MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Mar 11 2016, 6:52 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Leanna Weissmann Gregory F. Zoeller
Lawrenceburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Tyler G. Banks
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Douglas Blankenship, March 11, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
15A01-1508-CR-1158
v. Appeal from the Dearborn
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Jonathan N.
Appellee-Plaintiff Cleary, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
15D01-1304-FD-226
Crone, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Douglas Blankenship appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation. The
sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court abused its
discretion when it revoked Blankenship’s probation and ordered him to serve
the remainder of his entire suspended sentence. Finding no abuse of discretion,
we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] The State charged Blankenship with one count of class D felony theft and one
count of class D felony receiving stolen property. In October 2013,
Blankenship pled guilty to the theft charge in exchange for dismissal of the
receiving stolen property charge. The trial court sentenced Blankenship to 1095
days in prison, with 915 days suspended to probation.
[3] On October 8, 2014, the State filed an amended request for a probation
violation hearing alleging that Blankenship violated his probation by failing two
drug screens. During a revocation hearing held on October 15, 2014,
Blankenship admitted to the probation violation and the trial court imposed 180
days of his previously suspended sentence. Then, on March 4, 2015, the State
filed a second request for a probation violation hearing alleging that
Blankenship had failed another drug screen and also was terminated from his
court-ordered drug treatment program due to his failure to attend sessions.
Blankenship admitted to the probation violations, and the trial court imposed
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the remainder (735 days) of his previously suspended sentence. This appeal
ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[4] “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which
a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind.
2007). It is within the trial court’s discretion to determine the conditions of
probation and to revoke probation if those conditions are violated. Heaton v.
State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013). We review a trial court’s decision to
revoke probation for an abuse of discretion. Ripps v. State, 968 N.E.2d 323, 326
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012). An abuse of discretion occurs when the court’s decision is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the
court. Id. We neither reweigh evidence nor reassess witness credibility, and we
consider only the evidence favorable to the trial court’s judgment. Id.
[5] A trial court’s subsequent sentencing decisions following a revocation of
probation are also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Sparks v. State, 983
N.E.2d 221, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Once the court has concluded that
probation has been violated, it may continue the defendant on probation,
extend the probationary period for not more than one year beyond the original
period, or order all or part of the previously suspended sentence to be executed.
Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h)(3). Where a trial court has exercised its grace in
granting a defendant probation rather than incarceration, it has considerable
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leeway in deciding how to proceed when the defendant then violates the
conditions of his probation. Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188.
[6] Blankenship contends that the imposition of his entire suspended sentence was
unwarranted because he “presented himself to the court as a drug addict eager
to treat his problem.” Appellant’s Br. at 8. Blankenship directs us to his self-
serving testimony during the second revocation hearing in which he claims that
he is ready, able, and willing to participate in treatment to combat his
addiction. However, Blankenship’s behavior belies his claim, and it is the trial
court’s prerogative, not ours, to assess his credibility on this issue. This was
Blankenship’s second probation violation in this cause, and the trial court had
ample basis for determining that imposition of the entire suspended sentence
was proper since its prior attempt at a lesser sanction had proven wholly
unsuccessful. The object of probationary terms and conditions is to ensure that
probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation. If a probationer
repeatedly violates probation terms, as is the case with Blankenship, the very
purpose of probation is defeated. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that
the trial court abused its discretion in revoking Blankenship’s probation and
ordering him to serve his entire suspended sentence.
[7] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.
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