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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
TODD O. REEDER
Appellant No. 977 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 21, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-31-CR-0000627-2013
BEFORE: MUNDY, J., DUBOW, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED MARCH 09, 2016
Appellant, Todd O. Reeder, appeals from the May 21, 2015 aggregate
judgment of sentence of three and a half to twelve years’ incarceration,
imposed after the trial court convicted Appellant of robbery, theft by
unlawful taking, possession of a weapon, and simple assault.1 Upon review,
we affirm.
The certified record reveals that Appellant was arrested and charged
with the aforementioned crimes arising from the armed robbery of a Rite-Aid
Pharmacy in Mount Union Borough, Pennsylvania, on November 19, 2013.
Appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion on May 20, 2014, in which, inter
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701, 3921, 907 and 2701, respectively.
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alia, he sought to suppress statements he made to police on November 21,
2013, on the basis that he was “highly intoxicated.” On October 16, 2014,
the trial court convened an evidentiary hearing, and subsequently issued an
order denying Appellant’s motion to suppress. On January 21, 2015, the
trial court filed a memorandum in support of its order denying suppression.
The case proceeded to a bench trial on March 17, 2015, after which the trial
court rendered its guilty verdicts. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an
aggregate sentence of three and a half to twelve years of incarceration on
May 21, 2015.
Appellant filed a timely appeal on June 9, 2015. The following day, the
trial court ordered Appellant to comply with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 1925(b). Appellant filed his concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal on June 29, 2015, and the trial court filed a
responsive memorandum on July 9, 2015, in which it referenced its January
21, 2015 memorandum, stating it was “satisfied that in that adjudication we
adequately explained our reason for denying the motion to suppress.”
Memorandum, 7/9/15, at 3.
On appeal, Appellant presents his suppression issue for our review as
follows.
1. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion
in denying Appellant’s Motion to Suppress statements
made upon his arrest?
Appellant’s Brief at 5.
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Appellant specifically contends that the statements he made to police
should have been suppressed because “the police impermissibly questioned
him” when “he was too intoxicated to legally waive his rights to remain
silent.” Id. at 9.
Our standard of review from an order denying a suppression motion is
as follows.
[W]e may consider only the Commonwealth’s
evidence and so much of the evidence for the
defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the
context of the record as a whole. Where the record
supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are
bound by those facts and may reverse only if the
legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
Commonwealth v. Russo, 934 A.2d 1199, 1203 (Pa. 2007) (citation
omitted).2
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2
Our Supreme Court recently clarified our scope of review when considering
a challenge to a trial court’s suppression ruling as it relates to “the extent of
the record that the appellate court consults when conducting that
review.” In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1080 (Pa. 2013). The Supreme Court
held that such review is limited to the suppression hearing record, and “it is
inappropriate to consider trial evidence as a matter of course, because it is
simply not part of the suppression record, absent a finding that such
evidence was unavailable during the suppression hearing.” Id. at
1085. Because prior cases held that a reviewing court could consider the
trial record in addition to the suppression record, our Supreme Court
determined that the more limited scope announced in In re L.J. would apply
prospectively to cases where the suppression hearing occurred after October
30, 2013. Id. at 1088-1089. Instantly, the subject suppression hearing
was held on October 16, 2014. Accordingly, our scope of review is confined
to the suppression hearing record.
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Here, our independent review of the record reveals that four witnesses
testified at the suppression hearing. The Commonwealth called
Pennsylvania State Trooper Michael Davis, while Appellant called two of his
attorneys and took the stand on his own behalf.
Trooper Davis testified to responding to a call “that the Rite Aid in
Mount Union had been robbed by an individual wearing a mask, brandishing
a gun.” N.T., 10/16/14, at 6. Trooper Davis received a tip that Appellant
was a “person of interest,” and obtained a search warrant for Appellant’s
home, where police found evidence “linking [Appellant] to the robbery.” Id.
Appellant was “taken into custody and transported back to state police
Huntington where he was met by [Attorney] Newfield of the Public
Defender’s Office.” Id. at 6-7. After Appellant met with Attorney Newfield,
he was interviewed by Trooper Davis and Trooper Aungst. Id. at 7. Trooper
Davis testified that prior to interviewing Appellant, he “read the whole
Miranda to him.” Id. Trooper Davis further stated that Appellant “relayed
that he understood and chose to speak with me.” Id. Trooper Davis
proceeded to interview Appellant in the presence of Attorney Newfield. Id.
Trooper Davis described Appellant’s demeanor as follows.
[TROOPER DAVIS:] He was cognizant of his
surroundings. He knew where he was. While we
were on scene at his house, we attempted to speak
with him there. At that point he requested an
attorney so we set up the meeting with Mr. Newfield
for that night. He had the presence of mind to ask
for an attorney.
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THE COURT: Was he intoxicated?
[TROOPER DAVIS:] I would say that he
was under the influence of some pills, but I don’t
think he was intoxicated to the degree that he could
not make a sound decision.
[COMMONWEALTH:]
Q. What indicia of intoxication did you
notice?
A: Pinpoint pupils.
Q: Was he staggering?
A: No.
Q: Slurring his words?
A: No.
Q: Did he seem aware and lucid during the
interview?
A: Yes, he did.
Id. at 7-8.
Trooper Davis added that Appellant had the dexterity to write his
signature, and did not slur his words or seem confused. Id. at 9. He further
testified that he did not think that Appellant was under the influence of
alcohol, and did not smell any alcohol. Id. at 10. Trooper Davis could not
recall Appellant saying anything about being under the influence during the
interview, although Appellant did mention “during his interview at the
barracks of how intoxicated he was during the robbery itself.” Id. at 11.
Next, Appellant waived his attorney-client privilege and called Attorney
Nicholas Newfield, who testified to being a public defender and meeting with
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Appellant prior to his interview with police. Attorney Newfield stated, “When
I first walked in the room, when I first walked in, he said he planned on
talking to the police and if I was going to tell him otherwise, I can leave
now. … I told him, ‘Relax. Let me talk to you. Sit down. Let’s just kind of
talk between me and you.’” Id. at 14. Attorney Newfield further explained,
“First I told him talk to me and then we will go from there. Just tried to get
him to kind of ease down and give me information or at least talk to me as
his counsel and we will see where it goes from there. I think I did a good
job of having him just talk to me about it.” Id. at 15. Attorney Newfield
“told him wait until Tuesday. I assumed there would be a preliminary
hearing the following week. … I said, ‘Let me go out and talk to the D.A. to
see if we can get some kind of offer if you’re gonna talk.’” Id. at 16.
Specifically, Attorney Newfield advised Appellant as follows.
I told him not to [talk to the police]. I advised
him it would be better just to wait until Tuesday and
sleep on it, think about it, give [him] some more
time. At that time point he was still adamant on
speaking. … He said he was talking. He said, again,
if I told him not to, I could leave now; he didn’t need
me there; he was going to talk to them and give
them a statement.
Id. at 16-17.
Regarding Appellant’s demeanor, Attorney Newfield described
Appellant as “appearing tired.” Id. at 17. He said “[t]hat stood out more so
than anything. He just appeared tired. Speaking-wise, though, we were
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able to hold a conversation. He understood what I was explaining to him.
Coherent.” Id.
Appellant next waived his attorney-client privilege and called Attorney
Jennifer Habel, who also was a public defender, and who had been appointed
to represent Appellant at his preliminary hearing. Id. at 20. Attorney Habel
testified that Appellant “was very adamant that he did not want Attorney
Newfield to be with him for that particular pre-trial conference … and
[Appellant] was extremely upset at Attorney Newfield because he believed
that he had been promised State Intermediate Punishment and that was the
reason he gave a statement. … [Appellant] said he was extremely messed
up that night. … I believe he had been a heavy [drug] user for a number of
years, and he was coming off of something.” Id. at 22-23. Attorney Habel
explained as follows.
He was very angry at Attorney Newfield during
that meeting. That might have been his exact
words. He has said to me on numerous occasions he
believed he was extremely messed up. I wasn’t
there. Any conversation I have had with Attorney
Newfield was that he believed he was fine.
Id. at 23.
Lastly, Appellant testified that he was “absolutely” under the influence
of “Xanax, Adderall, percoset and heroin” when he made his statements to
police. Id. at 24-25. He claimed to have ingested “at least 10 pills” before
he “walked out to see the police.” Id. at 25. Appellant testified he had been
using drugs “all that day.” Id. He stated that he “wasn’t coherent” and
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“had no recollection of what actually happened.” Id. at 26. Appellant
averred, “I was extremely messed up. My level of intoxication was very
high. It’s possibly been the highest ever in my life.” Id. at 27. Appellant
elaborated as follows.
I really don’t recall even speaking to Trooper
Davis. I don’t recall speaking to Mr. Newfield. I
don’t recall the investigation as it happened that
night. The one thing I do recall is having a police
officer asking me a question over my shoulder and
me realizing I was speaking to the police and me
stating I shouldn’t be speaking to anybody right now
I’m so messed up on Xanax, percoset, Adderall; I
haven’t slept in days; I shouldn’t be speaking to
anybody.
And that’s when I saw a person who I later
found out was Mr. Newfield stand up, put his arms in
the air, and tell me, “But I can get you SIP.” And I
remember looking up and seeing District Justice Wilt
and a court reporter, and that is my entire
recollection of the night I was arrested.
Id. at 27-28.
After hearing from the four witnesses, the trial court denied Appellant’s
suppression motion, stating that it would “file written findings and
conclusions after the preparation of a transcript.” Id. at 32. On January 21,
2015, the trial court filed its memorandum in which it credited the testimony
of Trooper Davis and Attorney Newfield, and concluded that Appellant “had
sufficient mental capacity at the time of giving his statement to know what
he was saying and to have voluntarily intended to say it.” Memorandum,
1/21/15, at 6, citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 291 A.2d 103 (Pa. 1971).
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It is clear from our review that the trial court as factfinder did not
abuse its discretion in accepting as credible the testimony of Trooper Davis
and Attorney Newfield. As detailed above, the trial court’s factual findings
are supported by the record. Furthermore, the trial court’s legal conclusions
are not erroneous. Russo, supra. We have explained as follows.
[T]he law in Pennsylvania pertaining to the waiver of
Miranda warnings while intoxicated is well-settled:
The fact that an accused has been drinking
does not automatically invalidate his
subsequent incriminating statements. The test
is whether he had sufficient mental capacity at
the time of giving his statement to know what
he was saying and to have voluntarily intended
to say it. Recent imbibing or the existence of a
hangover does not make his confession
inadmissible, but goes only to the weight to be
accorded to it.
Commonwealth v. Adams, 385 Pa.Super. 513, 561
A.2d 793, 795 (1989) (citation omitted). “[W]hen
evidence of impairment is present, it is for the
suppression court to decide whether the
Commonwealth has established by a preponderance
of the evidence that the suspect nonetheless had
sufficient cognitive awareness to understand the
Miranda warnings and to choose to waive his
rights.” Commonwealth v. Britcher, 386 Pa.Super.
515, 563 A.2d 502, 507 (1989) (citations omitted).
Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1137-38 (Pa. Super. 2009)
(footnote omitted), appeal denied, 987 A.2d 161 (Pa. 2009).
Based on the foregoing, we find no merit to Appellant’s claim that the
trial court erred and abused its discretion in determining that Appellant had
sufficient mental capacity when he made his statements, and thus denying
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Appellant’s suppression motion. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment
of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/9/2016
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