Children, and

Father had not taken the initiative to parent Children in the role of the primary

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A01-1505-JT-337 | March 9, 2016 Page 16 of 20
 caregiver, as was necessary to safeguard Children. Furthermore, the evidence

reveals that Mother failed to follow visitation guidelines to ensure Children’s

safety, and Father made only minimal progress in intervening to correct

Mother’s inappropriate behaviors. While Parents have complied with the case

plan, they have failed to demonstrate consistent improvement in their ability to

keep Children safe. Father gained some insight into Mother’s factitious

disorder, but he failed to improve his ability to intervene and keep Children

safe. Mother made only partial progress in therapy to address her factitious

disorder.

[32] Turning to the second step in our analysis, we conclude that the trial court’s

extensive findings were sufficient to clearly and convincingly support the

judgment. In addition to the trial court specific findings, there were testimonies

and recommendations by multiple parties involved in this case. DCS and Dr.

Blix remained doubtful that Mother could overcome her factitious disorder.

Indeed, Dr. Blix specifically testified that it was unlikely that Mother would

change. Dr. Blix clearly stated that because of Mother’s factitious disorder,

Children were still at extreme risk for neglect.

[33] CASA Sheri Black (CASA Black) expressed her concerns that not only Father

had not stepped up as the primary caregiver for Children, but he had actually

decreased the amount of time he spent home since the start of the CHINS case.

Moreover, FCM Melissa Sparks opined that there was a reasonable probability

that Parents would not remedy the reasons underlying Children’s removal

because Parents had not alleviated the issues of neglect and supervision. While

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A01-1505-JT-337 | March 9, 2016 Page 17 of 20
 it is also true that some of the service-providers did not recommend the

termination of Parents’ parental rights, we reiterate that we only consider those

findings that support the trial court’s decision. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of

Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 198 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Accordingly, we

hold that DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions

which led to Children’s removal would not be remedied. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4.

B. Children’s Best Interests

[34] Further, Parents contend that DCS did not present clear and convincing

evidence that termination was in Children’s best interests. We are mindful that

in considering whether termination of one’s parental rights is in the best

interests of a child, the trial court is required to look beyond the factors

identified by DCS and look to the totality of the evidence. McBride, 798 N.E.2d

at 203. In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the parent

to those of the child involved. Id. “A parent’s historical inability to provide a

suitable environment along with the parent’s current inability to do the same

supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of

the children.” Lang v. Starke Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 861 N.E.2d 366,

373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. “Permanency is a central consideration

in determining the best interests of a child.” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1265. In

this vein, we have previously determined that the testimony of CASA regarding

the child’s need for permanency supports a finding that termination is in

the child’s best interests. McBride, 798 N.E.2d at 203; see also Matter of M.B., 666

N.E .2d 73, 79 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A01-1505-JT-337 | March 9, 2016 Page 18 of 20
[35] Here, Parents demonstrated their inability to provide a suitable environment for

Children. Parents neglected Children on numerous occasions and placed them

in danger. For example, there were several instances when Children were

found by the police and returned to Parents. Parents did not attempt to search

for the missing children or call the police. There was an incident when Children

got on the rooftop and neither parent was aware of that. Parents tried

to remedy the conditions, but had very limited success. Moreover, some of

their remedies—e.g., removing the door knobs inside their residence and

padlocking the front door—were clearly unsafe.

[36] Further, CASA Black testified that despite the fact that “[Children] and

[Parents] are bonded, [Children] do need a permanency in their lives and they

need safety and assurance … for their future.” (Tr. p. 540). CASA Black also

stated that the termination of Parents’ parental rights would be in Children’s

best interests. In addition to CASA Black’s testimony, service-provider

Gwendolyn Brotherton also testified that given Children’s ages, it was not in

their best interests for permanency to be “put off” any longer. (Tr. p. 662).

Therefore, we conclude that the totality of the evidence supports the trial court’s

decision that termination of Parents’ parental rights was in Children’s best

interests.

C. Satisfactory Plan for Care and Treatment

[37] Parents finally claim DCS’ adoption plan is not satisfactory because it would

rupture the bond between the siblings. Parents argue that it would have “long

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A01-1505-JT-337 | March 9, 2016 Page 19 of 20
 lasting effects” on Children. (Mother’s Br. p. 22; Father’s Br. pp. 36-37).

However, they fail to provide any evidence or authority to support their

argument. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (each contention must be

supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, or the record). As such,

Parents waive their argument on appeal. See also, In re Adoption of M.S., 10

N.E.3d 1272, 1282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (failure to state a cogent argument

results in its waiver on appeal). Waiver notwithstanding, we have repeatedly

stated that adoption is a “satisfactory plan” for the care and treatment of a child

under the termination of parental rights statute. In re B.M., 913 N.E.2d 1283,

1287 (Ind. Ct App. 2009) (emphasis added). Because Children require

permanency and because DCS established a plan for Children’s adoption,

which would not necessarily involve their complete separation,6 we find

Parents’ argument unpersuasive.

CONCLUSION

[38] Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court’s termination of Parents’

parental rights to Children was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

[39] Affirmed.

[40] Najam, J. and May, J. concur

6
See, e.g., I.C. § 31-19-16.5-1 (allowing postadoption sibling contact).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A01-1505-JT-337 | March 9, 2016 Page 20 of 20